THE “PERSISTENCE TO KEEP EVERLASTINGLY AT IT”

FUND-RAISING AND PHILANTHROPY AT CHICAGO OVER THE LAST 130 YEARS

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Today’s report on the past, present, and future of philanthropy at the University of Chicago revisits the topic of an essay that I first published in 2004. As I argued then, the philanthropic engagement of parents, friends, and, above all, alumni is vital to the long-term financial integrity of the arts and sciences and must be considered with respect to the resources that we commit to the undergraduate experience and how we communicate with students. It is not a matter that we resolve and lay to rest during campaigns, but rather an integral part of the stewarding of the University community to which we are privileged to belong.

Yet that particular moment in 2004, much like today, came during an ambitious campaign of great consequence for the health of the University, and it reflected historically specific concerns about the place of the College in the University’s fund-raising efforts. At the time, the College had just reached the enrollment target of 4,500 students that was set with no small amount of controversy during the administration of President Hugo F. Sonneschein, and we were beginning to adjust to the various needs for student services and support, as well as teaching, tutoring, and curricular resources that came with the expanded undergraduate presence. These
initiatives were costly, and we could not see them through without the solid support of our alumni, faculty, and administration. As we expanded resources for career services, study abroad, residential life, advising, and many other areas, I argued that the increased enrollment was necessary to sustain the eminence of the University well into the future, not only through the provision of tuition dollars, but through the strengthening of the University’s long-term philanthropic capacity. The existence of first-class support mechanisms and opportunities for learning and serving beyond the classroom were key to the development of our students as engaged, global citizens. To the extent that we attended to the current welfare of the College and vital domains of student life, we could protect and enrich the future welfare of the College and the University as a whole.

Yet the story that I recounted in the report from 2004 was in many ways dispiriting. One prominent educational leader—not an alumnus, but a strong friend of the University who knew something about its history—visited my office shortly after the monograph had been published and told me it was one of the most depressing documents about higher education in America that he had ever read. It brought to light the historical disregard of the University toward fund-raising in general and toward its College alumni in particular. By contrast to our peers, the University had been reliant for many decades on the availability of extraordinary grants from foundations and individual donors (largely in New York City) that rendered the building of bridges with its alumni base unnecessary. I wrote on the topic of philanthropy in 2004 to demonstrate the profound consequences of this legacy, to advocate for a more central role for the College and its alumni in the campaign, and to engage directly with alumni on behalf of the College. For the University to sustain its greatness, the alumni would have to become the principal stewards of our community.

Now, fourteen years later, many of the problems that I highlighted in the report have been addressed with a creativity and comprehensiveness that, until recently, would have seemed unrealistic. We have engaged robustly with more senior alumni, but even more encouragingly, we have seen successively higher rates of philanthropic participation from younger alumni who have been the immediate beneficiaries of investments in the College. Our work with parents, which was nonexistent as late as ten years ago, has blossomed into a series of supportive relationships that have proven of great value to the College and our students. Our alumni participation rate of 40 percent for the current campaign places us near the top of our peer group in the Ivy Plus, and many individual alumni have become passionate supporters of specific causes within the College, such as the Odyssey Scholarship Program, Metcalf Internships, and opportunities for study and research at our international centers. The contributions of the College and the achievements of its alumni figure crucially as the University articulates its work to the public, and the College has played a central role in our ongoing Inquiry and Impact Campaign.

The role of philanthropy thus remains central and invites reconsideration today in light of the very different College and national context for higher education that face us. This fall, we welcome a College of more than 6,500 students to our campus. We take pride that this body is more diverse, accomplished, and committed to the College than anyone imagined in 2004, and that it features a much greater range of student ambitions, interests, and self-generated activities. Our colleagues provide these students with rigorous and transformative teaching and research experiences, but also with a broad network of services for community support, financial aid, health and wellness, and professional development, all reflecting vital needs represented in this student body.

The role of philanthropy in American higher education is sometimes
caught up in parallel discussions of other legitimate issues of academic freedom, the public good and fairness, and the efficacy of liberal education, which are themselves bonded to the mission of universities. At some campuses nationwide, we have seen objections to the niche designations of some large gifts tied to very real concerns about rising student debt and tuition costs.1 At older, elite institutions, alumni solicitations can also be linked to the defense of customary traditions and intellectual narratives that younger faculty and students either do not value or even fully understand. In some cases, this has discouraged the giving of older alumni, who feel that their alma maters have lost the qualities they valued in their experience and doubt that their gifts will have desired outcomes.2 Finally, the historical problem of donors and foundations who seek influence over core issues of academic governance and appointments warrants continued attention, particularly when these efforts have explicit ideological agendas.3

These are important questions about the proper function of philanthropy in the modern university. Our conversations about these matters need to take place within a framework that acknowledges the institution’s core values and traditions, but also the particular historical experience of each university with the modalities of fund-raising, with the evolution of alumni sentiment about the efficacy of the work of the university, and with the relationship of giving to the specific programs that inform the institution’s identity. What I propose to do in this report is to provide a historical overview of the practices and traditions of fund-raising at the University of Chicago from the beginnings to the present. The current campaign rests within this longer, open-ended story, and it, too, will have a significant impact on the future well-being of the College and the University. To properly understand the campaign and our present situation, we need to understand our own history with philanthropy and the larger context in which past fund-raising campaigns took place. Successful campaigns have always required universities to engage wide sectors of American society. Many universities—and particularly this university—think of themselves as permanent institutions that operate outside the bustle of the world, changing slowly and only according to their own, internally generated desires and wishes. Yet philanthropy brings them in touch with contemporary life and forces them to appeal for support from an array of human and corporate actors—many of whom are alumni, while others are essentially strangers.

Financing and organizing a university in 2018 is a different enterprise from organizing and financing one in 1918. For example, like many of our sister institutions, the University of Chicago today is much more dependent on tuition revenue and on philanthropy than it was in 1900 or 1925. In 1925 tuition constituted less than 33 percent of the University’s budget, whereas endowment revenue provided 43 percent. Even at the end of the Depression in 1938–39 tuition revenues only covered 42 percent of the University of Chicago’s annual budget. By contrast, since


1985 almost 60 percent of the unrestricted revenue of Chicago has derived from tuition and fees (not including the Division of the Biological Sciences and the Pritzker School of Medicine), whereas endowment and other fund-raising income provides only 15 percent. Moreover, as Fig. 1 reveals, the University is now heavily dependent on unrestricted budgetary support from the College and the Booth School of Business, neither of which played such central roles in University financing before 1980.

The national context in which philanthropy takes place for private universities and other successful nonprofit institutions in America has also changed. Foundation giving has become far more targeted and less inclined to support the ongoing activities that constitute the core work of universities. Between 1949 and 1965 the Ford Foundation provided the University of Chicago with well over $50 million ($425 million in 2018 dollars), much of it as gifts that could be used for general faculty salary support and other key institutional priorities. In contrast, between 1989 and 2003 the Ford Foundation gave total gifts to the University of less than $10 million, most of which were focused on specific research projects. Corporate giving has also become more focused on support for specific institutional sectors within universities. Nowadays corporations are less inclined to provide general support for the core activities of the university, and more likely to insist on designating their gifts to business schools or other instructional programs that have an instrumental value to the corporations themselves.

As another indicator of how much has changed, most universities look to their alumni not only as a source of annual giving but also as a primary source of major and principal gifts. It is a general rule in higher-education philanthropy that the undergraduate alumni of a university are likely to be among the most enthusiastic, dedicated, and generous of an institution’s donors. Chicago faces some interesting challenges on this score. Our fund-raising opportunities today are limited because we have several decades of “missing” undergraduate alumni, i.e., those students who did not enroll and who thus did not fill the University’s own, publicly stated enrollment targets in the 1950s through the 1980s. In all, our current undergraduate alumni body totals about fifty thousand. Yet if we had welcomed first-year classes appropriate for a College of five thousand students between 1965 and 2000, which is the enrollment level that Chancellor Lawrence Kimpton recommended and that the Board of Trustees approved in 1954, we would now have tens of thousands of additional alumni, and many would be in the crucial giving years of forty to seventy years of age. Fig. 2 and 3 capture the impact of these missing alumni from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, showing that we will not have the same size undergraduate alumni population that Yale—an institution
Figure 2. Projection of Total Alumni Counts: IVY Plus Comparison

The relative size of Chicago’s undergraduate alumni population is growing and is projected to outpace many of our peers in the next thirty years.

Figure 3. Total University of Chicago Alumni by School

The College has fifty thousand living alumni and is projected to again have the largest alumni network at the University of Chicago by 2041.

Projected Living Alumni, 1978-2048

*Division: Biological Sciences, Humanities, Physical Sciences, and Social Sciences

**Professional Schools: Booth (full-time program only), Divinity, Law, Pritzker Medicine, Harris Public Policy, and Social Service Administration
and College of comparable size—enjoys until the year 2050. The loss of tuition income and subsequent gifts represented by these tens of thousands of “missing” undergraduate students compounded other budget problems facing the University between 1950 and 1980 and slowed the growth of our endowment compared to those of our peers.

The broader context of these trends is revealed in Fig. 4 and 5, which show the comparative standing of our endowment against peer institutions and our progress in inflation-adjusted fund-raising receipts by decade. As late as 1958 Chicago was reasonably competitive in endowment size compared to the other top universities in the United States, but since the 1960s our comparative position has declined. This trend happened in part because of our smaller base of undergraduate alumni donors at the University since 1950.

We must bear these challenges in mind as we survey the practices and traditions of fund-raising at the University, because the University’s current financial resources and opportunities for still greater scholarly luster are constrained by structural realities that originate deep in our history in the twentieth century. Even so, the history of philanthropy at Chicago offers not one, but multiple stories, since it inevitably touches upon a host of different institutional areas and problems in our common history. Let me be clear at the outset: the fundamental purpose of our university is and always has been scientific discovery and teaching, and our record in both domains over the last 130 years is nothing less than astonishing. We are a remarkable university, one of few truly distinguished universities in the world. But continued excellence in both domains requires steady access to significant financial resources. Philanthropy was and is one obvious way to attain those resources. Hence, I will conclude my report with some reflections on our current situation, as we seek to raise $5 billion for the current capital campaign.
The earliest period of the University’s history is unique in its profound dependence on civic generosity by individual donors, many of whom had no specific prior connection to the cause of higher education in Chicago. Civic pride, personal contacts, the urgency of William Rainey Harper’s pleadings, inter-elite sociability, and the desire to honor deceased spouses—all had a powerful effect in helping to establish the University. Alumni played no significant role, nor did foundations or corporations.

The reborn University was based on two fund-raising strategies: an appeal to John D. Rockefeller and a parallel campaign for local Chicago support. The first fund-raising done on behalf of the University of Chicago was Thomas Goodspeed’s urgent personal lobbying of John D. Rockefeller to support the cause of a reborn university in Chicago. Beginning in April 1886 Goodspeed became a one-man lobbying firm on behalf of a cause that, so he insisted to Rockefeller, was “of incalculable importance to the denomination and the cause of Christ.” With the able assistance of Frederick T. Gates, the corresponding secretary of the American Baptist Education Society who eventually became a trusted adviser to Rockefeller, Goodspeed’s invocations of man and God were successful in persuading Rockefeller to pledge a matching grant of $600,000 in


5. Goodspeed to Rockefeller, unpublished letter, filed in “Reminiscences of Thomas Wakefield Goodspeed,” 264, Thomas W. Goodspeed Papers. The archival materials cited in this report are located in the Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.
May 1889 to start the process of establishing a new college on the South Side of Chicago.  

Rockefeller’s pledge was contingent on the Chicago Baptists raising an additional $400,000 within one year. The first fund-raising campaign on the University’s behalf thus became a door-to-door subscription drive undertaken by Thomas Goodspeed and Frederick Gates. The University archives still own the original subscription books and forms used by Goodspeed and Gates as they urgently sought support in the Baptist community to meet Rockefeller’s pledge with an additional $400,000. 

The eager advocates contacted over one thousand people, gaining 1,081 contributions as small as $1 and as large as $50,000. One hundred and one subscriptions were for $1,000 or more, most of the rest were below $500, and a large number was in the $1 to $25 range. Gates later remembered this year as “the most disagreeable, depressing, anxious work of my life.” But so effective was Gates as a fund-raiser that he was asked by others for advice, which he put in a modest “how-to manual,” which was subsequently rediscovered during the Hutchins administration and reprinted in 1937 and again in 1966 and 1991, the latter under the title of Keep Absolutely and Serenely Good Humored: A Memorandum on Fund Raising. 

After months of urgent solicitations among the Baptists in Chicago and across the nation, Goodspeed and Gates widened the circle of potential donors to include more established members of Chicago’s business and civic elite. Charles L. Hutchinson and Martin A. Ryerson played crucial mediating roles in enlarging the focus of fund-raising, and by late May 1890 Goodspeed and Gates had the money needed to match Rockefeller’s original pledge.

Up to the First World War, John D. Rockefeller was the principal—if often ambivalent—donor to the University, contributing a total of $35 million by 1910. Rockefeller’s largesse came in stages, with Harper chronically unable to live within the University’s income and constantly having to prevail upon Rockefeller to cover his deficits with additional gifts. In addition to Rockefeller, however, the University merited considerable support from prominent Chicago business families. Silas Cobb gave $150,000 for the first building on campus, a lecture hall. Martin A. Ryerson, the long-serving chairman of the Board of Trustees who played a crucial political role in legitimizing Harper’s work among his fellow Chicago civic leaders, contributed $225,000 toward a physics building, named in honor of his father; while Sidney Kent gave $235,000 for a chemistry building; and Mary Beecher, Elizabeth Kelly, Nancy Foster, and Henrietta Snell each gave $50,000 for residence halls. Annie Hitchcock provided $200,000 for a residence hall, Leon Mandel $85,000 for an assembly hall, Caroline Haskell $100,000 for an Oriental museum, George Walker $120,000 for a museum of natural history, Mrs. Joseph Reynolds $100,000 for a student clubhouse, and A. C. Bartlett $150,000 for a men’s gymnasium, and so on. Since Rockefeller insisted that most of his gifts be used for endowment or operations, it was the Chicago contingent, led by individuals like Kent and Ryerson, who gave most of the first buildings on the Quadrangles.


7. See box 1, Subscriptions for Contributions to the University of Chicago, Records 1889–1906. Several of the largest original donors were unable to meet their pledges. Goodspeed was forced to draft dunning letters, asking people in the most polite way to honor their pledges.


9. Lists of the early major gifts are in Goodspeed, History, 184, 274, 281; and Record of Pledges for University of Chicago, 1890–1906.
What passed for fund-raising in these years, beyond Harper’s continual entreaties to Rockefeller, assumed two forms. On the one hand, Harper and Goodspeed continued to solicit members of Chicago’s civic and social elite, urging the cause of the new university. When Harper called on Henrietta Snell, seeking additional support beyond the men’s residence hall she had already agreed to, she told her housekeeper: “That is Dr. Harper. Don’t let me see him. He’ll make me give him some money for the University.” On the other hand, the young institution profited from extraordinary donations that came out of the blue and that were not the result of prior solicitations. Helen Culver’s gift of $820,000 in December 1895 to support the construction of buildings and research and teaching in the biological sciences was an example of such fortuitous largesse, generated by the self-sustaining enthusiasm that the early University encouraged in many local citizens.

Gradually the initial momentum associated with the founding of the University subsided, and Harper’s last years were marked by frustration on Rockefeller’s part over Harper’s spendthrift ways and seeming inability to raise additional funds locally to meet his ever-rising ambitions. In his unpublished memoirs, Goodspeed reflected that Harper had misjudged Rockefeller and might have gained even more support had he been willing to move more cautiously:

It sometimes seemed as though Dr. Harper was deliberately forcing the Founder’s hand and had adapted this as a thoroughly considered and permanent policy. It led to very unhappy consequences for Dr. Harper, as will appear later in this narrative, but I do not think the question can ever be decided. The matter made something of a breach between Dr. Harper and me. But I would not like to say that he consciously adopted the policy of rapid expansion with the deliberate purpose of forcing the Founder’s hand and extorting from him ever increasing millions, although this was in fact the result of the policy pursued…. Did Dr. Harper pursue the really wise course? Was the method of extorting gifts from the Founder by what seemed like compulsion the best method? Was this the only way in which the great immediate success and growth of the University could have been attained?”

When Harper died in early 1906, the board chose as his successor Harry Pratt Judson. Judson’s great accomplishment was to balance the budget, and for this the trustees and Rockefeller were extremely grateful. Responding to Judson’s fiscal probity, Rockefeller solved the deficit problem (at least temporarily) with several massive additional gifts to the endowment between 1906 and 1910, concluding with Rockefeller’s final gift of $10 million in December 1910. These gifts essentially capitalized the structural deficit and allowed the University to bring order to its

10. Memorandum by J. H. Tufts, box 1, folder 22, James Hayden Tufts Papers. Thomas Goodspeed later recalled that face-to-face fund-raising solicitations were difficult for Harper: “He admitted to his family that he sometimes turned back from a door where he knew he must ask for money, to seek fresh courage for the interview.” Thomas Wakefield Goodspeed, William Rainey Harper: First President of the University of Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1928), 151.

financial affairs, Judson also was fortunate in the decisions of Julius Rosenwald, Hobart Williams, and La Verne Noyes to give major gifts to the University between 1912 and 1918. But Judson himself did little active fund-raising, preferring to advocate the University’s cause in a style of a “dignified silent appeal,” which unfortunately meant that the pace of gifts to the University from prominent Chicagoans slowed considerably from that of the early Harper era. The early public enthusiasm surrounding the new and young University gradually dissipated, and by 1924 the John Price Jones Corporation, a professional fund-raising firm hired by the University, reported of Judson’s presidency, “the reason the University has not been receiving the support of Chicago people is not because people have lost interest, but because the University has failed to maintain

12. Between 1906 and 1907, Rockefeller contributed $3.7 million in additional endowment support: $1 million in January 1906 for the 1906–07 fiscal year and another $2.7 million in January 1907 for the 1907–08 fiscal year. This was followed by another $1.54 million gift in January 1908 and an additional gift of $928,000 in January 1909. See Minutes of the Board of Trustees, 1904–07, 350, 478; Minutes of the Board of Trustees, 1907–09, 149–50, 309–13. Judson noted in his annual report for 1908–09 that “the gift by the founder in January of one million dollars for endowment, to take effect July 1, 1909, will, it is expected, in the next fiscal year wipe out the last of the recurring annual deficits.” *The President’s Report: July 1908–July 1909* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1910), 5. In mid-December 1910, Rockefeller then announced a $10-million concluding gift that would be paid in $1-million installments over the next ten years, beginning January 1, 1911.

13. La Verne Noyes gave $300,000 to build Ida Noyes Hall in 1913 and an additional $1.5 million to create a scholarship fund for veterans of World War I and their descendants. Hobart Williams gave a gift of $2 million for scholarships and instruction in 1916, which was totally unsolicited. Rosenwald provided $250,000 in 1912 for a building for geology and geography.

contact,” and “the University has virtually neglected its Chicago contacts for many years, which will necessitate careful and intensive cultivation.”15

Nor did the University do much to cultivate its alumni. Before the 1920s the University did not rely on alumni contributions for current expenses, nor did it actively solicit them for such purposes. What alumni gifts did come in were processed through Judson’s assistant, the Secretary to the President David Robertson, since there was no professional development staff. An Alumni Fund was only created in 1919, as the result of pressures from a key group of younger alumni leaders and some sympathetic faculty members, including Ernest D. Burton and Shailer Mathews, who felt that the alumni should be solicited regularly for a fund to support the University. In an attempt to change this situation, a young alumnus of the College and newly appointed member of the Board of Trustees, Harold H. Swift, urged President Judson in 1919 to arrange for the publication of a small booklet that would describe the current state of the University and its material needs. Swift reported, “I am amazed to find how little our alumni know about what is going on at the University—what we have accomplished and what we hope to accomplish…. I think our alumni ought to know in considerable detail the progress of the University and the University’s ambitions along different lines. I believe that such information will develop in alumni good will and enthusiasm, the strongest asset the University can hope to secure.”16 In a subsequent letter pushing the project, Swift insisted, “I earnestly believe that many of our alumni are thirsting for material from the University…. I think if the University will make the effort and show her real interest in her former students, the reward, both tangible and sentimental, will be very great.”17

Swift was convinced that it was important to show to the alumni that Rockefeller’s gifts were neither sufficient nor overwhelming and that “actually we have departments that are almost suffering for the want of $50, which we can’t fit into these great big schemes. I wish we could emphasize the point that there is a field [of support] for every man and woman with their contributions until they get into the bigger and more affluent class when we want large ones.” Swift also insisted, “let’s stress the fact to the alumni that we need the alumni. In my opinion, our failure to express this is one of our fundamental weaknesses at present. Let’s cultivate them. Let’s indicate that we want the real family feeling.”18

Judson dithered about proceeding with Swift’s proposal, but Swift’s nudging finally led to the administration commissioning Thomas Goodspeed’s son, Edgar Goodspeed, to draft such a pamphlet, The University of Chicago in 1921, in late 1920. Even then, Goodspeed could not resist proudly restating the status quo, namely, that “it is not the policy of the University to call upon its alumni to meet deficits or to help in carrying current expenses.”19 What is fascinating about this document is that the


16. Swift to Judson, October 11, 1919, box 156, folder 25, Harold Swift Papers. The enthusiasm, leadership, and personal contacts with other alumni that Swift showed in this transaction may have led to his selection to succeed Martin A. Ryerson as the chairman of the board in 1922.

17. Swift to Judson, June 5, 1920, ibid. Judson only commissioned Goodspeed to work on the booklet a year after Swift requested it. See Goodspeed to Swift, December 24, 1920, ibid.

18. Swift to Edgar J. Goodspeed, January 4, 1921, ibid. A few days later, Swift sent another letter in which he noted that “undergraduates and graduates of our College Department frequently feel that we are trying to stifle rather than encourage that Department.” Letter of January 7, 1921, ibid.

younger Goodspeed assumed that simply by identifying the University’s needs, alumni donors would voluntarily respond.

Swift hoped to “stimulate Club work” on the part of the alumni via the pamphlet. Whereas Judson’s staff decided that the whole alumni body should receive a letter informing them of the pamphlet, offering to send it free of charge, Swift and the other alumni leaders wanted a more aggressive strategy. In the end the University sent the pamphlet to all subscribers of the University magazine and all subscribers to the Alumni Fund, as well as to other alumni for whom good addresses were available.

**BURTON’S VISION:**

**THE CAMPAIGN OF 1923–25**

When Ernest D. Burton became president in early 1923, he faced a disgruntled senior faculty, many of whom felt a loss of direction on the part of the University’s leadership, and an unsteady financial situation, in which the University was only able to sustain Judson’s budgetary austerities by belt tightening in the faculty salary budget, which seriously impeded the capacity of the University to attract and retain the best faculty. As the Jones Corporation reported in 1924, the “failure to raise faculty salaries, to meet increased living costs and competition with other universities, together with the failure to fill vacancies with new men of comparable attainments, has naturally had a detrimental effect on the morale and prestige of the teaching staff.”

20. Swift to A. G. Pierrot, February 19, 1921, box 156, folder 25, Harold Swift Papers. Pierrot was the secretary of the alumni council. The Alumni Fund raised over $100,000 in 1921, including some $57,000 in Liberty Bonds.

and even transform the University by appealing to donors beyond the Rockefeller charities and to use this appeal to reenergize the faculty to think ambitiously about improving the University. Burton thus created large expectations, which matched the heated economy of the 1920s.

Burton’s appointment as president came less than nine months after another crucial transition of power: Harold H. Swift succeeded Martin A. Ryerson as chairman of the Board of Trustees in June 1922. An alumnus of the College (Class of 1907), Swift was young, ambitious, well connected socially, and of a solidly pragmatic temper. His admiration for and preoccupation with the University dominated his professional and personal life. Swift had earlier worked with Burton on the pamphlet project, and he knew Burton and respected him. In view of Swift’s scarcely concealed doubts about Judson’s capacity to lead, Burton was a complete change.

The economic situation of the University was solid in the sense that the budget was balanced, but it was also increasingly uncompetitive and thus fragile. In 1923 the endowment was able to cover almost 45 percent of the total operating expenses of the University, a figure that nowadays would be impossible. Yet the impact of the war had led to many more students and rising costs, as well as a national environment in which top eastern universities were outspending Chicago for senior faculty salaries. Not only had Judson’s austerity regime led to key faculty departures, but many of the remaining senior faculty experienced the final years of the Judson presidency as a period of dangerous stagnation. Burton’s job was to get things moving again, and the only way to do this was to raise substantial sums of new money, both for faculty appointments and salaries as well as for new research and teaching buildings.22

Burton’s energy was contagious, and others soon realized the need to raise new money. Albert Sherer, a recently appointed trustee, an alumnus of the College (Class of 1905), and a close friend of Harold Swift, generated a memo in May 1923 urging the University to increase the number of donors and thus to increase the size of the endowment. Sherer was especially interested in enhancing the University’s supporters among the citizens of Chicago and the Middle West. He urged Swift to appoint a committee of the board to be known as Committee on Public Relations to study the problem of how to raise money. Sherer also felt that the board needed to appoint an “experienced man to devote his entire time to the work of interpreting the University to possible donors. Such a man working with the Committee on Public Relations could be of great service in formulating a practical program and his experience should be of value in cooperating with the alumni in organizing whatever fund-raising activities they plan to undertake.”

Swift agreed to Sherer’s scheme, and appointed Sherer, Rosenwald, Burton, and himself to be an ad hoc Committee of Four, which would have the authority to hire such a person.23 But before hiring a fund-raising czar, Swift insisted that the University also come up with a systematic plan of what a fund-raising campaign might look like and how it might be executed. After consulting with Sherer and Rosenwald, Swift and Burton therefore asked the Board of Trustees to approve a campaign planning study in January 1924. Swift was convinced that the amateurish, in-house methods of the past would not suffice. Hence, when Edgar Goodspeed argued against hiring external consultants to plan the campaign, insisting that he and like-minded faculty could very well develop the campaign structure and message (just as his father had done in the 1890s),

22. See, for example, Burton to Swift, December 26, 1923, box 73, folder 3, Harold Swift Papers.

23. Dickerson to Swift, May 9, 1923, box 82, folder 12, ibid.
Swift rejected such advice. Rather, he wanted a “comprehensive plan before going ahead to secure funds,” and to start the planning process off, he hired the John Price Jones Corporation of New York City to undertake a preliminary report on the feasibility of raising funds.24 While Swift took it upon himself to coordinate the structure of the campaign, he also tried to bolster Burton’s resolve in the face of an impatient and ambitious senior faculty.25

The report of the John Price Jones Corporation was ready by March 1924.26 It suggested that the University might successfully run a campaign that would invoke its past achievements and future promise, that would resonate with civic elites of Chicago by stressing the University as Chicago’s university, that would highlight the tremendous prestige brought to the city by the University, and that would also rely on alumni and trustee support: “The University has a strong appeal and a genuine need; it requires only the loyal effort of its Trustees, faculty, and alumni to bring the desired response.”

To coordinate and assist with the actual campaign the University hired the Jones Corporation, which had already staffed a number of other postwar college campaigns, beginning with the 1919–20 campaign at Harvard that had generated $14.2 million.27 Jones assigned a younger colleague, Robert Duncan, to work on the Chicago campaign. A graduate of Harvard (Class of 1912), Duncan was already an experienced college fund-raising who had played an important role in the Harvard campaign. John A. Cousens, the president of Tufts College, assured University authorities: “We employed … Mr. Robert Duncan to do some special publicity work for us. Mr. Duncan is a young man of unusual ability and energy. The University of Chicago would, I think, be fortunate if he entered its service.”28 Mark Cresap of Northwestern reported that Duncan was “highly satisfactory … a thorough, efficient executive.”29 Duncan would stay with the University as an episodic adviser over the next three decades, and by the 1950s he had a unique historical perspective on the internal problems and potential of the institution. After leaving Chicago

24. Swift to Burton, December 31, 1923, box 73, folder 3, ibid. Goodspeed’s proposal for an internally organized campaign is also in this folder. He insisted that “an outside agency, even for survey purposes, could tell us little, if anything, that we do not already know.” Swift was encouraged to select the John Price Jones Corporation in January 1919 by Trevor Arnett, who was still employed at the General Education Board but who was about to return to Chicago as Burton’s chief financial officer. See Arnett to Swift, January 17, 1924, box 73, folder 4, ibid.

25. See Swift’s encouragement of Burton when Burton wanted to call an emergency meeting of the Senate to announce a shortfall of revenue that might endanger Burton’s expansion program. Swift strongly urged him not to call the meeting, on the grounds that a “consistent and well rounded plan” was emerging that might resolve the situation. Swift to Burton, January 7, 1924, ibid. Burton again inquired in April whether he might call such a meeting, and Swift responded that the time was “nearly ripe.” Swift to Burton, April 17, 1924, ibid.

26. “A Survey and Fund-Raising Plan for the University of Chicago,” PP, Addenda 1924–81, folder 4. Jones believed that “such a survey bears to a financial campaign the same relation that a map bears to a military campaign or a diagnosis to medical treatment.” Jones to Albert Sherer, November 14, 1923, ibid.


28. John A. Cousens to G. O. Fairweather, January 21, 1924, box 73, folder 4, Harold Swift Papers. Swift reported that Duncan was “much interested [and] anxious [to] have work.” Telegram from Swift to Arnett, January 15, 1924, ibid.

29. “Extract of letter from Wilbur E. Post in response to H. H. S. [Harold H. Swift]’s request to find out from Mr. Cresap all he would say in reference to Mr. Duncan and the John Price Jones People,” box 73, folder 5, Harold Swift Papers.
in 1956, he returned to his alma mater and helped launch a spectacularly successful Harvard campaign from 1956 to 1960, which netted nearly $83 million. Inevitably, the advice (and, subsequently, the criticisms) that Duncan provided to Chicago reflected the fund-raising experiences (and the successes) that he had at Harvard.

Over the winter and spring of 1924, Duncan helped to engineer a highly sophisticated organization, staffed with clerical and professional staff who developed systems to research the giving capabilities of potential major-gift donors, who organized donor assignment lists (who was to make the initial contact with the prospective donor, who was assigned to make the actual solicitation, etc.), donor tracking and acknowledgement, a faculty speakers’ bureau, and many other features that are still the core activities of a major fund-raising campaign. Duncan had a flair for advertising, and in addition to dozens of different campaign publications, he also had large billboards created at several points in the city with the slogan “The University of Chicago, It’s Yours.” Trevor Arnett prepared a lucid explanation of the finances of the University, which demonstrated the need for new support. The campaign was also noteworthy for giving birth to the word “development” as a key rhetorical symbol of the University’s self-advancement. Duncan later recalled: “At one of the first luncheons the question of a name for the committee and for the campaign was raised. After some discussion and at President Burton’s suggestion, it was decided to call the committee the Committee on Development and the campaign the Development Campaign. So far as I can remember now, that was the first time I ever heard that term used.”

30. Cutlip, Fund Raising, 481.

Swift was insistent on getting the campaign started in the fall of 1924. To anchor and help launch the campaign, the University was able to parlay its contacts with the New York–based charities established by the Rockefeller family into a $2-million matching gift from the General Education Board (GEB) at 61 Broadway at one to two, with the University having to raise $4 million. Happily for the University, the officers and trustees of the Rockefeller charities included several men with strong Chicago connections (George Vincent, Trevor Arnett, James Angell, and later David Stevens and Max Mason). Although John D. Rockefeller Sr.’s final gift came in 1910, bringing his total gifts to $34.7 million, the University maintained close contacts with Rockefeller’s boards which, over the next twenty years, gave an even greater amount of money to Chicago than had Rockefeller himself (between 1911 and 1932 alone the Rockefeller charities gave the University $35.8 million, a sum slightly larger than the total personal benefactions of John D. Rockefeller). The extent of our continued dependence on Rockefeller generosity was demonstrated by the fact that of the $137 million that the University received in gifts between 1890 and 1939, Rockefeller contributions (personal or board driven) amounted to over $80 million, or almost 60 percent.

33. Swift to Burton, February 20, 1924, box 73, folder 5, Harold Swift Papers.
34. Burton first visited the GEB in early February 1924. As late as April, he hoped that he could get $6 million from them. See Burton to Swift, April 17, 1924, box 74, folder 7, ibid. The final decision was taken at the May meeting of the GEB.
35. See the list of Rockefeller-associated gifts to the University of Chicago from 1890 to 1932, box 85, folders 13a, 15, and 17, ibid. See also “Conditional Gifts—University of Chicago,” July 21, 1927, box 75, folder 28, ibid., and the data from 1938–39, box 29, folder 21, Office of the Vice President Records.
The heart and soul of the campaign was Ernest D. Burton, a distinguished New Testament scholar and director of the University Library who was one of Harper's first appointees in 1892. Long a forgotten figure in the history of the University because his term as president only lasted two-and-a-half years, Burton was a charismatic leader who had a lasting impact on Chicago's welfare. The campaign gave Burton a chance to reinvigorate the University by creating new momentum among the faculty, setting new goals for the trustees, and rekindling enthusiasm within a wider civic public. Burton was shrewd enough to understand that a successful fund-raising campaign required that he articulate his personal vision for the University and not simply ask donors for money. In a number of key speeches delivered in Chicago and in other cities around the country, Burton sketched his plans for the future of the University. The basic theme of the speeches was the need to build on Harper's heritage by making the University not bigger but better. Burton stressed the fundamental mission of research (“this mighty and fruitful thing, the quest for new truth”), but he also translated “research” into a set of practices that involved undergraduate and professional education, as well as doctoral training in the arts and sciences. He insisted that a new ideal of college life was evolving in the United States, stressing the development of intellectual habits more than the “impartation of known facts,” and the University of Chicago would help to shape these habits: “The dominant element of that life will be the recognition of the fact that life is more than lore, that character is more than facts; that college life is the period of the formation of habits, even more than of the acquisition of knowledge, and that the making of men and women with habits and character that will insure their being in after life men and women of power, achievement, and helpful influence in the world, is the great task of the college.” What better place to train young minds in the “capacity to think for themselves” than to place them under the influence of scholars “who are striking out new paths, fearlessly attacking the mysteries of truth…. It seems logical and right that the work of the colleges should be conducted in an atmosphere imparted by or akin to that of the great graduate schools, in places where freedom of the mind is encouraged.”

Burton’s approach was thus consistent with Harper’s values, but with a more capacious and articulate sense of the value of undergraduate work in a research university than Harper had ever articulated. Tellingly, one of Burton’s key ideas was to create a set of new buildings for the College south of the Midway, which would allow it to flourish adjacent to the graduate programs but not be overwhelmed by (or overwhelm) those programs. Burton was also emphatically pro-alumni, insisting that the alumni were critical to the future development of the University. Burton’s The University of Chicago in 1940, the idea of which was suggested by Duncan, was a splendid and incurably optimistic statement of the future of the University.

36. Copies of his various speeches are in box 5, University Development Campaigns, Part 1: 1896–1941.

37. Burton’s views of the College may have reflected nudges by Swift. When Burton sent him the first draft of The University of Chicago in 1940, Swift used Ernest Quaintrel’s imagined, pro-undergraduate reactions to urge Burton to tone down arguments in favor of pure research for a parallel argument about education as a social good unto itself. Swift to Burton, October 31, 1924, box 75, folder 1, Harold Swift Papers. Many years later Swift recalled about Burton’s support for undergraduate education that some senior faculty “reproached and reviled him for his emphasis on the College. Mr. Burton won the battle but only after great difficulty.” “Eighth Session,” 54, box 165, folder 2, PP, 1952–1960.

38. Duncan to Swift, September 13, 1924, box 74, folder 19, Harold Swift Papers; Duncan to Swift, September 25, 1924, box 76, folder 9, ibid.
Burton conducted a detailed survey of the University’s future needs in February and March 1924, and by the summer he came up with the figure of $50–60 million for current and long-range needs, $21 million of which should be raised in the next two years.\textsuperscript{39} Burton essentially wanted to double the University’s endowment within the coming fifteen years by adding an additional $33.5 million by 1940. Not all of this could be raised immediately, however, and the final goal for the campaign was reduced to $17.5 million ($7.5 million for endowment, $10 million for new buildings) in September 1924 after much negotiation among Burton, Duncan, Swift, and others.\textsuperscript{40} The campaign centered on endowment support for the faculty and on the construction of new buildings. On the faculty front, Burton initiated an effort to create the first endowed professorships in the University’s history, persuading Martin A. Ryerson to endow the first Distinguished Service Professorship in 1925 for $200,000.\textsuperscript{41} Within five years the University had eight such chairs, most of which were contributed by local Chicago donors.

The campaign consisted of appeals to the trustees, the alumni, foundations, and the general public in Chicago. The trustee side of the campaign was moderately successful. Harold Swift contacted all of the other trustees via personal visit, phone, or letter, urging that they set a generous standard of participation in the campaign.\textsuperscript{42} In the end, the trustees committed themselves to $1.68 million, or about 20 percent of the total that was finally raised. But Swift had a hard time generating active participation and real enthusiasm from many of the trustees. Moreover, their gift patterns were uneven, with some trustees giving paltry amounts. Three trustees—Julius Rosenwald, Martin Ryerson, and Harold Swift himself—accounted for $1.5 million, with the remaining $178,000 representing smaller gifts, some as small as $1,000.\textsuperscript{43}

The campaign of 1924–25 was also the first time that the University systematically tried to mobilize its alumni. A General Alumni Committee was organized in the fall of 1924. By October, it had 175 members and an executive committee of eighteen and developed an “Alumni Campaign Handbook” to guide volunteers in their solicitations. They in turn coordinated the work of a host of district and local alumni leaders around the country, who were poised to begin solicitations in March 1925 and whose task it was to obtain a pledge “from every Chicago man and woman in the locality over which he has jurisdiction, and as much more as is believe you will realize that this is the feasible way to handle [the matter]. To that end, I enclose herewith two pledge cards, one of which I should appreciate you filling in with the amount of your subscription.” Swift to Robert Lamont, November 21, 1924, box 76, folder 4, Harold Swift Papers.


\textsuperscript{40} The negotiations may be charted by the correspondence in box 74, folder 7, Harold Swift Papers.

\textsuperscript{41} See Burton to Ryerson, April 19, 1924, box 28, folder 23, PP, 1880–1925.

\textsuperscript{42} Swift’s standard solicitation letter left the recipient with little choice but to give a gift: “I dislike soliciting funds, especially from my good friends, but
necessary to make up his quota." The organization also included a detailed procedure for local leaders to rate the gift capacities of individual alumni in their area as to what they might be expected to give over a five-year period. Each district was also assigned a quota, and it was expected to fulfill that quota, come what may. The results were encouraging in Chicago and in other localities as well: by late 1925 out of approximately 27,000 alumni, over 11,000 gave contributions, and a majority of these were College alumni. Total alumni giving was slightly over $2 million. Alumni leaders would recall in 1926 that the “sudden and startling attention bestowed upon Alumni was unprecedented, and in marked contrast to any evident interest theretofore displayed by the University in its Alumni.” Even more impressive was the fact that this was a relatively young or at least younger group of people: in 1923 about 89 percent of our alumni were under forty-three years of age. Although men outnumbered women in the total alumni population, women graduates outnumbered men among the undergraduate alumni. Over 43 percent of the alumni in 1923 were employed in education—on the primary, secondary, and university levels—a characteristic that was crucial to the shape of the early alumni culture at the University.

One of the more charming features of the alumni campaign involved the work of a paid alumni volunteer, who was sent to try to encourage alumni outside of Chicago who were out of touch with the University. Some fascinating correspondence survives relating to the activities of Evon Z. Vogt, whom his friends called Skeeter. Born in Dayton, Ohio, Vogt had entered the University of Chicago in 1902 but was forced to drop out of the College during his senior year in November 1905 because he had contracted tuberculosis. He moved to New Mexico for health reasons, where he eventually became a sheep rancher, gold miner, and small-town newspaper editor (between 1938 and 1942 he edited the Gallup, New Mexico, Gazette). A friendly and sociable person, Skeeter Vogt proved to be a superb fund-raiser. In fact, during his years at the University, Vogt showed an aptitude for such work when, upon joining the Delta Upsilon fraternity, he raised money for that group by performing magic tricks. Paid $74 a week plus expenses, Vogt had a mandate from campaign headquarters in Chicago to travel to various towns in the Midwest and West during the winter and spring of 1925. Vogt was empowered to create new alumni clubs where none existed, to energize existing clubs, to appoint new chairmen on the spot, and to help local volunteers raise their quotas. A latter-day version of a French Revolutionary Representative on Mission, Skeeter Vogt arrived in the towns that he

46. If one includes the additional 4.8 percent of the alumni who were in the ministry and another 2.2 percent who were categorized as being “scientists,” it is clear that well over half of our alumni in 1924 were in occupations in some way related to learning and education. See box 2, folder 6, University Development Campaigns, Part 1: 1896–1941, and Floyd W. Reeves and John Dale Russell, The Alumni of the Colleges (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), 64–91.
47. For a charming memoir of Vogt’s life, see Barbara Vogt Mallery, Bailing Wire and Gamuza: The True Story of a Family Ranch Near Ramah, New Mexico, 1905–1986 (New Mexico: New Mexico Magazine, 2003), esp. 18, 42. Both nicknames and loyalty to the University of Chicago seem to have run in the family. His son, Evon Z. Vogt Jr., also attended the University of Chicago, beginning in 1937 as an undergraduate, where he majored in geography. He stayed on to take his PhD in anthropology, working with Robert Redfield, W. Lloyd Warner, and Fred Eggan, and went on to have a distinguished career in Mesoamerican anthropology at Harvard University. Among family and friends, he was called “Vogtie.”
visited representing the sovereign powers of the University. Literally living out of a suitcase, Vogt met with countless individual alumni and small groups, and thereby gained an immediate sense of the temper of the alumni and what they thought of the University—both its past and its future.

Vogt operated with limited resources. While in Houston, Texas, he was told in one cryptic instruction from the campaign’s director, George Fuller, that “the next job is to work back into Iowa, or if your ticket does not make that possible, work back along the route covered by your ticket.” He occasionally arrived in towns to find local fissures among our alumni that threatened to disrupt the campaign. He reported, for example, from Wichita, Kansas, that he had convened a group of loyal alumni, only to find that several were not speaking to each other because of fallout over a local municipal election: “I find the thing which has held up the Wichita work has been a municipal election which divided the town and tore it wide open almost as bad as a KKK election.” Still, Vogt was a man of considerable persuasiveness, and he eventually persuaded the Wichita alumni to come together and make a decent contribution.

Not shy about proffering his own opinions, Vogt liked to send back reports to Chicago on his encounters. In his first message in early 1925, entitled “Bulletin #1,” Vogt announced that he and his fellow alumni had conceived of a surefire method to ensure the University’s future fame and glory—the radio: “As the University is destined to be the greatest in the world, it is suggested by many alumni that this enlarging field of influence be studied and surveyed with the greatest care, so that Chicago may take advantage of it…. The messages of Chicago, all inspirational and of the finest, could reach the entire country and perhaps the world.” Hence, Vogt urged his superiors that the University should build a “broad casting station of the best type.”

Vogt also lobbied for merit scholarships, suggesting that “in all parts of the country it is considered a good thing to give scholarships every year to at least one outstanding student in each city…. The award of such scholarships should be made a matter of some ceremony if possible and accompanied with proper publicity prepared at the University and sent out to the most interested local alumnus who will see that the material gets into the papers.” Vogt further urged that the University strategically and systematically deploy its faculty to meet regularly with alumni groups all over the American West: “All alumni are proud of their degrees and study at Chicago. They are anxious to see the influence and fair name of the University grow each year. They feel in the central West that the influence of schools further east is gradually taking the place formerly held by Chicago…. It is hoped that it will be possible after the endowment drive is put over successfully to establish a speakers bureau which shall be ready and willing to send out the representatives of the faculty as well as the Board of Trustees to address meetings of all sorts in the West.”

But Vogt did not always report back happy news, for he also encountered disgruntled alumni, and these notations are noteworthy because they inaugurate rhetorical themes that run through much of the University’s history in the twentieth century. In his “Bulletin #10” he noted that

48. The Vogt correspondence is in box 2A, folder 1, University Development Campaigns, Part 1: 1896–1941, from which quotes in the following paragraphs are drawn.
“more than once I have heard that the attitude of the University was non-progressive and arrogant toward its students and graduates. No pains have been taken to befriend the students there, to cultivate a friendly feeling between the students themselves and between faculty and students…. One man mentioned to me that the professors and deans were very inaccessible, hidden at times behind painted doors swung on springs intentionally stiff so they could not be opened.” But Vogt insisted that “this [kind of criticism] has not been mentioned to me very often, for I get it for the most part the other way around—the kindliest feeling, though in many cases it is more of an intellectual admiration and not a college spirit that will readily express itself in checks to the endowment fund.” Vogt’s last point was sobering—many alumni who did admire the University often felt little personal commitment to support it financially. This would not be the last time such views were heard.

Robert Duncan also had personal stories to tell about alumni living in distant areas, for he visited eastern South Dakota and northwestern Iowa for one week in May 1925 and contacted one hundred alumni who had not given a contribution. Seeking to explain such apathy, he later reasoned that it was caused by “a neglect on the part of the University to keep in touch with its alumni after graduation. We were informed many times by alumni that they had never received any communication whatever from the University” as well as by the “cold-blooded and machine-like” way in which the University was conducted when they were in college, resulting in the creation in the minds of many alumni of the feeling that their attendance at the University was purely a business transaction and that the services rendered by the University were paid for by the alumnus in full.”


In the middle of the spring 1925 campaign activities, Ernest Burton died suddenly on May 26 of a recently diagnosed colon cancer. His death was a terrible shock to the leaders of the campaign and to the faculty, and it created an immense leadership vacuum. Trustee Robert Lamont noted:

Nothing is gained by attempting to minimize the seriousness of the disaster that has come to the committee. I am more impressed with it after listening to the tributes to the character, personality, and ability of Dr. Burton. One of the things that greatly impressed me … was the courage and fighting quality of the man. At 67 he undertook a work that would have daunted most men, and his last thought was that it should go forward. We must not fail him now.”

Yet, in retrospect, that is exactly what happened. Burton’s successor, a distinguished mathematical physicist from the University of Wisconsin, Max Mason, had little stomach for the kind of public campaigning necessary to complete the final part of the drive, which was to be a major public campaign in the city of Chicago. The campaign for public civic support urged by Duncan and Jones and planned for 1925–26 was potentially the most important, but least successful, component of the Burton Campaign.

Outsiders looking at Chicago’s predicament thought it natural that the University should seek and receive downtown support. President R. D. Hughes of Miami University, who published one of the first rankings of U.S. universities in 1924, wrote to a Chicago friend in October 1923 urging that

Chicago businessmen should take a definite step to aid Chicago University in maintaining her prestige in the United States. It would seem to me that if a group of Chicago businessmen took the matter up earnestly and raised some money, they might prevail upon the General Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation to aid in making the endowment of Chicago University more adequate. Roughly, it would seem to me that they should have at least twenty million more dollars in endowment. I am enough of a middle westerner to feel that the heart of America is here in the center of America, and that our civilization in the United States will depend a great deal on what development in the central part of the country comes about. Chicago University in its type and in its ideals is an institution by itself. It can do things which the state university cannot do, and will not do, and it is a proper crown to the higher education of the west. It should be maintained at any expense in a preeminent position.\[51\]

John Price Jones had urged Harold Swift in January 1925 to undertake a major initiative to recruit support from leading businessmen in Chicago who were not presently connected to the University. Jones thought it essential to have a $1-million gift to announce publicly, and he wanted the University to avoid the temptation of approaching wealthy donors on a one-by-one basis. Rather, Jones wanted the board to assemble a group of outside Chicago donors who could represent the University to the outside world:

If you do not establish this group leadership by getting gifts outside early in your work and if you are refused by leading citizens, you must remember that the man who has been asked for a gift and who has refused does in most instances tell some intimate friend that he was asked for money and then seeks to justify himself for not having given. Thus you have an anti-propaganda. Reversely, when a man has given, he is proud of having supported an institution; and he talks and influences others by his conversation. I write thus, not because I am alarmed lest Chicago will not get sizable gifts, for I believe it will, but because I deem it important that you, who are new to the psychology of this work, should have an ideal situation and state of public mind toward which to strive. The greater the momentum of this kind is established, the more money the University will get this year and in the following years.\[52\]

Jones urged Swift to seek at least one major $1-million gift by a "prominent man,” which would “give the committee a big lift toward developing the momentum of which I write.\[53\]

Jones then followed up in mid-April 1925 urging again that special gifts receive major attention: “Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the necessity for hard, driving work here.”\[54\] Robert Duncan also insisted on the importance of a city campaign, imagining a huge citywide effort that would capture the imagination of the citizens of the city, driving home the idea that the University belonged to the city, and making sure

51. R. M. Hughes to R. D. Lee, October 27, 1923, box 73, folder 5, ibid.
52. Jones to Swift, January 27, 1925, box 82, folder 1, ibid. Swift sent the letter to all members of the Executive Committee.
53. Ibid.
54. Jones to Sherer, April 13, 1925, box 73, folder 6, Harold Swift Papers.
that in the future the University became the alma mater of the children of leading Chicago citizens and those of the midwestern and western states: “Instead of many of the youth of the West going east for a college education, they would come to Chicago because there would be found better facilities than anywhere else.” For a Harvard alumnus, Duncan’s ideas were both shrewd and generous, for what he was in fact imagining was a strategy whereby children of midwestern and Chicago elites would stay in Chicago, rather than venturing to the East Coast, for their undergraduate education.35

Key leaders on the Board of Trustees seemed to agree with Jones and Duncan, and began to make plans for the fall civic campaign that included a request to John Price Jones that Robert Duncan stay with the campaign.36 For a time, John G. Shedd seemed a possible candidate to give a blockbuster gift and to lead the city campaign. (Duncan prepared a detailed memo on why Shedd should be asked to a give a massive gift.)37

55. Robert Duncan, “A Suggestion Regarding the Future of the University of Chicago Campaign,” May 16, 1925, box 82, folder 1, ibid.

56. Writing at Swift’s request, Sherer told John Price Jones that he anticipated that the summer of 1925 would be slow, but that in the fall the “second lap” of the campaign would begin and that the University very much wanted Duncan to continue to work on the Chicago campaign. Sherer to Jones, March 19, 1925, box 73, folder 6, ibid.

57. Ten years later Harold Swift recalled: “It is an interesting fact that when we first conceived of the college buildings across the Midway, President Burton went to John G. Shedd and asked him to do the whole thing at a cost of three to four million dollars. His reply was that he was interested but he was already committed to the Aquarium and he would not do both at that time. He said, however, that the city had not taken up the Aquarium enthusiastically and that he had lost his ardor for it, and that if the project was defeated when it went to the voters for approval, he would then give the University the three million dollars—probably for the college plan. Unfortunately for us, the voters approved the

After Shedd declined, the campaign organizers eventually persuaded Bernard Sunny of the Chicago Telephone Company to take the chairmanship of a Committee of Citizens in November 1925. But without strong leadership from the new president, Max Mason, the committee met only infrequently and without substantial results.38

The campaign of 1924–25 was long remembered as a model effort and a successful one to boot. The final results of the campaign were optimistic. The University spent about $300,000 on the campaign and raised as of June 1, 1926, $7,785,300, $2 million of which was generated by the alumni.39 In 1954, Harold Swift looked back on the Burton years as the “two most thrilling years in the University’s history.”40 Yet the campaign had mixed results. Almost one-third of the total came from the matching grant from the GEB and a single gift from Julius Rosenwald. Aggregate alumni contributions were impressive, but the campaign also encountered a lack of interest on the part of many alumni, some of whom complained about the faculty’s indifference to the lives of the undergraduates. In his

Aquarium project.” Swift to Stifler, March 26, 1935, box 82, folder 12, ibid. Swift’s secretary, M. F. Sturdy, informed Duncan on June 12, 1925, that “Mr. Swift reviewed the matter with Mr. Donnelley and they both definitely agreed that Mr. Shedd was out of the picture at present.” Letter of June 12, 1925.


59. See John F. Moulds to Max Mason, June 1, 1926, box 75, folder 19, ibid. Two million dollars came as a matching grant from the GEB and $1 million from Julius Rosenwald that was counted as part of the $1.7-million trustee gift. Rosenwald intended that his gift be expended and not lodged in a permanent endowment. Swift to Trevor Arnett, March 25, 1925, box 82, folder 1, ibid; William C. Graves to L. R. Steere, January 14, 1927, box 76, folder 4, ibid.; and Moulds to L. R. Steere, October 14, 1926, box 76, folder 1, ibid.

final report on the campaign, submitted in February 1926, Robert Duncan was openly critical of the failure of the University to maintain contact with its alumni, and also remarked on the unpleasant atmosphere on campus that had left at least some alumni disillusioned:

Despite a very large amount of publicity, in some cases considered too much, there seemed to be an apathy among the alumni very difficult to overcome. This can only be ascribed, so far as Headquarters can see, to two things: (1) a neglect on the part of the University to keep in touch with the alumni after graduation. We were informed many times by alumni that they had never received any communication whatever from the University. (2) The “cold-blooded and machine-like” way in which the University was conducted when they were in college, resulting in the creation in the minds of many alumni of the feeling that their attendance at the University was purely a business transaction and that the services rendered by the University were paid for by the alumnus in full. There seemed to be no feeling of obligation on the part of the general run of alumni outside the city.

Duncan was particularly concerned with the views and opinions of the undergraduate alumni, since the holders of bachelor’s degrees were “the group in whom loyalty to the University would be expected to be the strongest.”

An equally troubling part of the campaign, however, was the dearth of the special gifts solicited from members of Chicago’s civic elite. The special-gifts initiative in the city was a failure, and a lack of focused leadership after Burton’s death was the cause. In his final report on the campaign, Duncan did not mince words as to whom he thought was to blame:

Several members of the [Special Gifts] Committee were “bearish” in their attitude on obtaining large gifts, with the result that the meetings of the Committee, instead of being of an inspirational nature, had the opposite effect…. It is a source of regret that, with the mass of favorable publicity which the University was receiving last Spring and Autumn, members of the Board were unable to prosecute more actively the Special Gifts campaign…. Success in Special Gifts work is obtained only as a result of persistence and constant hard work, and few of the University of Chicago Trustees or leading alumni were in a position to give the necessary time to the effort.\textsuperscript{62}

Duncan was certain that had Burton lived the civic campaign would have been pushed forward with vigor, since “his death was a severe blow to the alumni campaign” and “he was the real leader of the campaign. Shortly after his death, there was a noticeable slowing up in campaign activity, and the momentum of early spring 1925 was never regained. The result is that the possibilities of gifts from citizens of Chicago have hardly been scratched.”

In the confusion that followed Burton’s death, signals became crossed. As late as August 1925, Harold Swift admitted that he was well satisfied with Robert Duncan’s work and reported that “we believe they gave us

\textsuperscript{61} Robert F. Duncan, “The Campaign for Development of the University of Chicago, August 11, 1924–February 6, 1926,” 37, 43, box 1, folder 9, University Development Campaigns, Part 1: 1896–1941.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 22, 23, 27.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 7, 48.
a good set-up and we think them willing and capable of cooperation. At any rate, we have engaged [the John Price Jones Corporation] for next year when we expect to have a wider appeal to the public." This statement suggests that Swift was committed to a full continuance of the campaign. Yet when Max Mason arrived on campus, things began to change. Swift later recalled that, although he thought well of the John Price Jones operation, Mason disliked its campaign tactics, resenting its (as Swift put it) “go-get-em salesmanship,” which Mason felt might accomplish its goals but which might also “do so much harm as to make people sore and hurt us in the long run.” Mason was opposed to a “continuing plea for funds” at the University. Hence, according to Swift, “after Mr. Mason was elected, it was decided to call off the campaign.”

In fact, the decision was more complex. Several members of the Committee of Citizens, led by Bernard Sunny, lobbied Mason and Swift to substitute a “quiet” campaign among local businessmen for the public, citywide effort advocated by Robert Duncan and John Price Jones. Sunny’s motives are unknown, but Mason clearly welcomed Sunny’s intervention. In mid-January 1926, the trustees’ Committee on Development voted to close down the public campaign and to recommend that the city campaign “take the form of a quiet canvass of the wealthier prospects under the leadership of and along the lines to be determined by Mr. Sunny and President Mason, it being understood that the former campaign closing date of June 30, 1926, will be ignored, and, a vote having been taken the motion was declared adopted.” At this meeting Albert Sherer recorded Sunny’s promise to the effect that “Mr. Sunny’s willingness to take active leadership and responsibility in the raising of the $10,500,000 balance and the co-operative attitude of members of his Committee have greatly encouraged the Committee on Development.”

Robert Duncan was thanked, and the agreement with John Price Jones abrogated.

Max Mason’s decision may have reflected his temperament and family situation, as well as his confidence that, in the booming economy of the later 1920s, personal fund-raising led by Bernard Sunny on a one-on-one basis might gain the University sufficient large donations to finance necessary new buildings and create more professorships. During the remainder of his short presidency, until Mason left (or was forced out of) office in mid-1928, several wealthy citizens did in fact decide to fund new buildings, including Wieboldt Hall, Eckhart Hall, Jones Hall, and Sunny Gymnasium. But in the case of Jones, Wieboldt, and Eckhart, the gifts came because of idiosyncratic contacts with University officials, not because of Sunny’s “quiet” campaign. Another Chicago donor, Max Epstein, promised $1 million for a new art building in late August 1929, but his commitment proved to be one of the first victims of the Great Depression.

64. Swift to Jacob Pfeiffer, August 11, 1925, box 73, folder 13, Harold Swift Papers.
65. Swift memo to C. H. S., February 19, 1930, ibid. Shortly after Mason’s resignation, Robert Duncan sent Swift a letter asking about the status of fund-raising at the University and offering to become reengaged with Chicago, on an ongoing consultancy basis. See Duncan to Swift, October 19, 1928, ibid.
66. “Minutes of the Committee on Development,” January 13, 1926, box 74, folder 6, Harold Swift Papers. See also Minutes of the Board of Trustees, January 14, 1926, 7. The Trustees’ Committee on Development, having no more work to do, recommended its own abolition. See Minutes of the Board of Trustees, November 11, 1926, 434. It was only reestablished in November 1928. See Minutes of the Board of Trustees, November 8, 1928, 226–27.
67. The Eckhart gift came as a result of Trustee Julius Rosenwald’s intervention. The Jones gift originated from an intervention by David Evans. The Wieboldt gift resulted from cultivation by Ernest Burton and Julius Rosenwald.
Mason's determination to curtail the public appeal of the campaign was unfortunate for three reasons. First, in relying on Bernard Sunny to carry on the campaign quietly to raise the missing $10 million Mason made a serious miscalculation. It was soon clear that Sunny had no way to deliver such grandiose sums, even though Sunny himself generously donated $164,000 in April 1928 for the construction of a gymnasium for the Laboratory Schools and upon his death in 1943 established trust funds that also came to the University over time. In fact, Sunny soon became enraged by Professor Paul Douglas's strident attacks on Samuel Insull, in whose traction schemes in Chicago Sunny was involved, and he could hardly serve as an activist spokesman for the University.

Second, Mason’s “quiet” strategy deprived the University of the unique opportunity to make a systematic, citywide canvass for funds among prominent and not-so-prominent citizens in Chicago at a time when economic conditions were extremely favorable. Finally, Mason’s decision resulted in a collapse of long-range development planning, halting the progress in donor cultivation made between 1924 and 1926 and returning the University on the fund-raising front to a state of affairs reminiscent of the Judson days.

One problem that ensued from the furtive way that the campaign was closed down was that no one bothered to write to the alumni volunteers to thank them for their efforts until mid-October, almost seven months after the trustees had abrogated their agreement with John Price Jones. These events were, in retrospect, regrettable, and the last example cited—the lack of courtesy to the alumni leadership—was unfortunate.

Still, the last years before the Crash were flush ones for the University, in part because of the magnificent grants bestowed on us by the Rockefeller Boards. Max Mason visited the headquarters of the GEB in January 1927...
and came away confident that the GEB and its sister boards, like the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Rockefeller Foundation, would support most of the relevant research requests that the University might put forward. Mason reported, “I feel there is almost no limit to the support the Boards will give us provided we have important projects under the direction of able men.”

A month later, in February 1927, the GEB board gave $1.5 million to support research and facilities in chemistry, physics, mathematics, astronomy, and botany; equally impressive support, amounting to almost $3 million, followed in 1927 and 1928 for the Medical School and the Hospitals. In May 1927, the GEB gave the University $250,000 for support of research in the humanities, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial awarded over $2 million for the construction and operation of a new social-science building, including support for faculty research. In December 1928, the International Education Board then gave the University $6.2 million for the Oriental Institute. The year 1929 was also a fruitful one for Chicago in that the GEB voted in May to award the University $2 million in endowment support for the Medical School and $1 million to sustain its clinical operating expenses over ten years, together with smaller grants from the Rockefeller Foundation in support of research in anthropology, comparative philology, and the biological sciences.

This largesse was stunning, much easier than running fund-raising campaigns, and Mason’s skepticism about Burton’s campaign may have been strengthened by his (then) quite reasonable confidence in unlimited access to Rockefeller money.

### The Hutchins Era and the Fiftieth Anniversary

In April 1929, Robert Maynard Hutchins was elected the fifth president of the University of Chicago. Hutchins was the most controversial but also, next to Harper, the most important president in the University’s early history. Hutchins’s restructuring of the arts and sciences in 1930–31, his support for the new general-education curriculum developed in the 1930s, his adamant and eloquent defense of academic freedom, his uncompromising insistence on intellectual excellence, his abolition of intercollegiate football, and his idealization of the University as a place exclusively given to learning and discovery—these and many other interventions gave Hutchins a most distinguished place in our history and in the history of American higher education. The creation of the New Plan in 1931 also helped to respond to alumni criticisms about indifferent teaching practices, a state of affairs that Dean Chauncey Boucher characterized in 1932 as “a period of several years, not so very long ago, [when] the instruction of our undergraduates, and particularly of Freshmen and Boards to the Medical School were over $12.8 million up to 1932. Plimpton to Swift, March 4, 1932, Box 85, folder 13a, Harold Swift Papers.
Sophomores, was grossly neglected or positively scorned. Our students were the innocent victims.”

In 1940–41, Robert Hutchins presided over (or endured, depending on one’s point of view) the second major fund-raising campaign in the University’s history. The story of this campaign is fascinating, since it brings together a set of complex issues, some perennial, others peculiar to the 1930s, involving the austerities of the budget, cultural changes in student life, patterns of alumni discontent, tensions surrounding Hutchins himself among the trustees and local civic elites, the uneasy relationship between public relations and fund-raising, and basic questions about the identity of the University.

The Hutchins’s era is legendary for its cultural revolution in undergraduate life and learning, which also had profound influences on the wider academic culture of the University. Hutchins undertook this revolution under sorely trying circumstances, for within several months of taking office Hutchins faced the greatest economic challenge in the University’s history. The Depression hit the University hard, yet our experience was less traumatic than at many other institutions, largely because of the substantial reserves that had been accumulated in the 1920s. The endowment of the University continued to grow ($22.3 million in new endowed funds were added between 1929 and 1939), largely as a result of gifts to the Medical School (the core endowment, aside from Medicine, grew by only 6.9 percent). The annual income available from the endowment declined from $3.4 million in 1929–30 to $2.1 million in 1938–39, as the rate of return dropped from 6.2 to 4 percent.

Hutchins initiated an austerity program that cut administrative costs by 20 percent. The University eliminated 350 courses, increased faculty teaching loads, and imposed a mandatory faculty retirement age of sixty-five. The general budget (which covered the costs of the non-medical areas) was cut from $6 million to $4.5 million from 1930 to 1933. Faculty salaries were frozen and attrition and retirement reduced the full professorial ranks from 160 in 1930–31 to 116 in 1939, with few replacements being hired, even at junior levels. Total salary expenditures for full professors declined by almost 20 percent between 1930 and 1940. Some departments felt decimated: by 1936, English had lost five professors, one associate professor, and six instructors, all of whom were replaced by three instructors. To cover the budget shortfalls that remained even after these austerity measures, the trustees approved the use of $12 million between 1929 and 1939 from gifts, reserves, and cash funds. By 1939, both the general and medical budgets were in chronic deficit ($300,000 and $500,000 respectively), with the GEB’s $1-million grant for clinical operations in medicine from 1929 totally depleted and the $3-million grant from the GEB half gone. By 1938–39, the University had exhausted all easily available austerity measures and about a 10 percent annual budget gap remained. Further cuts would have meant a still greater reduction in faculty size, which Hutchins was loath to do. In the face of this disaster, the specter of urgent new fund-raising loomed on the horizon.

The target of $12 million set for the 1940–41 campaign was intended to generate sufficient income to cover a significant part of the University’s operating deficit for ten years.

Between 1926 and 1936, little changed in the organization of fund-raising. The Board of Trustees continued to have a standing Committee

75. Chauncey S. Boucher, “To the Anonymous Donor of the Special College Fund,” April 20, 1932, box 141, folder 12, Harold Swift Papers.

76. Detailed information on University finances in the 1930s, as presented to the Board of Trustees in 1939, is in box 9, folder 26, VP Papers.
on Development. (It was dissolved in 1926 but reestablished in 1928.)”77 Sewell Avery chaired the committee, but the group led a rather sleepy life and Avery finally asked out in 1931.78 Harold Swift thereupon put a retired clergyman, James M. Stifler, in his place. The committee languished, with Stifler complaining to Swift that it was “doing a little better than marking time.”79 To Edward Ryerson in January 13, 1932, he observed that “our committee has not been functioning very well. It has been difficult to secure attendance at meetings, although the number of meetings has been reduced.”80 When the committee finally met in February 1932, Stifler reported that the members “deprecated any direct advances in solicitations for money at this time. It was their view that it would be prejudicial to the interests of the University, that while the unemployment campaign was in such serious condition and the state warrant was finding it so difficult to secure a market, to ask people to give money to these things was not wise.”81

All public relations, development and fund-raising, alumni activities, and college recruitment efforts were handled by Stifler’s office with minimal staffing and modest budgets, at a cost of about $83,000 a year.82

Stifler was not an expert in any of these fields, and he concentrated on recruiting students to campus, putting ads in newspapers on University activities, creating promotional pamphlets, and promoting the University to high school students. Aside from student recruitment, the University spent about $50,000 annually on public relations, alumni relations, and fund-raising.

Hutchins’s first step to try to stabilize the finances of the University was to tread the well-worn path of visiting the University’s friends in New York City. In the autumn of 1929, he journeyed to New York for confidential meetings with the officers of the Rockefeller Boards.83 In early March 1930, he submitted a massive joint request to the GEB for $2.5 million and the Rockefeller Foundation for $4.5 million toward the first stage of a general financial program consisting of $28 million.84 The application was originally intended to be part of a larger scheme that included gifts from Julius Rosenwald and Edward Harkness for $5 million, but the prospects of those gifts had disappeared in early 1930.

A prominent addressee of the March 1930 appeal was none other than Max Mason, who had become president of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1929. This was the beginning of a series of appeals to the Rockefeller Boards for financial support, which became more urgent as the Depression deepened. The University of Chicago seemed well placed to enter

77. See John F. Moulds to Swift, November 5, 1926, box 74, folder 6, Harold Swift Papers.

78. See “Report for the Committee on Development to the Board of Trustees,” April 11, 1929, box 75, folder 4, ibid.; Minutes of the Board of Trustees, April 11, 1929, 80–82.

79. Stifler to Swift, December 1, 1931, box 82, folder 7, Harold Swift Papers.

80. Stifler to Edward Ryerson, January 13, 1932, box 82, folder 8, ibid.

81. Stifler to Hutchins and Swift, February 16, 1932, ibid.

82. “John P. Howe to Executive Committee and Committee on Development,” December 11, 1939, box 201, folder 2, Harold Swift Papers.

83. Hutchins to Swift, October 1, 1929, box 175, folder 7, ibid.; “Confidential memorandum of conversation between Mr. Hutchins and Mr. Mason, October 13, 1929,” and “Memorandum of Conversations with Mason, Day, and Ruml, December 7, 1929,” ibid.

84. Hutchins to the Rockefeller Foundation, March 5, 1930, box 175, folder 7, Harold Swift Papers; “Memorandum on the Financial Programme of the University of Chicago,” March 24, 1930, box 52, Development and Alumni Relations Records. This memo revised slightly the original proposal of March 5, 1930.
these negotiations, since Mason was not the only ex-Chicagoan involved. Trevor Arnett had returned to New York to become president of the GEB in 1928, and David Stevens, formerly a faculty member at Chicago and assistant to Max Mason, left Chicago in 1929 to become the vice president of the GEB and then director of the Humanities Division of the Rockefeller Foundation. But such intimacy also had its dangers, especially in times of financial distress, when all universities were scrambling for whatever support they might find. Mason was candid with Hutchins that his and Arnett’s close association with Chicago was an issue of some awkwardness. When Harold Swift tried to push Chicago’s cause by writing a flattering, but grossly inflated letter to Mason telling him that his presidency was, along with Burton’s, part of a “renaissance of the University,” the situation became more awkward.

The initial response of the boards to Hutchins’s appeal was equivocal. In May 1930, the GEB agreed to a $1-million grant to assist in the construction of new buildings for anatomy and hygiene and bacteriology, but the general omnibus request was deferred, with Mason urging the University to undertake systematic budget reductions. Hutchins was able to secure a five-year grant of $275,000 from the GEB in April 1931, however, to implement the College’s New Plan curriculum between 1931 and 1936, covering faculty and administrative salaries, scientific equipment, and the costs of the new Comprehensive Examinations. The spectacular academic success of the College in the 1930s was thus deeply indebted to New York support.

Then, after further remonstrations, the GEB agreed in December 1936 to give the University an emergency grant of $3 million to support both the Medical School’s and the University’s general budget. The success of this appeal rested largely on an eloquent presentation about the national importance of the University of Chicago that Hutchins made personally in May 1936, which local staffers subsequently christened “Bob Hutchins’s $3,000,000 Speech.” As this money slowly evaporated, Hutchins then tried again with another appeal in May 1940, arguing that “in periods like the present the community seems unable to distinguish between the good and the excellent, or at least is unwilling to meet the large additional expense that excellence involves. Vocational training, practical or short-term research, and ‘college life’ are easily understood and are relatively cheap. Liberal education, long-term research, and experiments in organization and instruction are not easily grasped and are

85. For example, to procure the $275,000 from the GEB, Robert Hutchins paid personal visits to Trevor Arnett and David Stevens in January 1931 in New York. The grant was approved three months later. These informal networks with former Chicago men must have influenced Hutchins’s strategies.

86. “Very embarrassing to so many Chicago men officers. More embarrassing to Arnett than him.” “Confidential memorandum of conversation between Mr. Hutchins and Mr. Mason, October 13, 1929,” box 52, Development and Alumni Relations Records.

87. Draft of a letter to Mason, November 14, 1939, ibid.

88. Minutes of the Board of Trustees, June 12, 1930, 147.

89. Ibid., May 14, 1931, 59. This grant was also the result of a personal visit to New York. See “Mem. of conversation with Messrs. Mason, Arnett, and Stevens, 13 January 1931,” box 52, Development and Alumni Relations Records.

90. Hutchins provided Mason with a detailed accounting of the financial distress of the University and its intended budgetary reductions in a letter of November 7, 1931, box 52, Development and Alumni Relations Records.

91. Raymond D. Fosdick to Hutchins, November 16, 1939, ibid. Hutchins’s notes for the speech are in the same file. See also Hutchins to Fosdick, June 4, 1936, box 48, Development and Alumni Relations Records.
likely to be expensive.” This time Hutchins’s eloquence failed to work its magic.92 Undaunted, Hutchins delivered another verbal appeal in January 1941, pitched at the need to defend the core activities of the five or six best private American universities, urging that the Rockefeller Boards allocate $3.5 million a year over five or even ten years to strengthen these institutions. Hutchins reported that “at the end I was thanked very nicely. Several members spoke about how interesting the meeting had been. I have no way of knowing what the effect of this conference was or may be.”93 Sadly, it did not have the outcome that Hutchins wanted.

As long as personal visits to 61 Broadway in New York City continued to generate needed support, why undertake onerous fund-raising campaigns? John Price Jones captured this psychological dilemma well when he shrewdly observed in 1936 that “over a long period of its history, this [fund-raising] function of the Board was to some extent dulled by the large gifts from Rockefeller sources.”94 Among the Rockefeller officers, however, there was a growing concern that the University needed to find other sources of major support. David Stevens wrote to Fritz Woodward in 1931 hoping that “a year from now there may be funds in hand for current support in full measure, and likewise something for the capitalization of stronger undergraduate instruction along present or other lines.”95 Stevens’s vague hopes were put in more forceful language by a memorandum drafted in 1936 for the directors of the GEB that was, in turn, sent to the University authorities. This memo, most likely authored by Raymond Fosdick, insisted that the GEB had no peculiar responsibility … to the University of Chicago. We do not recognize any such responsibility, nor have our trustees ever considered that they were under any obligation to the University of Chicago that differed in any way from the obligation which they have to other institutions of similar rank. We emphasize this point because in some quarters it has been intimated that public opinion in the Middle West and elsewhere has believed that the Rockefeller boards bore a peculiar and unique relationship to the University that was not shared by other educational institutions. For the sake of the University itself, and the necessity which it faces of developing a broad basis of financial support, we would want emphatically to disavow this opinion.96

Fosdick’s message was conveyed more bluntly three years later by Warren Weaver, the director of Natural Sciences at the Rockefeller

92. Robert M. Hutchins, “The University of Chicago, with Special Reference to Medicine,” May 15, 1940, ibid. Hutchins was forced to reply to Fosdick’s ambivalent response to this memo by insisting that the University was not seeking “preferential” treatment by making these further requests. See draft of a letter to Fosdick, undated, 1940, ibid.


95. Stevens to Woodward, May 8, 1931, General Education Board files, box 48, Development and Alumni Relations Records. Woodward noted in pencil “I don’t know what this means!” but Stevens’s meaning was actually quite clear—he hoped that Chicago would find ways to endow the activities the GEB was temporarily supporting, but from sources other than the GEB.

96. “Report of the Committee of Three of the General Education Board (Mr. Rockefeller, Jr., Mr. Young, and Mr. Fosdick) on the Chicago University Medical Project,” included in a letter from Raymond B. Fosdick to Harold Swift, December 18, 1936, box 48, ibid.
Foundation. In an informal conversation in January 1939 with Dean William Taliaferro of the Division of the Biological Sciences, he reported that “certain members of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation seem to resent what they conceive to be a feeling on the part of the University officials that the University of Chicago has a special claim on Rockefeller funds.... The upshot of this general discussion was that the [Rockefeller] Trustees would probably not be favorable to any large grant to the University at the present time.”

Fosdick’s goal—to nudge the University into “developing a broad basis of financial support”—could only be accomplished by a strategic fundraising plan, and as the flow of money from New York City began slowing, it was natural that the idea of a general fundraising campaign again reared its head. In fact, as the University’s finances deteriorated, some trustees had considered an emergency campaign as early as in 1934. The trustees commissioned another fundraising advisory firm, Tamblyn & Brown, to analyze the situation. Tamblyn reported on the University’s dire financial situation, recommending a mini-campaign to raise $400,000 in one year. In addition, they recommended increasing College enrollments as a long-term strategy and offered to help the University market itself better to prospective high school students.

No action was taken on these suggestions, but in October 1934 with Hutchins’s agreement Harold Swift removed James Stifler as chair of the Development Committee and appointed Paul Russell in his place. Russell was a College alumnus (Class of 1916), a recent appointee to the board, and a close friend of Harold Swift. Russell wrote to the full board in February 1935 urging a covert alumni campaign to close the budget gap: “The Committee on Development recognizes that a public appeal for funds is not timely but it is still of the opinion that there are individuals known to the trustees to whom the situation can and should be presented in such a way to bring a favorable response.” The committee also thought that there were alumni “who will not only give to such an object according to their ability but will cooperate with the trustees in an effort to maintain the eminence of their institution.... It is important ... that we proceed at once with personal interviews and [a] presentation of the details of the University’s urgent needs so that the reception of some substantial gifts may be assured as soon as possible.” In a further report to the board in June 1935, Russell noted that “the Committee on Development recognized that it is not timely to make a broad appeal under present conditions and that, therefore, it is important that as much as possible of the amount needed to help support the current budget and to care for other emergency needs be secured from alumni and Trustees.”

To provide a conceptual context for this effort, the board commissioned the John Price Jones Corporation in February 1936 to prepare a detailed report on the prospects of fund-raising at Chicago. In one of the many small ironies that mark our history, the University thus recalled the firm it had dismissed in 1926 to advise the board on the chances of undertaking a campaign ten years later. Jones and his staff produced a thoughtful analysis of the University’s situation, including its budget

97. W. H. Taliaferro to Hutchins, January 24, 1939, box 52, ibid.

98. “Statement and Recommendations to the University of Chicago,” January 1934, box 82, folder 11, Harold Swift Records. $200,000 was to be raised in major gifts quietly and $200,000 from alumni for scholarships.

99. “Memorandum of the Committee on Development for the attention of the Board of Trustees,” February 1935, box 82, folder 12, ibid.

100. Memorandum to the Board of Trustees, June 13, 1935, 6. This memo urged more attention to improving student enrollment, urging that “it is desirable that as large a proportion as possible of these persons shall be able to pay their own way.”
problems and the impact of the accusations of radicalism generated by the Walgreen Affair. Jones was fascinated with Hutchins, and much of the report focused on the opportunities (and problems) that Hutchins posed for fund-raising. This report, 201 pages in length, was submitted to the trustees in May 1936, together with a summary prepared by John Moulds. It argued that the University required a campaign for at least $15 million to stabilize its finances, but that the University also needed to mobilize a much larger body of leaders than was done in 1924–25 to attain this goal. Jones’s message was crucial: “The University has grown great not through dependence on student fees and current gifts, but on independence born of endowment. If this independence is to be preserved, endowment must be the main objective of fund-raising.”

Jones’s tome had little initial effect, however, other than a vague resolution by the trustees that the “University should proceed with some program for the development of public relations and a plan for securing additional funds, and that the Committee on Development be instructed to recommend a plan to the board for the attainment of these objectives.”

An alumni campaign in the context of the upcoming 1941 anniversary gained additional support in September 1936, when two Chicago trustees returned from the Harvard Tercentenary celebrations, which included a campaign that raised $2.5 million. Clarence Randall wrote to Harold Swift that he had been “thrilled” by the Harvard celebration and that “I am so obsessed with the idea that I should like to urge strongly that some suitable occasion be found for staging a similar celebration at Chicago.”

Still, James Stifler reported to Swift in December 1936 that “both Laird Bell and Max Epstein blew off to me with considerable heat this morning about the lack of aggression on the part of our Board in going at some money raising at once. I have heard the same thing from other of our trustees. I am myself not quite sure what is holding us back at this moment… I have a feeling that we should hop to it at once.”

Harold Swift responded that the board felt bound by its decision to commission another report by a public-relations expert, William Benton, whom Hutchins had urged on them. Benton was a talented public-relations specialist whom Hutchins had known since his days on the be meeting with officers from the GEB in New York on May 19, 1936. Again, New York seemed to be the easiest way out of the predicament.

101. For the Walgreen Affair, see John W. Boyer, Academic Freedom and the Modern University: The Experience of the University of Chicago, 2nd ed. (Chicago: College of the University of Chicago, 2016), 43–65.


104. Minutes of the Board of Trustees, May 14, 1936. Russell presented it to the full board without any specific recommendation on May 14, 1936. At the same meeting, Swift informed the board that a delegation of Chicagoans would...
intercollegiate debate team at Yale. Benton agreed to come out to Chicago in the fall of 1936 and essentially to repeat the John Price Jones exercise of six months earlier, but from his own perspective. While Benton completed his report, the University received some very welcome news. The GEB approved Hutchins’s request for $3 million to help to stabilize the University’s budget in December 1936, thus taking immediate pressure off University leaders.

In his confidential report to the trustees in January 1937, William Benton came to conclusions not very different from those of John Price Jones, although he was more interested in shaping positive public opinion for the University than in the instrumentalities of fund-raising. The University needed a dramatic reengineering of its public relations, but Benton also acknowledged the budget problem and advised the University to plan a full-scale campaign by 1940–41. With this report as additional evidence, the Development Committee met on January 25, 1937, and determined that the University should try to raise at least $15 million over the next five years, culminating in a celebration of the fiftieth birthday, to be “patterned after the Harvard Tercentenary.” They further recommended that “the general program suggested, without commitment as to details, on the condition that Mr. Benton will personally put into effect such parts of the program as receive the approval of the committee…. He should direct the alumni secretary; the publicity office; the speaker’s bureau; radio broadcasting; solicitation of funds; and development of material for students, donors, and others.” Benton joined the University in October 1937 as a part-time vice president, but his other activities and unsteady health prevented him from devoting full-time attention to the University’s affairs.

The full Board of Trustees approved the committee’s recommendations on February 3, 1937. But the next eighteen months were given over to more debate over exactly what kind of a campaign should be undertaken. Finally, to break the inertia, the Committee on Development recommended in late December 1938 that the University should reengage the John Price Jones Corporation to assist in planning both a general fund-raising campaign and the anniversary celebration.

As the Jones Corporation’s officer who was most familiar with the University of Chicago, Robert Duncan was assigned to the case and he returned to the University in mid-January 1939 to begin planning the second great campaign in our history. After a whirlwind of consultations, Duncan prepared a detailed action plan for a dual alumni/public campaign that would cost approximately $430,000. He submitted this document to the Board of Trustees in mid-February. General consensus emerged about the need for an alumni campaign, but much less agreement was evident about a general, public campaign. Trustee Clarence Randall argued that

109. Minutes of the Board of Trustees, January 14, 1937, 3. Although the formal use of the money was to support the Medical School, the GEB allowed the University to use part of it to stabilize the general budget.
111. “Memoranda for Development Committee,” undated [January 1937], box 82, folder 13, Harold Swift Papers. In folder 14 there is a letter from Swift to Russell, February 1, 1937, indicating that he had edited Russell’s memo. See also the Minutes of the Board of Trustees, February 3, 1937, 13–14.
a campaign beyond the alumni would be a waste of time since “the University could not raise money from trades and industry, ... the University couldn’t raise funds from the Commercial Club group, or from the Chicago Club group, ... [and] the University (or at least the President) was definitely unpopular with the business interests and would not be supported.” Sewell Avery insisted that “he considered it entirely inappropriate to think the University could raise money from the business men of Chicago” because “the University (or at least the President) was unpopular” and because it was “too much affiliated with New Deal ideas.” As of mid-March 1939 Laird Bell was uncertain what should be done, and concerned about cost, he urged that the University not “splurge” in a time of fiscal duress.114

Most important, Robert Hutchins was skeptical, being especially concerned with Robert Duncan’s call that large amounts of money and organizational resources should be committed. He wondered if a campaign would be the best use of “time, energy, organization and funds.”115 Hutchins noted that during the 1924–25 campaign, the University had received forty-one major gifts from non-alumni. He suggested merely contacting those forty-one people again, and those who had already been cultivated since then, in order to save the time and trouble of a campaign.

Trustees like Herbert Zimmermann (Class of 1901) were conflicted as whether to have a focused drive, seeking money, or a more general informational movement. Their ambivalence came in reaction to a questionnaire that Charlton Beck, the Alumni Association secretary, sent to two hundred local and national Chicago alumni about their receptivity to a fund-raising drive for the fiftieth anniversary. Of these alumni, 23 percent were opposed to a drive and a further percent were noncommittal, while the opinion of those who gave the most generous gifts in 1924–25 was solidly negative; further, many of these same alumni expressed an “unhappy feeling” about the University.116 Not surprisingly, Zimmerman was quoted in Benton’s report that “the Alumni feel like hell. They think they’ve been badly neglected, that the University is indifferent to them. This is a bad time to ask them for money even though the time is near when people will have money to give.”117

Eventually, reacting to dismal reports about the state of the budget, the Committee on Development forced the issue, voting in June 1939 to proceed with campaigns both for the alumni and for the wider Chicago public.118 The Committee made it clear that “beginning on July 1, 1939, a discrepancy of some $1.2 million between probable income and the cost of operating the University at the present level” would become known, that “any plans for a campaign between now and the Anniversary in September 1941 must take this fact into consideration,” and that “the only way by

114. See Swift’s notes of these conversations in “Memoranda for P. S. R. [Paul S. Russell],” [1939], box 201, folder 2, ibid.; Bell to Swift, March 14, 1939, folder 2, ibid. Randall’s negative view is confirmed by a later letter of Frank McNair. See McNair to Randall, February 7, 1941, box 201, folder 3, ibid.
116. Zimmermann to Paul S. Russell, April 20, 1939, Duncan to Zimmermann, April 19, 1939, box 7, folder 5, VP Papers. See also “Minutes of the Meeting of the Alumni Committee on Cooperation with the Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration, June 27, 1939,” box 201, folder 6, Harold Swift Papers, and Swift to Moulds, “confidential” June 12, 1939, box 201, folder 2, ibid.
118. See “A Suggested Report from the Committee on Development to the Board of Trustees,” in Moulds to Swift, July 3, 1939, box 201, folder 21, Harold Swift Papers. Duncan wrote to Paul Russell on June 30, summarizing where the situation stood.
which the discrepancy between recurring income and recurring expense can be met is by raising new money.”

In recommending both an alumni campaign and a general campaign, the committee also cautioned that these interventions would not succeed unless “each member of the Board … by his personal activity take[s] an individual part in the campaign.… It is essential that every member of the Board assume[s] a sense of individual responsibility in completing the Anniversary Fund. Unless such spirit pervades the Board, the campaign should not be launched.”

The committee’s recommendations were approved by the board on July 13, 1939. The campaign was to seek $12 million under the guise of an “Anniversary Fund” and be launched on September 1, 1939. Final planning for the campaign ensued in the summer of 1939.

Since the University extended its contract with the John Price Jones Corporation, Robert Duncan became a key actor in the shaping of the total campaign strategy. Duncan requested the opportunity to interview Robert Hutchins one-on-one to gain insights for possible themes for the campaign. This remarkable interview, which was recorded in a verbatim transcript and took place on June 19, 1939, revealed much about the possibilities and limits of fund-raising at Chicago. The goal of the meeting was to find a coherent theme to organize the campaign. Duncan asked Hutchins to outline his vision for the University over the next ten to fifteen years. Hutchins responded by arguing that this way of framing the question was misleading, since no one in 1939 was in a position to justify any new initiatives. Rather, the only purpose of the campaign could be to control the deficit problem, or as Hutchins put it, “Keep what we’ve got!” This troubled Duncan as well as John Howe and John Moulds (who sat in on the session), since it would force the University to try to raise money to cover deficits, which ran counter to the conventional wisdom about how to project a positive campaign image. They thus pressed Hutchins as to what he would really like to do with the University in the next decade. Hutchins admitted that if it were up to him he would stress integration and consolidation to a much greater degree than heretofore. Howe and Duncan thought this might be the angle they were looking for, but Hutchins torpedoed that possibility with the comment that what he thought about the University’s future and what the faculty thought were two very different things:

Mr. Duncan: Is it possible for you to tell us in what ways you would like to see the University made better in this process?
President Hutchins: Yes, but it couldn’t be published!
Mr. Duncan: You don’t think any of it could be published?
President Hutchins: No, sir.
Mr. Duncan: Not even enough of it to raise some money?
President Hutchins: It wouldn’t help to raise any money and it would only antagonize the Faculty to a great extent.

119. Committee on Development to the Board of Trustees, July 13, 1939, box 201, folder 2, ibid.
120. Minutes of the Board of Trustees, July 13, 1939, 232.
121. Donald P. Bean (Class of 1917), the business manager of the University of Chicago Press, was installed as the executive director of both the alumni and public campaign efforts, with assistance from John Howe, William Morgenstern, campaign publicity director, George Mather, executive director of the alumni campaign, and other staff members from Benton’s office. The University opened a downtown office and organized alumni gift committees and a special gifts committee.
Duncan gamely suggested that it might well be a novel idea to try to raise money for the deficit; perhaps the urgent circumstances of the University could be the central message. But Hutchins was not convinced. The exchange is fascinating because it showed the paradoxical situation in which Hutchins found himself. He could not try to “sell” a new program of integration because the faculty would disown it. Instead, he had to raise money to keep the status quo alive and well. He would do so largely via a booster’s argument that the University of Chicago was the best university in the United States, and it was important to the nation that it remain so. Duncan also asked Hutchins if he intended to go back to the GEB for another large grant. Hutchins answered affirmatively and with seeming confidence that he could talk Fosdick and the other GEB officials into another round of largesse. In this he was, as we know now, mistaken.

The final message of the campaign was thus not radical innovation and change—themes that one might have expected from Hutchins—but continuity of the high quality, intellectually distinguished, and financially encumbered status quo. The final campaign pamphlet, on which John Howe and Duncan collaborated, developed this theme superbly. This pamphlet, entitled Your University and Its Future, argued that endowed universities like Chicago enjoyed a very special and implicitly privileged role within the system of higher education in America, and that they deserved to be sustained and protected, especially in a time of severe financial problems (which were discussed at length and with candor). Brilliant invocations of American national interest and the greatness of the research university as a guarantor of the future of civilization in time of war replaced bold new ideas on the future of the University, “at least until a more peaceful order is restored America has a special responsibility to future generations everywhere.”

Yet the tensions with the senior faculty to which Hutchins had alluded in his conversation with Duncan were overshadowed by two other issues that would determine the fate of the campaign—the discontent with the University among members of the downtown business elite, which also paralyzed some of our trustees, and grumbling and unhappiness among some segments of the alumni. Hutchins’s eloquent defense of the idea of academic freedom during the Walgreen Affair in 1935 and his equally staunch defense of Paul Douglas’s social reformist rhetoric merited him great admiration on campus, but it also irritated many wealthy Chicago businessmen. William Benton noted in his 1937 report that “wide acclaim would Mr. Hutchins win in some quarters if for New Year’s he resolved to fire, or to attempt to fire, certain members of the faculty on the charge of radicalism. These are influential quarters, including some of Chicago’s wealthiest citizens, many potential donors to the University.”

The survey of local opinion in the city undertaken by the Jones Corporation in 1936 encountered numerous leading citizens who affirmed the high intellectual standing and prestige of the University but who were also critical of its teaching “radicalism.” The authors concluded that “there is a widespread feeling that certain elements within the University are

123. For Hutchins’s sometimes turbulent relations with key groups of senior faculty in the 1930s and 1940s, see Mary Ann Dzuback, Robert M. Hutchins: Portrait of an Educator (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), esp. 185–207.

124. Your University and Its Future (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1941), 4. See the files in box 12, folder 15, VP Papers.

125. Ibid.

unjustifiably stirring up social discontent, and that the University itself has not been sufficiently diligent in controlling this.”

Nor did Hutchins’s subsequent espousal of isolationist rhetoric in January 1941 go down well with pro-British leaders in the city. Harold Ickes, FDR’s secretary of the interior and Chicago alumnus, recorded in his private diary in April 1941, “Hutchins has jeopardized the endowment drive that comes to a head early next fall. [Charles] Merriam thought that he was looking for a large sum of money from Marshall Field, and Field is quite distinctly on the other side. Dr. Fosdick had remarked to Merriam that it seemed curious that ever since he was appointed president at Chicago, Hutchins had made no statement on a political subject but that now he should take the position that he has. The Rockefellers are also against him on this issue.”

The “radicalism” charge also muddied the waters for some members of the Board of Trustees and other alumni who were successful businessmen. When a wealthy businessman (and undergraduate alumnus) A. C. Allyn wrote to John Nuveen refusing to join the alumni campaign committee in November 1939, he explained that “my interest in the University of Chicago has faded materially since the school has been so conducted in recent years as to make it unattractive to both of my boys who, despite my interest in the University of Chicago, refused to consider it as a place of education. As a consequence, I question if I would be of any material assistance in this undertaking of yours. In other words, while I would be glad to do almost anything you, as an individual, wanted me to do, I am not particularly sympathetic to the University of Chicago or its operations.”

One trustee, Charles Goodspeed, bluntly insisted that the faculty needed to confront the radicalism charge before the trustees could ask for money in a public campaign. He wrote to James Stifler in March 1935:

As no increase in the usual source of income is probable and as it would be detrimental to the work of the University to further reduce expenditures, the only solution of the situation seems to be an appeal to the public for contributions to support the budget. Unfortunately, however, the public, due to the outside activities of a very small number of the faculty, has the impression that the University of Chicago is an institution which is encouraging those elements which are working for the destruction of our American institutions. This impression, which is a grave injustice to the faculty and student body of the University, will have to be overcome if we are to receive any important support from the public. It may be wrong for anyone to accumulate wealth but the fact remains that the University is dependent upon accumulated wealth for its support and cannot hope to receive the support if this impression is not rectified. This is a problem for the faculty and not the Trustees. … The Trustees wish to present the situation to the faculty and request that they suggest a plan for solving these problems and assure them of their support and cooperation.


129. Allyn to Nuveen, November 18, 1939, box 201, folder 4, Harold Swift Papers. Allyn was an investment banker who was Class of 1908.

130. CBG to Stifler, [March 1935], who sent copy to Swift, box 82, folder 12, ibid.
Other trustees who were close to the College were disturbed by what they felt to be a privileging of graduate over undergraduate life in the campaign rhetoric. Ernest Quantrell (Class of 1905) wrote to Swift in October 1939: “While I realize the importance of research and graduate work at Chicago, we should not forget to emphasize our undergraduate department. Harvard seems to be a leader in both departments and there is no reason why Chicago should not be the same. I have the impression that the results of our alumni campaign will depend largely on former students who did nothing but undergraduate work as contrasted with graduate students. If this is true, it is shortsighted not to emphasize teaching and undergraduate work in our fund raising literature. So far, the greater emphasis has been on research.” It is possible that Quantrell was worried that Harvard seemed to be educating the children of the social class that generated its trustees and top benefactors, while Chicago was not.

In the face of such intramural wrangling, it was not surprising that the trustees presented a divided front in the fund-raising efforts between 1939 and 1941. As the campaign wore on, William Benton commented on the failure of trustees to raise funds effectively. They were well meaning, helped to respond to criticisms, and gladly distributed brochures, but “with the exception of four or five trustees who have definitely asked the people assigned to them for money, the balance have confined their assistance to advice and help … most [of the] advice and help have now been given…. What remains is the final drive for money, for which the trustees in most cases do not seem to be qualified.” Benton concluded:

I believe we have counted far too much on the trustees to do a job that the trustees will not and cannot do…. For a long variety of reasons familiar to you, trustees are not qualified by the nature of their business connections, nor sufficiently informed about the University, to do a real soliciting job. Even when a trustee comes in with a gift of $1,000, we should assume that the gift is primarily an evidence of interest on the part of the prospect: perhaps that particular prospect could give $100,000 were the story properly presented. I remind you of Mr. Frank McNair’s remark of some months ago that there are 100 men in the city who might give $100,000 apiece to this Campaign. To date, apart from our trustees, only one such gift has come in as a result of the Campaign.

Robert Duncan’s assessment was even harsher than Benton’s: “Too many reasons were found last year for not going ahead. Initial refusals were given too much weight.” Moreover, the Board of Trustees bore major responsibility and “the cause of this lack of spirit appears to lie mainly with the Board of Trustees. The Board does not yet seem sufficiently convinced of the need for reaching the campaign goals. Until the Board regards the University’s situation with more seriousness and a number of its members get excited about it, one cannot expect the crusading spirit among subordinate alumni leaders. Coverage of any respectable proportion of 48,000 alumni scattered throughout America cannot be accomplished without leaders dedicated to a cause, and that dedication is not yet sufficiently serious.”


The campaign also generated many responses and commentaries about
the University among alumni leaders and ordinary alumni who had an
opinion to offer or a bone to pick. Hutchins could count on the solid
support of most of the current students in the College, and those students
who were mobilized to meet with alumni or other groups during the
campaign made an excellent impression. William Benton related that
Professor Carey Croneis had told him that at several alumni group pre-
sentations “he had seen undergraduates at these alumni meetings who
were much more effective than the members of the faculty.”

The situation among the alumni was more complicated. Robert
Duncan had warned the trustees in April 1939, that “these feelings on
the part of influential alumni, if left as they are today, will be a big handi-
cap in any campaign.” The conclusion of the 1924–25 campaign had
led some alumni to expect that the University would continue to cultivate
them and that over time, this would lead to impressive financial support
for the University. In 1926, a group of alumni observed to Harold Swift
that “with the passing of the next fifteen years, the Alumni body will
have grown in numbers, wealth, and influence. There will then be living
generations of Alumni comparable with those of any other university of
hundreds of years of history. A systematic sowing of the seed will yield
an impressive harvest when the time comes. The devotion of the coming
years to the cultivation of Alumni, therefore, would seem to be advisable
and is strongly recommended.”

Asked to comment, Harold Swift agreed: “Proper handling of Alumni
relations should lead to the fullest understanding of the University, and
through the Alumni we should have interpreters of the University
throughout the width and breadth of the land. Thus, if the University
continues to do its splendid work, and if the Alumni are properly informed
and cultivated, the most ideal result should be expected—a full under-
standing and appreciation which shall lead to moral and financial
support.” But Swift also added an important caveat: “I think we ought
to keep in mind all the way through that our Alumni are a peculiar,
heterogeneous lot, and that if we adopt standard practice of following
Alumni, we shall probably go wrong. In my opinion, there is no institu-
tion in the country that has as difficult an Alumni contact problem as
we, so that I think we should keep the detailed facts always in mind.”

Swift’s candid notation of an “alumni contact problem” suggested that
the University needed to take considerable care to try to develop relation-
ships with its alumni. Yet from its earliest days the independence generated
by Rockefeller’s huge gifts had resulted in little pragmatic need for sus-
taining ongoing personal or professional relationships with the
undergraduate alumni. That a considerable number of our alumni were
graduates of MA or PhD programs complicated the issue still more.

134. Benton to Hutchins, November 21, 1939, 2, box 9, folder 23, VP Papers.
135. Duncan to Herbert Zimmerman, April 19, 1939, box 7, folder 5, ibid.
136. “University-Alumni Relations,” 45, box 156, folder 27, Harold Swift
Papers.
137. Swift to Earl D. Hostetter and Adolph Pierrot, April 30, 1926, 2–3, 11–12,
ibid. He also observed: “It is easy to say that continued Alumni contacts will
produce cash in the long run, and it is probably true, but that doesn’t establish
how much is a logical expenditure, particularly when the University is greatly in
need of funds to carry on its academic pursuits. It seems to me quite analogous
to a new business, where it is easy and probably wise to say that a new business
should spend money in advertising, but when demands are enormous and
income scarce, the question is—where is the money to come from?” (p. 2)
The problem of alumni relations was still unresolved ten years later. In 1936 Herbert Zimmerman, who would join the Board of Trustees a year later, wrote to Paul Russell, urging that the University spend more money on alumni information and noting that “organization among our alumni is, as you know, difficult. They have no class organizations and experience has shown that they can only be brought together by an intellectual attraction. If we are going to have them friendly to the University for a campaign, the cultivation should start intensively right off, and only if the University treats it as a major problem will it be successful.”

By the later 1930s, the University was thus in a bind: it now needed alumni and especially undergraduate alumni support, and it was forced to solicit their cooperation, even though it had made little effort to sustain the kind of strong connections called for by the writers of the 1926 appeal. Some might fall back into private cynicism—William Benton once quipped that “as far as I know, every university regards its alumni pretty much as a necessary evil, good only for providing funds and students”—but most senior administrators and senior faculty understood that better communications with the alumni were highly desirable.

Inevitably, when the door cracked open, alumni with divergent opinions rushed through, trying to tell the administration how to improve the University. The interventions of Allan Marin are a good example of the challenges generated by a loyal, indeed deeply committed, undergraduate alumnus who thought he could improve the running of the University. A 1934 graduate with an undergraduate business degree, Marin lived in Hyde Park and was a member of the alumni executive committee in Chicago. He was not shy about offering unsolicited advice to everyone associated with the campaign.

Marin was convinced that the University faced serious challenges with its alumni. He estimated that 40 percent of the (approximately) 40,000 alumni in 1938 were teachers and of the rest (24,000) only 70 percent were men, thus leaving only 16,800 as (in his words) “good prospects” for the fund-raising campaign. In dealing with the latter group, Marin believed that Chicago was handicapped because the alumni felt a “lack of sentiment about the University” and that “the University has failed to instill that spirit [of sympathy and understanding] in the alumni body, by and large, and this failure goes back to its relations to the undergraduate body.” Citing his own experience—plus those of his sister, brother, and other Chicago alumni whom he knew—Marin concluded that Chicago suffered from an undergraduate student body too small in proportion to number of graduate students. Moreover, since more than 50 percent of the undergraduates lived at home, the University was for them a mere “day school” that did not generate loyalty. These students came to the University to attend classes, use the libraries, and pass exams, but they did not develop strong bonds of affection. The University in turn deliberately encouraged

139. Benton to Mather, April 11, 1940, box 13, folder 2, VP Papers.
140. Howe wrote to Benton, “Marin’s greatest asset is his vigor. He has ideas—some good, many not good, few of them new. What he’d apparently like to do is develop ideas at large—radio, alumni, donor relations, or whatever—and try to work some of them out. This won’t work very well. He doesn’t know the University too well…. I suspect that most of our men—Beck, Bean, Dryer, et cetera—wouldn’t think many of his ideas were very good, and would resent him.” Memo of March 27, 1940, box 9, folder 18, ibid.
141. Marin to Hutchins, March 13, 1939, box 13, folder 1, ibid.
142. Marin to John Nuveen, July 24, 1939, ibid.
a feeling of “cold intellectuality, [and] reflects it in contacts with students and student organizations.” Marin further insisted that a spirit of warmth and friendliness does not seem to me to be present on campus. It is not surprising, then, that this same spirit may be lacking in the majority of the alumni, many of whom would naturally get dewy-eyed at the mention of the University. I do not overlook the many loyal alumni who give generously of their time and money to the University. But I claim that these people are by far in minority. Any general appeal for support to the alumni body as a whole must, in my opinion, rely principally on the degree of friendliness it is able to generate. There are too many genuinely pressing appeals being made for charities, refugee funds, relief, etc. Conditions are different now than they were at the time of the last campaign (1924). And for that reason, I think the appeal for the University will have to be even stronger than at that time.\(^{143}\)

Whether Marin’s views were shared by many other younger alumni is uncertain. A survey of 1,085 students in 1938 who studied under the New Plan between 1931 and 1935 found most of them quite positive about their educational experiences in the College and about the University’s culture of tolerance and liberalism, but a majority (78 percent) felt that their education had not helped them select a job or a profession and almost half (46.7 percent) thought that there was too little “college spirit” at the University. When asked to compare the opportunities for social contacts at Chicago with those at the college or university they had subsequently attended, exactly half (50 percent) of the 179 students who transferred to another institution said it was worse (as opposed to 26.4 percent who found it the same, and 23.6 percent who found it better).\(^{144}\) But the real problems for the campaign organizers related to the opinions of alumni who graduated before Robert Hutchins came to the University. The senior leaders of the campaign came primarily from the pre-Hutchins college. A list of the local and regional chairmen of the University of Chicago Alumni Foundation in October 1939 indicated that of 213 men and women, all across the country, only 35 had graduated since 1931. Almost all of them were undergraduate alumni, suggesting the reliance on college graduates to carry the fund-raising torch for the University.\(^{145}\)

Yet it was precisely among the pre-1930 alumni cohorts that the University had the most problems. Some older alumni resented Hutchins’s innovations, which seem to cast doubt on the efficacy of their degree programs before 1930. Still others resented the “radical” aura that they imputed to the Hutchins administration. Martha Landers Thompson, Class of 1903 and the wife of historian James Westfall Thompson, captured these sentiments when she wrote to Harold Swift in October 1939 that “in the last drive [1923–25] the Alumni stood behind President Burton and the University policies, and financial conditions were much better than at present. You know that the recent policies of the University

\(^{143}\) Ibid. To prove his point, Marin contacted twelve local alumni and asked them to respond to a survey developed by the Alumni Council with various questions, including, “What, by and large, is your opinion of the University’s relations with its alumni?” The responses he received were almost uniformly negative, from “remote,” “poorest possible” “quite formal and distant,” and “University seems indifferent to alumni” to “I do not think the University maintains any kind of close relations with alumni except to invite them to the [Interfraternity] Sing and ask for contributions.”

\(^{144}\) “Students at the University of Chicago,” 7–9, box 9, folder 23, VP Papers.

\(^{145}\) Box 156, folder 3, Harold Swift Paper.
have caused much discussion and criticism. Many of the older Alumni probably would not contribute and the younger ones who have worked under President Hutchins and might wish to contribute are in no position to do so. In Berkeley there are very few graduates of the University of Chicago except those on the California faculty. I do not think you will find much enthusiasm for the present policies of the University of Chicago among the members of this faculty."

Such views were not isolated. Trustee (and undergraduate alumnus) Ernest Quantrell held a luncheon meeting with senior alumni representatives at the University Club in January 1940 to discuss their concerns about the University. Quantrell encountered lots of criticism of the recent decision to end intercollegiate football and of a perceived indifference to the fact that many children of alumni were no longer interested in attending the University. But the following exchange also took place, which highlighted another major problem:

Val Appel stated that when Teddy Linn passed away his affection for the University ended. He resented the statement a young faculty member made on the occasion for the twentieth reunion of his class to the effect that a college education twenty years ago was the same as a high school education today. Several of those present resented the implication that the education of their day was poor and that the only good education that was being received was that at the present time. Appel greatly resented the fact that on the occasion of their twentieth reunion the President did not answer a letter which had been sent to him regarding the class reunion and that no representative was appointed to greet the class. He felt there was a marked feeling of indifference on the part of the Administration regarding the Alumni."

Hutchins was seen as flippant and smart-alecky to these senior alumni, but Quantrell was careful to note that during the five hours of “picking the University to pieces, communism was not mentioned once.”

Given the extraordinary publicity with which Robert Hutchins and Dean Chauncey Boucher launched their general-education New Plan curriculum in the early 1930s, it was perhaps understandable if older alumni felt consigned to a form of academic second-class citizenship. If Chicago only came to provide a really first-rate education after the creation of the New Plan in 1930–31, then what kind of education did those who graduated in the 1910s and 1920s receive? And was the New Plan really preferable to what had gone before? These questions must have grated on some older alumni, as Vallee Appel’s comments suggest. Carey Croneis, a professor in the Department of Geology, insisted that many of the pre-1930 alumni whom he knew—who were “the only ones with important resources”—disapproved of the level of freedom given to students under the New Plan (not having to come to class, in engaging in “disrespectful” attitudes toward the faculty and administration, etc.), that many “deplore [Hutchins’s] anti-vocationalist standpoint, and that some of them, and many of the general public, will have nothing to do with an organization which sponsors it.”

The leaders of the campaign received numerous comments from

146. Thompson to Swift, October 7, 1939, box 156, folder 1, ibid.
147. “Confidential Report of Mr. Quantrell’s Luncheon at the University Club,” January 17, 1940, box 156, folder 10, ibid. Vallee O. Appel was the president of the Fulton Market Cold Storage Company and a graduate of the Class of 1911 who also received a JD in 1914. He was a personal friend of Harold Swift.
148. Croneis to John Nuveen, March 19, 1940, box 82, folder 18, ibid.
alumni correspondents. One alumna, Beth Fogg (Class of 1910), wrote that “since the launching of the New Plan and the breakdown of all traditions under Mr. Hutchens [sic], I have been questioning the place of the alumni in the University planning. To realize that we are alone important when funds are low doesn’t arouse me to a feeling of enthusiasm. I realize that alumni are obnoxious, but I am strongly opposed to Mr. Hutchens’ attitude that he can’t waste his time listening to the unanointed.” Still, Fogg’s loyalty got the better of her, since she sent her son to the College, from which he graduated in 1938, and in the end she agreed to serve on the Alumni Advisory Committee.149

Another alumnus, Tom Cowley (Class of 1931), argued that the University needed to pay more attention to athletics and to the “undergraduate side of the University,” and he resented “the overemphasis on the graduate aspects of the school, which mind you are fine, but when they result in such one sided activities we kind of squirm.”150 A third correspondent, G. Harold Earle (Class of 1911), observed, “I think the attitude of the present administration of the University toward well-rounded undergraduate life is most unfortunate. I suspect it is having a very strong influence on the alumni today…. It seems to me that the University of Chicago today decidedly lacks the atmosphere of experiences which unites the undergraduate body into a unit, and that those experiences of college life which keep the alumni interested in their alma mater are somehow lacking…. I wonder if other alumni are particularly enthusiastic about assisting financially to make the University of Chicago purely a graduate institution.”151

Helen Norris (Class of 1907) was deeply unhappy with the educational experiments on campus, and she did not mean football: “I do not altogether approve of what is going on at the University (and I exclude football though I love to watch it).” Norris was willing to come to a fund-raising dinner, however, “because I have been convinced that I will not thereby be condoning anything. I hope you understand.”152

Finally, an exchange between Hutchins and Howell W. Murray is illuminating. Like Ernest Quantrell, Murray was a loyal undergraduate alumnus (Class of 1914) and a successful investment banker, and like Quantrell, Murray donated a much-valued prize that the College still awards each Spring Quarter. In December 1939, Murray wrote Hutchins with a detailed critique, urging more attention to undergraduate life, noting that most of the money raised in the 1924 campaign came from undergraduate alumni, who also made up two-thirds of the total alumni body. Murray argued that the administration should support the fraternity system (which, he insisted, was very different from that of Yale), encourage class organization and reunions, and look to future alumni relations: “We are all proud of the outstanding record of the University, but it seems to me that the undergraduate school can give its students a better rounded college experience and this has bearing on the alumni attitude toward the University. It also has an important bearing on the public relations of the University.” Hutchins responded by admitting that “the alumni who have done their undergraduate work at the University are the most important alumni to the University in connection with any money raising efforts.” But Hutchins then argued that the quarter system

149. Beth Fogg Upton to Nuveen, November 8, 1939, box 201, folder 5, ibid.
150. Tom Cowley to Clifton Utley, November 6, 1939, ibid.
151. G. Harold Earle to Charlton Beck, November 1, 1939, ibid.
152. Norris to Swift, January 18, 1940, box 200, folder 16, Harold Swift Papers. Swift also received a generous note from Lawrence Whiting, to the effect that he was sure that the University would rebalance itself in time.
and the fact that 63 percent of all students in the College receiving bachelor’s degrees transferred here from another college made the construction of class identity very difficult. The two were talking past each other.153

To meet such criticisms head on and to reestablish personal ties with as many alumni as possible, campaign officials organized alumni meetings around the country in the early winter of 1940 that featured senior faculty as guests of honor. These meetings were a considerable success. Suspicions and questions could be answered on the spot, and the alumni reassured. The alumni seemed honored to meet senior faculty up close and to spend time with them. Of Professor Anton Carlson’s visit to Washington, DC, one alumnus wrote, “I feel that one of the finest things which the University can do is to send a man like Dr. Carlson to our alumni meetings. Making no pretense to be an orator, he nevertheless by his sincerity, frankness, and subtle humor immediately wins the attention and respect of his audience. No one sleeps during Dr. Carlson’s talks and

I am sure that he even startles some out of their lethargy in thinking. Dr. Carlson not only says what he thinks but he thinks a lot and therefore has something worthwhile to say.”154 Professor John Wilson’s appearance in St. Paul, Minnesota, was just as successful. D. B. Smith wrote, “I was mighty glad that Dr. Wilson came to the Twin Cities for several reasons. In the first place I found him to be a darn good egg; in the second place I learned a great deal on a subject that has always fascinated me and in the third place it gave me an opportunity to become acquainted with your brother…. The evening meeting at the Saint Paul Institute was unusually well handled by Dr. Wilson. He had everyone’s tongue hanging out for more information and then stopped talking. In other words, everyone was very enthused with him.”155

Hutchins too went on the road, and—given his charisma, eloquence, and power as a public speaker—he was almost always able to win his audiences over, at least temporarily. From Tulsa, Oklahoma, came a report that “the President gets an A plus on today’s performance. Talked with business leaders for a couple of hours and acted as though he enjoyed it. Made a darned good impression. Talked to two reporters without batting an eye. Made a corking good speech to the alumni and answered questions for 45 minutes, after which he stuck around and shook every hand presented, with the graciousness of a true gentleman.”156 Even on the North Shore, which was the preserve of many conservative alumni

153. Howell Murray to Hutchins, December 1, 1939, and Hutchins to Murray, December 8, 1939, box 201, folder 5, ibid. Hutchins’s notation about the large number of transfer students should also be put in the context of the fact that in 1939 nearly 67 percent of the then current College students had to work to put themselves through the College, compared to 6 percent in 1910. Residential patterns also affected class loyalty, since in 1938, 66 percent of all men students and 54 percent of all women students in the College lived at home and commuted to the University. See “Facts about Undergraduates,” box 12, folder 3, VP Papers. Hutchins’s attitudes about fraternities were more complicated. Fraternities continued to exist during the 1930s. The total number of fraternities declined from 26 to 17, but the number of members declined only slightly, from 682 in 1932 to 630 in 1940. Although Hutchins did not encourage the fraternities, he did loyally show up each year at the Interfraternity Sing, and stood with the members of Alpha Delta Phi, since he himself had joined that fraternity as a college student at Yale. I am grateful to Paul Wagner for providing me with this information.


155. Smith to Mather, February 26, 1940, box 201, folder 11, ibid.

156. Report of January 22, 1940, box 201, folder 10, ibid. Hutchins was treated as a celebrity in Fort Worth, Texas, where he inspected the local public library and visited three public schools, being accompanied by the local president of the board of education. Report of January 24, 1940, ibid.
who distrusted his policies, Hutchins was able to do some good. A report on a dinner for alumni from Kenilworth, Highland Park, Glencoe, and other posh suburbs argued that the attendance of 184 guests (out of 700 invited) to hear Hutchins speak was gratifying in view of the unusual resistance to the University which is evident among the large majority of alumni in this region. To generalize, most of the alumni are graduates of the College in the pre-war era who had strong fraternity attachments and who are proud of the football teams of their era. The recent years of depression, the elimination of many of their fraternity chapters, a conservative point of view with regard to politics and social legislation, the biased and too frequently erroneous opinion of the University’s administration and the subconscious tendency to oppose its actions and confuse it with and hold it responsible for the national administration are possible bases for their resistance. Fortunately, a few of the least enthusiastic were at the dinner, and in some cases their conversion from anti- to pro-administration was noticeable.

The report concluded: “One fact is outstanding: in accomplishing good will for the University and stemming the tide of antagonism to it, the dinner undoubtedly helped. If such an event had been held annually over the past years, the pledge results would undoubtedly have been better.”

The early 1940 regional meetings and lectures may have generated considerable goodwill, but the campaign staff in Chicago and in the regions still found it difficult to generate effective participation among professionally successful alumni for the actual work of the campaign. At a meeting of the Campaign Steering Committee on January 3, 1941, “there was considerable discussion on the question raised by Mr. McNair as to whether the alumni leadership could be obtained. Zimmermann said it was difficult to get the alumni in the upper brackets enthusiastic enough to fire [up] the workers. Mr. Gordon said that he did not think the interest and leadership of the prominent alumni could be obtained; that he had spent a large amount of time on the ‘glamour boys’ this spring and they had either refused to help or were apathetic.”

Some regional organizers faced considerable challenges in generating real enthusiasm. Nell C. Henry (Class of 1912) wrote to Swift in late January 1940, complaining that the local chair of the Cleveland area was doing nothing. She observed to her fellow alumnus Clifton Utley that the lack of response here in Cleveland is getting me down somewhat. Just to show you what one careless speech can do—I have today talked with a man who gave $500 to the Development Fund [in 1924], and whose wife (then single and teaching) gave $300. They are not giving one cent this time, because Dean Boucher said in a talk here that the “small” alumni gifts were not a drop in the bucket—the University needed “large” gifts. They decided that the need for their gifts was in no way commensurate with their importance to themselves. She had paid hers out of saving because she was not employed part of the time when payments were due. So it goes! About one third of the people we approach refuse to give


158. “Steering Committee,” January 3, 1941, box 201, folder 18, ibid.

159. Henry to Swift, January 28, 1940, box 156, folder 7, ibid.
anything at all. It makes me feel that I have failed. I wish I knew the answer.160

Rudy Matthews (Class of 1914), who was responsible for the alumni campaign in Florida, complained in October 1939 about a lack of class organization and the need to restore confidence among the alumni: “We fumble the ball of creating good will as badly as do the Germans. Sometimes write to me how much active support you expect from all these Ph.D.’s we rattle off in listing our achievements? Damn little, is my guess, is what we’ll get.”161 A friend of Matthews in Florida, Douglas Ball (Class of 1916), who hosted a fund-raising event, also found that most alumni in Miami were “not particularly interested” in the University: “Even those like Red Cunningham for whom we reserved dinner did not show up, and many others who said they could not come to dinner but promised to attend the meeting afterwards, failed to appear.” Ball insisted that “you can’t get away from the fact that the school has neglected the alumni, and it will take a lot of work to bring back any number into the fold.”162

The situation in Los Angeles was also troublesome. Norman Barker (Class of 1908) reported in January 1939 to Swift that “there are only a very small per cent of alumni that are hostile to the policy of the University. Many want to be active, but they do not know just what to do.”163 Later he confessed that he was meeting many disappointments in organizing a local committee, largely from “previous inactivity,” but hoped that this effort would help in future. John Moulds reported in May 1940 to Quantrell about the situation in Los Angeles that “many of the men … were not sufficiently enthusiastic to get out and work at the job of personal solicitation. As a result the campaign in the Los Angeles area was heading almost entirely toward a mail solicitation.”164

Of course, these comments do not differentiate between the views of graduate and undergraduate alumni. One might expect more zeal from the undergraduate alumni, but Chicago had a relatively large graduate alumni pool by 1940, mainly those who came to Hyde Park for a master’s degree. The attitudes of the MA alumni, many of whom were in school teaching, made the alumni loyalty problem still more complicated. An observation from an alumni gathering in Michigan illustrates this point.

At a meeting in Muskegon, as reported by Howard Mort, the local chair was Harold Caesar, a local school principal. Mort noted that Caesar was very dedicated and committed but he “explains that the few businessmen who are alumni are hard to interest in the University. He was unable to get any of them to attend this meeting. Even the teachers are lukewarm about Chicago, insisting that they had little student life while there and simply went to get higher degrees for purposes of advancement in their

160. Henry to Clifton M. Utley, February 23, 1940, box 201, folder 11, ibid.
161. Matthews to Utley, October 31, 1939, box 156, folder 9, ibid.
162. Ball to Matthews, March 6, 1940, ibid.
163. Barker to Swift, October 29, 1939, box 156, folder 5, Harold Swift Papers.
164. The situation was similar in New York, where Ernest Quantrell reported weak results. John Moulds noted that of those who gave, the amount was often much below what had been expected. Moulds to Quantrell, May 15, 1940, ibid. Grumbling was also heard in Chicago. At a luncheon for local Chicago chairs of the alumni campaign in March 1940, an alumni leader from Hyde Park “pointed out that too huge a task had been given them. He outlined at length the difficulties he had experienced in getting people to come to meetings—of getting those who came to agree to work, etc. He referred bitterly to the remarks of a Trustee’s son who came to a meeting and said he had discussed the University with men on La Salle Street and could not find himself willing to go out and ask for funds.” “Luncheon for Chicago Chairmen,” March 30, 1940, box 201, folder 12, Harold Swift Papers.
teaching.” Harold Swift found similar problems in Orlando, Florida. He reported that “the meeting impressed me as fairly typical, an intelligent and interested group (three or four physicians, two or three theologians, most of the others in education), without much prospect to the University financially.” Rudy Matthews confirmed Swift’s estimate when he wrote, “I would like to defer appealing for subscription until next Fall here in Florida. With the lack of interest and the large majority of our prospects [being] graduate students it will take several more meetings to recreate the loyalty necessary to sign on the dotted line.”

The alumni issue could play in the reverse, however, especially where alumni involved in higher education were concerned. Professor Ralph Gerard, who spoke at gatherings of alumni at Mount Holyoke College and Cornell University, reported that

the University has an Alumni body of which it can justly be proud and which should be intensively cultivated for values even more important than the raising of money. In each case the group had never previously met, and most of the individuals did not know each other, but they seemed to really enjoy coming together and have made plans for future meetings. The tone of these Alumni groups was so far from the “rah-rah” atmosphere and on such a plane of intelligence and culture that I should have no fear of a strongly organized Alumni body, which would then inevitably exert more influence on University affairs. Graduation from a common

Gerard’s invocation of shared intellectual values was pleasing and reassuring, but the organizers who paid for his trip must have felt chagrined to learn that these values were “more important than the raising of money.” The hard fact was that the University needed the alumni’s financial support. Could shared intellectual values—as opposed to (as Gerard put it) a “rah-rah” atmosphere—motivate alumni not only to admire and respect the University but also to support its financial needs?

In the face of these considerable challenges, the actual campaign was skillfully managed. John Howe (Class of 1927) especially did an extraordinary job, one of the many unsung staff heroes over the decades who combined intelligence and dedication to implement our campaigns.

The alumni mail campaign was targeted and technically well organized. Several waves of mail solicitations went out, including one in May 1941 to 34,000 recipients. An honor roll was created for the recognition of donors. Local chairmen were designated in cities and towns across the country, who were to constitute ad hoc solicitation committees. But, unlike the 1924–26 campaign, no quotas or explicit targets were assigned, which may have been politically necessary but which had negative consequences in levels of alumni giving. For those volunteers assigned to

165. Mott to Mather, February 23, 1940, box 201, folder 11, ibid.
166. Swift to Mather, February 27, 1940, ibid.
167. Matthews to Mather, February 25, 1940, ibid.
168. Ralph W. Gerard to Carey Croneis, February 23, 1940, ibid.
169. Howe’s own proposal for the campaign from late 1938, “The Fiftieth Anniversary of the University of Chicago,” was acute in its analysis, rejecting inflated goals (some of Hutchins’s staff dreamed of raising $40 million) and urging a more realistic figure that might be attainable. See box 7, folder 4, VP Papers.
work with major-gift prospects detailed instructions were formulated on how to approach donors, urging a three-visit approach when the prospect was new to the University. Fund-raisers were also given a clear explanation of the financial situation of the University to assist them in answering questions. Behind the scenes, the Campaign Steering Committee consisting of several trustees, administrative officers, and senior campaign staff met weekly to monitor progress and to adjust ongoing tactics. As is often the case in such projects, the records of their meetings give the impression of a creatively controlled chaos, making things up as they went along.

As 1940 wore on, Hutchins, Swift, and a few other leaders systematically visited major-gift prospects and heads of foundations. Hutchins visited each person on the prime prospect list at least once, and in some cases more than once. He also wrote letters to potential prospects asking for meetings, and he regularly went to such meetings. The campaign systematically collected information on potential donors, including friends who might be sympathetic mediators with other donors. Hutchins even led a personal discussion of the prime prospect list in May 1941.

From September 1, 1939, to September 30, 1941, the University received $6,092,987 in new gifts. The alumni gave $510,072, significantly less than in 1924–26, and all the more troubling in view of the fact that the University in 1941 had 49,300 alumni as opposed to 27,000 in 1926. The aggregate results for the campaign fell short of the original target of $12 million, but given the circumstances under which the campaign was launched and conducted, the results were as good as could be expected. As in 1924–25, the weakest part of the campaign was the lack of major gifts from members of the civic elite who were not alumni or trustees. The largest single gift by a non-alumnus was $250,000 from the Rosenwald family, given on the condition that the University would raise at least $5 million in pledges from other sources for the campaign. The two next largest gifts were for $150,000 and $100,000. Gifts of this level, while extremely generous, could not resolve the structural budget difficulties of the University.

Robert Duncan’s close involvement in the campaign can be charted from several confidential reports that he prepared for the trustees during its two-year history. In contrast to the strictly operational role that he had played during the 1924–25 campaign, this time Robert Duncan served campaign have been highly encouraging.” See also “Steering Committee,” July 26, 1940, folder 18, Harold Swift Papers, where Hutchins reported meetings with Leon Mandel twice, Edwin Mandel, and Eugene Meyer, and letters sent to Mr. Kraft, and Mrs. D. Mark Cummings, plus unsuccessful efforts to see Arthur Andersen, Charles Walgreen, Jr., and Justin Dart.

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171. See box 201, folder 18, ibid.

172. See the “Report of Contacts and Information Gleaned by Mr. Hutchins,” November 13, 1940, box 201, folder 19, ibid.

173. “Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee on Development of the Fiftieth Anniversary Campaign,” May 13, 1941, box 201, folder 18, ibid. At the meeting of the “Steering Committee,” November 22, 1940, ibid., Frank McNair (Class of 1903) commented that “in spite of the apparent lack of immediate results to personal approaches on the part of President Hutchins and others, Mr. McNair saw no reason to be discouraged. On the contrary, in view of the present times and circumstances, he feels that results to date for the
both as a loyal coach and a frustrated critic. In a report in November 1939, Duncan observed that the alumni part of the campaign had come together much earlier and more effectively than the general campaign or the anniversary celebration. But he cautioned that this momentum could unravel:

> There are at least two essentials to success in any such undertaking as the University of Chicago has determined upon. These are (1) an effective organization capable of providing proper leadership, a case worth (in this instance) $12,000,000, determined workers, and interested prospects, and (2) a spirit of determination and persistence to keep everlastingly at it. I have been fairly familiar with the University’s fund-raising efforts since the summer of 1924 and I state with conviction that since the end of the Development Campaign at the death of President Burton in May 1925, the University has not possessed these two essential and necessary measures, either on the part of the Administration or the Trustees.  

> Displaying a tension that sometimes emerges between public-relations and development professionals, Duncan was also skeptical about William Benton’s expensive public relations program, to the extent that it took resources away from the hard, trench work of actual fund-raising. He asserted:

> The Board is familiar with the present excellent program of public relations. It needs no praise from me. Were the University not faced with an immediate, pressing financial need, that program would be timely and valuable. But in view of present conditions the question is pertinent whether the University can afford to superimpose a $12,000,000 fund-raising campaign on top of it…. The present program of public relations is a formidable one…. some of these men are active in some phase of fund-raising but few of them have had fund-raising experience. In an institution even as large as the University of Chicago any promotional plan is going to run second best to a program which possesses such expert and dynamic leadership. A fund-raising campaign, in a very real sense, then becomes a necessary evil, its demands to be filled as best they can, but to come after the main show…. Now, it is clear to the most inexperienced that a campaign to raise $12,000,000 cannot run second to any activity except the actual continuation of the educational program. To succeed, it must be a major interest, not only of the President, but of all his assistants, except those immediately engaged in conducting the University. I have a feeling that this is not the case at Chicago today.

176. “A Statement to the Board of Trustees of the University of Chicago from the John Price Jones Corporation,” November 9, 1939, 4–5, box 156, folder 2, Harold Swift Papers. Duncan noted that the impact of two recent football disasters and the shortage of publicity department personnel had led the University to cancel a special-gifts fund-raising dinner at the Blackstone Hotel scheduled for November 17. He also noted that the University’s goal of $12 million was extremely ambitious in that Pennsylvania had set a similar goal two years ago and had only raised $3.5 million. Even Harvard was only able to raise $5.5 million for its Tercentenary Fund in 1936.

177. See Cutlip, Fund Raising, 78–79.

178. “A Statement to the Board of Trustees of the University of Chicago from the John Price Jones Corporation,” November 9, 1939, 4–5, box 156, folder 2, Harold Swift Papers.
A year later, in December 1940, Duncan returned to these themes by observing:

The present campaign is turning into a public relations campaign and as such it is extremely valuable. But it is not fund-raising on the scale of which the University is capable. The case, or appeal, is not yet as strong as it must be if workers and donors are to reach the necessary pitch of enthusiasm. The University has done a notable piece of publicity work in its pamphlets, but the emergency has not been pointed up or dramatized. Some members of the Board harbor doubts as to the real need [for the campaign].... Partly because of the weaknesses in the case there is not sufficient power or drive in the volunteer organization. President Hutchins is giving the campaign everything that he has, but the balance of the organization has not reached the state to which it should be brought if the job is to be done. There should be more “fight” and willingness to sacrifice other things for the Fund. It is said that $24,000 was raised for the Chicago Opera over the telephone recently in an hour and a half, and that $75,000 was pledged to the Wilkie Campaign in ten minutes at a luncheon. Compared with either of these excellent causes the University can make a strong case. These other funds were raised because a few influential men were excited about these causes and an emergency existed. It is now time that some body of the same type got excited about the University of Chicago and point out to alumni and the community exactly what kind of a university Chicago will have if the needed funds are not obtained. Today the volunteer organization lacks punch. A fighting leader from the Board or even better from the Citizens Board, who will “take his coat off” is much needed.179

Duncan prepared a third report in early January 1941 on the alumni campaign. He was especially concerned with the issue of leadership. He insisted that “too many reasons were found last year for not going ahead. Initial refusals were given too much weight.” Moreover, the Board of Trustees bore major responsibility for the University, but the cause of this lack of spirit appears to lie mainly with the Board of Trustees. The Board does not yet seem sufficiently convinced of the need for reaching the campaign goals. Until the Board regards the University’s situation with more seriousness and a number of its members get excited about it, one cannot expect the crusading spirit among subordinate alumni leaders. Coverage of any respectable proportion of 48,000 alumni scattered throughout America cannot be accomplished without leaders dedicated to a cause, and that dedication is not yet sufficiently serious.

179. “The Fiftieth Anniversary Program of the University of Chicago. A Report from the John Price Jones Corporation,” December 19, 1940, 3, box 156, folder 2, ibid. A subsequent meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee on Development, December 24, 1940, revealed that there was a division of opinion “as to the merits of Mr. Duncan’s further usefulness at this time in connection with invigorating the efforts and setting up a more comprehensive program for the general campaign,” which may suggest that Duncan’s frankness was not well received. See box 201, folder 20, ibid. An agreement was reached to postpone a decision on Duncan’s future involvement until later in January 1941. At the next meeting of the committee, Benton was clearly unhappy with the way things were going, suggesting that Duncan’s usefulness depended on his having a “proper attitude .... regarding the particular circumstances involved in this particular University of Chicago money-raising effort.” Trustee Frank McNair was pro-Duncan, however, because “his presence tends to crystallize action and force issues on behalf of the campaign.” Paul Russell sided with McNair, and an agreement was reached to continue to retain Duncan one week out of every five. Meeting of January 10, 1941, ibid.
Duncan concluded that the University was trying to do two things at once: make up for lost time in creating “a favorable attitude” among its alumni and also trying to “establish quickly a nation-wide [campaign] organization.” As a result, local alumni chairman were enlisted before they were thoroughly “sold on the cause, and they, therefore, failed to function effectively.” Momentum was never created, and “the alumni had no feeling that they were all joined together in one well-organized national movement.” Duncan then remarked that “it must be remembered that for many years after 1925 there was no organized attempt to educate the alumni on the University’s needs…. Though the relations between the alumni and the University are better than in the recent past, there are many complexities to rob the leaders and workers of their enthusiasm and to afford prospects convenient reasons for refusals to give. This was particularly so in Chicago.” He also believed that

many alumni, several of them influential, whether or not interested in football, still feel that the Administration’s attitude on football and fraternities dooms the type of undergraduate life to which they are devoted and which would prompt them to give…. Exactly how much in money the University is losing on these counts will never be known. But there is no doubt that the dissatisfaction of some alumni with what they consider to be the Administration’s attitude toward undergraduate life is a major campaign [obstacle]…. The apathy attributable to these circumstances proved a great handicap in organizing the Chicago canvas. The leaders on whom the University would normally rely refused to accept responsibility. As one leader expressed it, “the glamour boys refused to work.” Much valuable time was consumed in explaining and arguing. As a result the campaign burden had to be placed on an entirely new and untrained group of leaders and workers. But even with them the job is being done from a sense of duty and not with enthusiasm.  

The final celebration of the campaign took place in September 1941, which also marked the fiftieth anniversary of the University. A highpoint of the celebration was the return of John D. Rockefeller Jr. to campus. As a courtesy to Hutchins, Rockefeller sent him a first draft of the speech that he intended to deliver before a dinner of prominent guests, many of whom were members of the University’s Committee of Citizens. In this speech, which was otherwise extremely friendly and supportive to the University, Rockefeller tried to signal that Chicago would not receive any additional family money, and, conflating the gifts from his family and gifts from Rockefeller funds and boards, he also seemed to suggest that the University would no longer receive board money as well. Upon receiving a copy of this speech, Hutchins wrote to Rockefeller delicately but urgently requesting that he differentiate between family gifts and board gifts, that he make clear that the University had received the latter on the merits of its proposals, and that, at least potentially, it would be free to apply for more such gifts.

Hutchins was worried that a public statement coming from Rockefeller, in front of a banquet for local citizens, that no further gifts would be forthcoming would be read by other wealthy donors as indicating that the family was leaving the University in the lurch and as having a “somewhat negative ring.” Instead, Hutchins wanted Rockefeller to create a “positive challenge by telling the group what you told me in New York, that the Family was not ‘abandoning’ the University because of lack of

faith or interest in it; it was doing so because it wanted no suspicion to lurk in the minds of the community that it could evade its responsibility to keep the University great and strong.”

Rockefeller responded graciously and tried to accommodate Hutchins, all the while still insisting that the University had now become the responsibility of the people of Chicago and no longer of his family. The anxiety of the University authorities (Fritz Woodward also wrote to Rockefeller, urging him to soften his remarks) was underscored by Hutchins’s comment to Rockefeller that “every word you say will receive the closest attention.”

These exchanges, filled with amicable comments by Rockefeller and Hutchins about each other, signaled the final end of the Final Gift. But they also demonstrated how acutely sensitive Hutchins had become about the standing of the University before the local civic community. Given that many potential major donors were sitting on the fence, Rockefeller’s original formulations might have created problems for the University. But even in the form in which they were delivered, Rockefeller’s remarks made it clear that the only source of general support for the University would be the civic community. Speaking of himself in the third person, Rockefeller insisted:

“Though they [his father’s and his own gifts] have been completed and it is not to be expected that further gifts from the same source will be forthcoming, this does not mean that the founder’s son is any less interested in the University or its future than his father was for that is not the case. He rejoices in its present attainment and is eager for its increasing usefulness. It simply means he also feels that in one way alone can the University achieve the purposes for which it was created; that is, as the university not of a family, but of the people; wholly administered and supported by them; resting squarely on their shoulders; their responsibility alone; theirs to make as great as they will; its successes redounding to their credit exclusively.”

The Rockefeller era was over; and, although Hutchins could not know this, the era of large-scale general support from the Rockefeller boards was over as well.

YEARS OF TRANSITION, 1945–50

The last years of the Hutchins presidency project a fascinating but conflicting set of images. On the one hand, these were years of great pedagogical excitement and curricular drama at the University. What we customarily refer to as the Hutchins College, the College based on a uniform general-education curriculum, reached its zenith during these years, under the brilliant leadership of Deans Clarence Faust and F. Champion Ward. The budget of the College exploded upward, growing from $79,000 in 1939 to $631,000 in 1949, and remarkable standards for faculty teaching in small discussion classes were established for our general-education programs, to which we still adhere fifty years later. The University also

181. Hutchins to Rockefeller, August 28, 1941; Rockefeller to Hutchins, August 30, 1941, box 201, folder 22, ibid.

182. Hutchins to Rockefeller, September 4, 1941, and Woodward to Rockefeller, August 29, 1941, ibid.

183. “Remarks by John D. Rockefeller Jr. at the Citizens Dinner of the President and the Trustees of the University of Chicago,” September 26, 1941, box 14, folder 34, University Development Campaigns, Part 1: 1896–1941.
made the transition to peacetime research in nuclear energy, metallurgy,
and solid state physics, retaining or recruiting scientists of the caliber of
Enrico Fermi, Harold Urey, and James Franck, establishing the Institute
for Nuclear Studies and the Institute for the Study of Metals, and con-
structing the Research Institutes buildings.

On the other hand, these were also years of deteriorating financial
solvency, with pressures being put on Robert Hutchins to do something
to put the University’s fiscal house in order. In order to finance the post-
war expansion of the University, including the construction of the new
Research Institutes and the Administration Building, Hutchins per-
suaded the Board of Trustees to draw upon the endowment principal of
sixteen Rockefeller funds for four years at a rate of 5 percent and a fifth
year at 2.5 percent, for a total of $3.3 million, all of which was technically
legal but which, as a later observer put it, “caused disappointment among
the Rockefellers that the University used for current purposes funds
which were intended as permanent endowments.” Such practices, when
coupled with spending of other endowed funds to cover the operating
deficits of the period, hurt the University’s endowment over time.

In two letters in June 1950, Harold Swift commented on the Univer-
sity’s financial situation to Laird Bell, who had succeeded him as chair
of the Board of Trustees eighteen months earlier. Swift criticized
Hutchins’s propensity toward overspending and his half-hearted work as
a fund-raiser:

As I see the situation, since the war the University has spent or
appropriated unprecedented amounts of capital (endowment) and

other University funds for postwar building projects and for under-
writings to finance current operations. Exhibit II [one of several
charts that Swift sent to Bell] further exemplifies this situation by
setting forth in summary the financing of the postwar building
projects under construction or completed and the specific appro-
priations and underwritings of building projects with the specific
funds designated. The tendency has increased with the years, and
has reached (or passed) the safety point. The same situation seems
to me true in reference to the Regular Budget.

Please note exhibit showing a 20-year look at what has happened
to our Endowment funds. The difference between the result of the earlier ten years and the later ten years is quite marked. Exhibit V
shows that our Regular Budget has practically doubled in a ten-year
period, whereas our Endowment funds have remained practically
constant. For ten years we have lived off fat rather than building
up our Endowment funds. While we have had reasonable contribu-
tions and bequests, which heretofore would have gone to building
up Endowment, we have deducted funds heretofore allocated to
Endowment and this category has not increased.

The result is that our financial situation is extremely precarious,
and our important manpower should be devoted to improving
the situation by raising funds, so that temporary allocations from
endowment and reserves can be restored. The experience of other
universities during the period was very different, and more
conventional. My conclusion was—We should tighten our
belts and channel the activities of the Chancellor, who should spend
the large majority of time raising money to cover the above under-
writings and for new projects. This should be arranged by the Chair-
man and Vice Chairman of the Board … who should thoroughly

184. John I. Kirkpatrick, “The University’s Financial Problem,” November 18,
1955, 5, box 77, folder 2, Harold Swift Papers.
understand the situation and keep a tight rein [possibly meetings every two weeks ... is the way to get going], working with the Chancellor, Williams, and Kimpton, if necessary leaving the administration of the University to Colwell and Harrison. The University’s greatest need is money, and raising it should be the Chancellor’s chief concern, and his time should be dedicated to it until the situation ceases to be precarious.\footnote{Swift to Bell, June 7, 1950, box 90, folder 9, ibid.}

Five days earlier, Swift had written another, even more candid letter to Bell, who wanted more information on the financial situation and who thought that Swift was being too harsh toward Hutchins. Swift insisted:

My argument is that during and since the War we have been living off of fat. Now our ribs are showing, and since the War we have been chipping at our backbone (endowment). This procedure of living off of fat is generally speaking unprecedented in our history, in that traditionally we have not embarked on projects unless we could see them financed (and in the main this has been done by the chief administrative officer, heretofore President, now Chancellor). Nor do I see that this situation has occurred in any other important institution of learning. Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Cornell, notably Northwestern, have been building up endowment while they were expanding.

In the last ten years we have doubled our general University budget (not counting war activities), and during that same period our endowment has not increased. We have had through gifts and bequests a reasonably good accretion of assets during the period, but we have spent those accretions either in building underwritings or in not permanently financed activities. I don’t believe there is another important institution of learning in the country which has doubled its expenses and not increased its endowment funds during the last ten years.

We have done it on the theory proposed by the Chancellor [Hutchins] that the needs were so great that there wasn’t time to raise the money, but that the money would be raised to relieve the underwritings which were entered into. This has not been done, I think chiefly because the Chancellor has not given his undivided attention or even his chief interest to the project; and I believe the situation is now so critical as to require that he should do so, and I think other important institutions are an illustration of what we should have done and failed to do....

I think the explanation is simple. The Chancellor found it more exciting and more interesting to venture into these new projects and to live off of fat rather than to do the more humdrum thing of making a real effort to raise money as we went along; and I think his failure to do so has increased (with the years and with each new expenditure) his moral commitment and the necessity of doing so now. His recommendation in building the Institute [for Nuclear Studies] buildings and the many other buildings was that they be temporarily financed and the underwritings would be replaced. This has not happened.

I think we cannot pass over lightly the criticism of the chief financial officer, with his constant feeling of irritation that when the Chancellor is away he cannot get anything done and when the Chancellor is present he cannot get his attention and support for
money raising affairs because he is too busy worrying about academic freedom (or some other subject—not money raising). 186

In late 1950, the Board of Trustees commissioned Kersting, Brown & Company, a new fund-raising firm of which Robert F. Duncan had just become president, to survey the development situation. The results were mixed. 187 They found that many alumni were unhappy with the University’s alleged left-wing activities. In the alumni’s mind, the College was “not getting a fair cross section of youth” and was appealing to “prodigies to become ‘long-haired’ geniuses.” They also felt that little social prestige was attached to the school, resented the fact that many alumni sent their children elsewhere, and that the abolition of football and “the fraternity situation” precluded sentimental attachment and took away “any reason for return to campus to keep up ties.” Finally, some felt the Chancellor to be a controversial figure. 188 Even so, these individuals almost always admitted the importance of the University as an institution, and many wished “to know about what the University is doing and as one put it be ‘made to feel proud of having gone to Chicago.’” This translated into giving rates by Chicago alumni substantially below those of private peer institutions. The average participation rate in the annual fund for Chicago alumni was 14 percent, compared with an average of 37.5 percent for five other top private universities, resulting in $135,304 in cash contributions compared with the average of $484,320 attained by our peers. Perhaps as a result, Kersting found that “there seems to be on the part of some members of the Administration a sort of defeatist attitude toward the University’s alumni, a feeling that they are not to be counted on, especially those in the earlier classes who should be more able to give.” 189

Kersting took the appointment of Lawrence A. Kimpton as the new vice president for development to be an encouraging sign. The current vice president for public relations, Lynn A. Williams Jr., was overburdened with public-relations work, and he had received little support: “There also seems to have been a decided tendency to leave to him the calls on many prospects for substantial gifts which should rightfully have been in the province of the Trustees, Chancellor, President or top faculty men.” But “the bringing in of Mr. Lawrence Kimpton as Vice-President in Charge of Development for full-time fund-raising fulfills a major requirement and should do much to further the program.” 190

186. Swift to Bell, June 2, 1950, ibid.
187. Kersting, Brown & Company, “An Inventory of Fund Raising Resources and Suggested Procedure,” December 1, 1950, box 83, folder 13, Harold Swift Papers. The research included interviews with fifty-one alumni representatives selected in Chicago; New York; Des Moines and Waterloo, Iowa; and Madison and Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and fifty-six interviews with non-alumni businessmen and professionals as well as members of the board, senior staff, and some foundation leaders.
189. Ibid., 13.
190. Ibid., 10. Lynn Williams himself wrote to Hutchins in June 1949 urging an overhaul of the central administration and complaining that “the members of the Central Administration are so overwhelmed with minutiae as not to find the time for reflection and study which is required if we have to have an intelligent and orderly approach to meet our major difficulties…. We need to develop clear and regular channels for doing things so that most decisions can be handled in groups or classes, and so that we do not treat every instance as new and special…. As matters stand now we have no organization chart and no schedule of responsibilities.” Williams to Hutchins, June 24, 1949, box 14, folder 16, PP, 1945–1950.
Most striking, Kersting found that the growth of the University's endowment was almost flat from 1939–49, whereas the endowments of eight other top private universities had averaged a growth rate of 34 percent. The University had taken $10 million out of the endowment in this period to cover building costs and underwrite deficits, but the book value remained the same (so that endowment actually did grow). The University was especially deficient in gifts from individuals for current use. Chicago received $466,884 in gifts from individuals for 1949–50, representing 14 percent of the total gifts for current operations. In 1948–49, Harvard had received $1,043,379 in gifts from individuals (28 percent of the total gifts it received), Yale $545,764 (27 percent), Columbia $616,560 (31 percent), and Princeton $598,766 (54 percent).

As time went on, contemporaries were willing to talk, at least confidentially, about the financial problems that Hutchins had left behind. In a confidential memorandum in November 1955, the University's chief financial officer, John I. Kirkpatrick, explained the University’s financial problems by noting that expenditures exceeded income by approximately $1 million a year since the end of World War II. Whereas the University’s budget increased from $8.75 million in 1939–40 to $18.4 million in 1949–50, sufficient new income to finance these increases was not apparent, with the result that Hutchins was forced to carry large deficits. Moreover, Kirkpatrick insisted that Hutchins thought deficits were a good thing: “Mr. Hutchins proclaimed publicly that a great university operates in the red. He went on the theory that there are always more things to do than a university can afford and hence a balanced budget is an indication that a university is not progressing enough.”

As the next decades of the University’s history would reveal, these patterns in endowment growth were difficult to undo. Robert Hutchins’s eloquent defense of intellectual values shaped the University in powerful ways that endure down to this day. Hutchins’s cultural imprint still influences the collective self-understanding of the University, not in the least because his emphasis on the vital intellectualism of our community accords so well with the way in which the faculty think about the fundamental purposes of the University. But to his critics, Hutchins’s academic successes came at a serious cost to the endowment and to the image of the University among key sectors of our alumni and important elements of Chicago’s civic elite.

At the very end of his presidency, on January 10, 1951, mixing ruefulness and deep frustration, Hutchins insisted that “the only problems that money can solve are financial problems, and these are not the crucial problems of higher education. Money is no substitute for ideas.” Yet the reality and the depth of the financial crisis was unmistakable and stirring rhetoric, laden with self-justifying declarations, would not make it go away. The trustees wanted a change, and they would have it.

4–5, box 77, folder 2, Harold Swift Papers.

192. Kirkpatrick, “The University’s Financial Problem,” November 18, 1955, subsequent oral history interview in 1987, George Watkins, who greatly admired Hutchins’s bravado and intellectual style, admitted that the trustees “were scared to death of what this guy might do fiscally.” Hutchins “scared the Board to death, in terms of its financial and fiduciary responsibility.”

Although he had ambivalent feelings about development, Robert Hutchins might have been an effective fund-raiser had he faced more sympathetic constituencies. After all, Hutchins believed in the fundamental importance of the University, and, for all its faults, he seemed genuinely certain that the University of Chicago was the closest example of what a real university should be. Moreover, Hutchins and the University as a whole had much to be proud of, for the 1930s and 1940s were among the most exciting in the University’s history, if measured by the scholarly attainments of the faculty and the educational progress of our students. But, perhaps tragically, Robert Hutchins did not enjoy the privilege of negotiating only with the converted. Instead, key members of the senior faculty opposed his educational reforms, important pockets of the alumni resented his institutional reforms, more conservative members of the Chicago’s civic elite believed the myths that his University was filled with “red” students and faculty, and members of his own Board of Trustees feared his budget practices, even if they also acknowledged his intellectual brilliance and personal charm.

William Benton shrewdly remarked about Robert Hutchins’s dilemma in 1937 that “a large percentage of the criticisms aimed at the University by businessmen in Chicago springs from ignorance of the functions of a real university. My surveys and interviews in Chicago show how widespread and how profound this ignorance is.” If Benton was correct, and I personally think that he was, we might take consolation by arguing that Robert Hutchins was simply ahead of his time. That is, Hutchins had the courage to try to create a “real university,” filled with uncompromising academic values and revolutionary pedagogical practices, but the world was just not ready. If such was the case, then we are surely obligated to

ask: is the world now ready for these values? Will those who cherish Chicago as a “real university” in our time support its unique values and educational practices?

KIMPTON’S CRUSADE:  
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1954–57

Robert Hutchins resigned as chancellor of the University on December 19, 1950. He was succeeded by Lawrence A. Kimpton on April 13, 1951. Kimpton became chancellor at the most fragile time in the University’s history. Financially, the University’s budget had been in deficit for almost a decade. It faced severe challenges in its relations to the surrounding neighborhood. Equally difficult, the College’s enrollments were shaky and about to collapse, hitting bottom in 1954, when less than 1,400 undergraduate students were enrolled. Internecine hostility among senior faculty in the divisions and in the College about the undergraduate curriculum adopted in 1942 and revised in 1946 also remained a source of disruption.

Kimpton had first joined the University in 1943 to work as the chief administrative officer on the Metallurgical Project and soon was appointed dean of students. He departed for his alma mater Stanford in 1947 to serve as its dean of students. Kimpton disliked working in Palo Alto, however, and when Hutchins, reacting to pressure of the trustees that his administration must become more active on the fund-raising front, offered Kimpton the newly created position of vice president for development, he accepted with alacrity and returned to Chicago in August 1950. Kimpton was a thoughtful, well-spoken person with suitable academic credentials (a PhD in philosophy from Cornell University). He had civic courage, much common sense, and a genial wit. He was also an adroit fund-raiser.

Once in office, Kimpton acted immediately to try to restore financial order and to plan a major capital campaign. The trustees liked Kimpton’s dogged, nonconfrontational style, and they agreed to the importance of improving the public relations of the University, especially in Chicago, and regaining alumni support. Kimpton hired George Watkins in 1951 as his chief development officer. An affable and creative College alumnus who had fond memories of his years on campus in the 1930s.

197. Hutchins had been in touch with Kimpton, on and off, since Kimpton left for California, occasionally expressing a hope that Kimpton would return to Chicago. He contacted Kimpton in March 1950 about this specific job. Swift was also involved, since he had been asked for a reference on behalf of Kimpton by a new organization in the field of mental health. Hutchins’s mandate to Kimpton was to “to direct the money-raising … financing of the University.” Hutchins to Kimpton, April 12, 1950. In approving Kimpton’s appointment on May 1, 1950, the Committee on the Budget noted that “in the discussion that followed concern was expressed about the financial situation of the University and particularly the immediate need of funds for the Hicks Memorial and the Charles Gilman Smith buildings. The necessity for more aggressive approaches to donors was emphasized, and for continuous pressure on the Development Office and, in the last analysis, on the Chancellor.” Laird Bell drafted this statement. Hutchins himself claimed that he was “feeling much better about everything” once Kimpton had accepted the job. Hutchins to Kimpton, April 29, 1950. This correspondence is in box 79, folder 1, Robert M. Hutchins Papers, Addenda.

198. See Watkins’s account of these early years in his comments to the Lakeside IV Conference, March 15, 1957, box 167, folder 1, PP, 1952–1960.
(he remembered with particular gratitude courses taught by Mortimer Adler and Robert Redfield), Watkins had gained considerable marketing experience in the insurance industry. Watkins was a perfect adjutant for Kimpton and became, over time, Kimpton’s veritable alter ego.

Kimpton spent the first three years of his tenure cutting the budget, pushing faculty to revise the most radical features of the Hutchins College’s curricular structures to respond to the external demographic crises and internal factional pressures, and making weekly and even daily forays to meet as many Chicago civic leaders as possible. As his budget cuts took a serious toll in faculty morale and as enrollments in the College continued to worsen, Kimpton assembled a key group of trustees and senior staff at Harold Swift’s home in Lakeside, Michigan, in early March 1954 to present them with a tough, but pragmatic plan to deal with the University’s financial troubles.

Kimpton advocated a vast social reengineering of the campus, focusing on the necessity of recruiting many more students to the College and on the need for a general fund-raising campaign:

The Chancellor thus said that he hoped to state quite frankly to the trustees that the administration of the University had taken every possible step toward balancing the budget but that to take more would be ruinous to the institution and, therefore, he stated the belief that the trustees must be acutely aware of the consequences of any further reduction. He stated that he felt one of the great problems of the University is that of attracting more students and doing so at once.... He reiterated the sentiment, which he has expressed on various occasions, that the tendency of the University in recent years has been to attract too many students of a certain type and that selection must be greatly broadened in order to make
the University a healthier institution, particularly at the undergraduate level.\footnote{199}

Two months later, in May 1954, Kimpton was even blunter. Commenting on the College’s enrollment crisis, he argued: “What that means is that Chicago gained less in terms of post-war enrollment than any of these other comparable institutions [Northwestern, Harvard, Columbia] and it has lost far more as the post-war years receded. These are very serious figures indeed because they show how we look in relation to the institutions with which we compare ourselves.” Kimpton then noted that whereas Chicago had originally had 3,144 undergraduates and 2,719 graduate students in 1939, it now (in 1954) had 1,612 undergraduate students and 2,830 graduate students:

I think that the moral of this is clear. On the basis of economics we cannot continue to have the kind of ratio that we now have…. We cannot exist economically on that basis [having more graduate students than College students] and I can only remind you that Clark University practically disappeared as the first great university because of this and Johns Hopkins is trying to dig itself out of the same hole. This is our first problem. The second problem in this matter of distribution of students is that as the undergrad numbers decrease, the place becomes less attractive to undergraduate students and less alluring to them by way of coming in the first place. The result is that you can become involved in an almost vicious circle, in terms of which, as you have fewer undergraduates, fewer and fewer are attracted. The entire atmosphere on the campus changes and the result is that your undergraduate body, for all practical purposes, is shot to pieces. Now, the causes of this are immensely complex…. Certainly one of our difficulties is that at the undergraduate level at any rate, we have obtained a very undesirable reputation all through the country. We have been brought out as a quiz kid institution, interested only in the very bright student, the unusual youngster, who, too often it seemed to me, was merely odd. This has given us a very unfortunate reputation with the [high] school[s]. Another difficulty, of course, at least I think so, was the organization of the undergraduate program in terms of which our AB’s did not stand up. It had no currency in the market place, and, as you know, we changed that in part at any rate for that reason. Our alumni, and perhaps this is one of the most distressing things—our alumni no longer send their youngsters to this institution as undergraduates. They don’t like it. They don’t enjoy the program and they don’t know anything about it, and this, I think, has deeply hurt us too.\footnote{200}

Kimpton’s bold strategy for returning the University to budgetary solvency was based on a unit-by-unit survey of faculty needs.\footnote{201} It was premised on the University achieving a total enrollment of ten thousand


201. See box 165, folder 1, PP, 1952–1960. Watkins transmitted the final results to Kimpton with the note that “one basic assumption behind the planning is the acceptance of a figure of a total Quadrangles enrollment of 10,250, approximately half of which would be undergraduate. Both faculty salaries and dormitory needs are planned with such a total enrollment in mind.” Ibid.
students by the mid-1960s, five thousand of whom would be College students.  

This would lead to an increase in new net tuition income for the University from $224,000 in 1955 to $2.9 million by 1965.  

Kimp- 
ton's plan further involved raising $12 million to sustain current academic operations, adding $3.7 million more to bolster instructional areas that would have to deal with the student enrollment increases, $2 million in additional financial aid, and $11.4 million for residence halls for College and graduate students and other capital projects. The total equaled $29.1 million, which was later adjusted upward for an official campaign goal of $32.8 million.  

Kimpton and Watkins’s presentation of the new financial plan persuaded the trustees, and soon the debate changed from whether to have a campaign to how to organize it and where to set its goal. George Watkins recommended that the University engage Robert Duncan, whom he admired for having helped organize the “classic” 1924 drive, to help run the campaign.  

Harold Swift then asserted that a drive for only $15 million would hardly be a major drive and that it should in fact be more than $20 million. Watkins insisted that either the University must launch a major drive or begin to “lower our sights” as a University. Gardiner  

Stern said that $25 million was initially high to him, but that as the conversation had unfolded it seemed “less fantastic than it had in the past.” Henry Tenney, who had felt “quite negative about a drive when it was first mentioned,” now decided that “we would be slipping unless we did something positive to change the course of events and therefore he would favor the drive.” Fairfax Cone observed: “We had no choice in the matter—that we must do this or start going backward,” and Herman Dunlop Smith concurred about the positive “moral effect” of a drive. Swift was for it, and Edward Ryerson, as chair of the board, concluded that “we must go ahead and in a big way.”  

With that, Kimpton had won the day. But would he succeed in a campaign for $32.8 million? This was one of the largest sums ever sought by a private American research university up to that time.  

Robert Duncan, who had left John Price Jones in 1950 to become president of Kersting, Brown & Company, returned to Chicago in early 1955 and stayed, full time, until June 1956 for the University’s third great campaign in the twentieth century. This time, Duncan found a more appreciative audience.  

Duncan was impressed with Kimpton’s vision for the future of the University, but urged him to make it more public: “If a majority of the leading citizens of the City could have the

206. Ibid., 48–49.  

207. Duncan was forced to take on responsibilities in the day-to-day running of the campaign that exceeded the role of adviser. His positive feelings at the end may in part have been an expression of his satisfaction in having done a good job, as opposed to coaching others to do a good job. It was a odd mixture of roles, but then the University was in a rather unorthodox situation to begin with. “Counsel was thus called upon to cover a wider field in these respects than is usually the case.” Robert F. Duncan, “University of Chicago Campaign: An Interim Report Covering the Period from the Initiation of the Campaign Through June 30, 1956,” 11, box 71, folder 1, PP, 1952–1960.
understanding of the University which you gave the group last evening. I think you would have no trouble in future years in getting all the money you need.” 208 Duncan had very specific notions of the role of the president and his leadership. The president should articulate the ideas that would carry the campaign:

I have a strong personal feeling that if the president of the institution is incapable of writing (or having written) a compelling statement of the institution’s opportunities (not needs) he is not fit for the job. Ideas raise money; if the head has not ideas on education, or if he has them and is incapable of projecting them to a widespread constituency, he is not in the right niche. These days an important function of a college president is to interpret his institution to those capable of giving it financial aid. 209

As in 1924 and 1940, the campaign was a multifront effort, seeking support from the alumni, the trustees, foundations, corporations, and outside major-gift donors. The campaign devised a careful publicity schedule for the alumni, with many different letters and brochures, all specifically timed for greatest effect. 210 The alumni campaign was put in the hands of two senior alumni from the 1920s, Earle Ludgin (Class of 1920) and John McDonough (Class of 1928). Ludgin, a noted advertising expert in Chicago, assumed a vital role in designing letters sent to the alumni to reenlist their loyalty and support. Ludgin’s alumni letters won a national award, the Time-Life Award from the American Alumni Council in 1956, which avowed that the “erudite humor and effectiveness of the copy is spectacular in its quality.” 211 The letters completely ignored Robert Hutchins and his educational reforms and said nothing about the curricular controversies between the College and the divisions in the early and middle 1950s. Rather, invocations of the glories of an idealized student past were put forward, such as the comment that a new women’s dorm would be in line with the traditions of Kelly, Beecher, and Green, which had been “charming and romantic in our day,” and added an additional note: “The girls on campus are remarkably pretty these days, even to these bifocal eyes—well up to the standard of Kelly, Beecher, Foster, Green.” 212 These materials were an amalgam of friendly boosterism and candid financial appeals. Much emphasis was placed on the quality of student life, on recalling pleasant memories, on the importance of faculty research, and on the general prestige of the University.

There was, thus, a clear effort to develop themes that pre-1930 alumni could understand and accept. The main campaign statement, The Responsibility of Greatness, was a sophisticated attempt to run against the record of the Hutchins administration by rejecting the unpopular facets of Hutchins’s rule without publicly repudiating him. Nowhere in this booklet was Hutchins mentioned, even to the point that William Rainey Harper had to be given credit for formulating the program of the College. In essence, the campaign sought to reach out to and co-opt alumni who

208. Duncan to Kimpton, March 7, 1956, box 70, folder 7, ibid.


had graduated before 1930, who occupationally and professionally would have fully established their careers by the early 1950s, who would be in a position to give substantial gifts, and whose connection to the University was once very positive and could now be reengaged. George Watkins later remembered the situation he found in relation to his fellow alumni in 1951:

Almost all of the publicity in the news media was negative. Many of the alumni, and certainly most of the alumni of the classes prior to Robert Maynard Hutchins were shocked and outraged. Many of them were already spooky about academic changes taking place in the College, and the decision about football compounded their concerns. They responded by not sending their children to the College…. And alumni financial support diminished drastically.213

Watkins’s restorative theme was tricky, however, since trying to hide Hutchins was like trying to squirrel away an elephant. Inevitably, intergenerational tensions became apparent in the comments of those alumni who wrote responses to the fund-raising letters they received. Of the forty comments about Kimpton’s administration that came in, twenty-two were favorable to Kimpton and “the way things are going now,” while eighteen were mildly or strongly hostile to the administration. Most interesting about these responses is that the median class membership of the positive responses was the Class of 1908, whereas the median membership of the opponents was the Class of 1946. Kimpton and Watkins had tried to placate and reconnect with pre-Hutchins era alumni, while not further alienating the more recent grads. They did the first brilliantly, but clearly had difficulty with the second, and in fact, managed to alienate some alumni of the Hutchins era.214 Responding to the first nexus of alumni unhappiness—that generated among alumni who graduated before 1930—Kimpton and his colleagues inadvertently created a second nexus of alumni discontent on the part of graduates from the later 1940s and early 1950s, many of whom resented Kimpton’s seeming trashing of the Hutchins College.

While the campaign was proceeding, Kimpton also tried to revamp the College’s admissions efforts, organizing volunteers and attending small parties for prospective students. At Duncan’s urging, the University tried to organize alumni committees throughout the country to try to recruit more applicants for the College.215 At the same time, Kimpton found himself at odds with the admissions office staff, several of whom seemed unwilling to embrace Kimpton’s ideas. To Watkins, Duncan complained in June 1955 that “the [admissions] counselors do not talk the same language as the Chancellor when operating in the field.” Duncan reviewed the advertising material used by the staff and concluded that it was “long and difficult to read,” that it had a “tendency to boastfulness” and “an almost exclusive emphasis on intellectual competence to the exclusion of conscience,” and that it provided no “real reasons why a boy


215. The University was represented at one hundred College Days in various high schools. Kimpton also traveled to events for secondary school principals in Boston, Providence, and Philadelphia in late 1954. Staff Letter No. 1, January 31, 1955, box 79, folder 15, ibid.
or girl should wish to attend the University." Kimpton’s ambitions for a larger and more diverse applicant pool were well received by trustees like Harold Swift, however, who felt that the additional students would be more likely to go into a wider array of occupations. Swift too complained to Watkins that the current publicity on the College seemed to suggest the University only wanted to recruit students who intended to become scholars:

My comment on the material is that it seems to me to be effective for a group who are interested in graduate work, but I see little in it to attract the right kind of young men and women who mean to get out in the world after receiving their college degrees. In fact, I would say that if a parent, looking about as to where he should send his child to college, were to have access only to material as sent to me, it would be pretty conclusive evidence to him as to why he should send his child somewhere else, because you have emphasized only scholarly work whereas many parents want to train their children to become good members of society, not expecting that they will turn out to be scholars.

As I understand the Chancellor’s program, he puts very high on his list of desiderata more students and, particularly, more of the right kind of men and women for the College. Because of this, I feel that it is very important to correlate both the College and the Divisions and schools at almost any time that either of these is mentioned.

In my opinion we have a remarkable group of College alumni who are proving to be constructive and effective in our social milieu, and it seems to me in the buildup of the College they are worth boasting about. It seems to me among our College alumni we have a tremendous number of bankers, heads of business, professional people, economists, scientists, lawyers, and top industrialists, and that they should be featured in most of our public relations material.

The work of the trustees and the alumni constituted bright spots for the campaign. The trustees achieved a 100 percent participation rate and raised $4.5 million, close to their original goal of $5 million. In contrast to 1939–40, there was little or no dissent behind the scenes. Leading the gifts from the trustees was a joint gift from Bell, Swift, and Ryerson for $1,250,000.

216. Duncan to Watkins, June 7, 1955, box 70, folder 8, PP, 1952–1960. Calls for more diversity among students date back to the Hutchins era. In 1937 William Benton claimed that he was told by John Moulds that the faculty deliberately set the admissions criteria high so as to keep undergraduate student numbers low. John Howe, certainly a Hutchins loyalist, remarked to Benton that “the University needs students who are able and effective in the social world, not just the bulging-brow kind.” Benton himself wanted the University to style itself as a place where leaders would come to be educated, a proposition with which Kimpton would have strongly agreed. See Benton, The University of Chicago’s Public Relations, 118–19, 124, 126.

217. Swift to Watkins, November 26, 1954, box 79, folder 13, Harold Swift Papers. In 1954, Kersting, Brown & Company prepared a public-relations plan for the campaign, in which they argued, “It would appear that at the bottom of the University’s serious decline in undergraduate enrollment lies the disaffection of important segments of the public, including particularly secondary school educators, alumni, and parents of college-oriented young men and women.” “Public Relations Plan for the University of Chicago,” [1954], box 1, University Development Campaigns, 1955–58.
The alumni campaign was vibrant and creative, and generated a very respectable $2.6 million. Special gifts from non-alumni remained a dilemma, however. To better understand how the civic elites viewed the University, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) undertook a survey in August 1954 on the views of Chicagoans about the University. Clyde Hart of NORC had proposed a survey of the general population of Chicago in 1949, but Hutchins’s staff vetoed the idea as a waste of time and money. Kimpton allowed the survey, focused now on elite attitudes, to go forward. The survey found that opinions about the University were in considerable flux, more so than those about Northwestern. Of the members of the University’s Citizens Board, as many had a favorable impression of Chicago as of Northwestern; but among other prominent leaders in the city, Northwestern had the clear advantage. The study found that Lawrence Kimpton had substantially improved attitudes about the University in the last two to three years—nearly two-thirds of the Citizens Board and half of the women and other prominent persons reported that their opinion of the University of Chicago had changed for the better over the past two or three years, in large part because of Kimpton’s work. But some of the findings were troubling, such as the fact that a majority of Citizens Board members agreed with the proposition that

“the University of Chicago undergraduate college has too high a proportion of very bright but socially-not-well adjusted students.”

Still, these findings might have given some cause for optimism, but when the preliminary major-gift solicitations began in early 1955, Robert Duncan reported that the civic atmosphere still remained frosty: “We are confirming our early discovery that, because of little continuous cultivation by the University in previous years, there are few ‘pools of wealth’ familiar with our needs and favorably disposed toward us.” Moreover, the climate within the city itself remained neutral if not “positively unfavorable” and “a number of cases have come to light which seem to indicate a deep-seated unhappiness with the University and especially with its current product. While there are favorable comments about the Chancellor, his administrative associates, and individual members of the Board of Trustees, we hear too often dissatisfaction with the University and especially criticism of the type of student and recent graduate.” Duncan concluded that “we are only expressing the opinion of many Board members when we say that the University is attempting to raise money in an amazingly complex situation and in the face of extraordinary handicaps.”

Edward L. Pattullo, the staffer who ran the special-gifts campaign, offered the following reflections:

The greatest difficulty faced by Special Gifts solicitors has been the lack of sustained, effective prior cultivation of prospects. Many of the individuals to whom we must now turn for multi-thousand

218. “The consensus was that this survey would not be of value to us at this time.” J. A. Cunningham to Clyde W. Hart, September 30, 1949, box 127, folder 6, PP, 1952–1960. Hutchins himself seems to have suggested the idea to Hart, but then ran into harsh opposition from some of his senior staff. The 1949 proposal was for a general survey of the population, not specifically focused on elite behavior or attitudes.

219. “Confidential Survey 360, Form 1, 8-9-54,” box 79, folder 11, Harold Swift Papers. The survey was conducted in August and September 1954 with 304 members of the Citizens Board, 156 other prominent men, and 31 prominent women.


221. Duncan to Watkins, April 25, 1955, box 70, folder 7, ibid.
dollar gifts have been out of touch with the University, or downright hostile to it, for a decade or more. Substantial gifts are rarely given to an institution until the donor has had fairly close contact with it over a period of years. An important part of any campaign is precisely the creation of situations which will bring such long-standing relationships to fruition. We have not had our share of ripe prospects ready to be plucked.... The foregoing analysis of the difficulty under which Special Gifts has labored points up a moral for the University to remember during the years ahead.... Whatever other development activity is carried on henceforth, ample and explicit provision must be made to ensure that an adequate number of top prospects are effectively cultivated in season and out. Continuity is very important and someone on the staff should always be clearly charged with responsibility for seeing that several scores of such relationships are constantly nurtured and strengthened. This is often a complicated, frustrating, rather tiresome business and it demands time from both officers and trustees for activities which at the moment may seem picayune; to neglect it can be disastrous.222

On the foundation front, the University moved to try to reengage the big three New York–based foundations. Swift, Ryerson, Bell, Kimpton, and Watkins met the heads of the Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford Foundations for dinner in May 1955 to present the University’s case. A cordial time was had by all, and while the bids to Rockefeller and Carnegie were less successful, in December 1955 the University learned that it would receive a massive $5-million gift for faculty salaries from the Ford Foundation.223 While grateful for Ford’s support, Kimpton was disillusioned by the penchant of foundations to restrict their giving to focused projects and to refuse to provide general support for the core activities of the research universities. In a speech before the trustees and faculty in January 1956, Kimpton asked archly,

> What really happens? First, and most important, the professor is usually enticed into doing something that he really does not want to do in terms of his own development as a scholar. Second, there occurs an ominous bulge in the pattern of the university, and it is very often a bulge that the university would not seek if it were operating with its own funds. Finally, all sorts of casual people of dubious distinction cluster ’round the project and drift ominously toward tenure commitments. At the very peak of this circus, when there are the most people and the most commitments, the lemonade money runs out and the university is left to support this side show that had no place under the main tent in the first instance.224

For Kimpton, this added up to a dangerous game:

> As gifts in more recent years have come to the universities in increasingly restricted form, the administration of a university has become more difficult. Those fields of teaching and research that


have captured the imagination of the public and the foundation executive have flourished and the salaries and facilities of such areas have burgeoned. Those parts of the university that have had no similar appeal—whatever their intrinsic importance—have starved and withered…. We have recently launched a campaign to raise many millions of dollars. If we fail, it will seriously injure the University for years to come. And I am forced to add that if we succeed, it may also injure the University for many years to come, since we can be killed by restricted kindness. Our objective is to keep the University free, and unless we take carefull heed, we may enslave it, for we can be degraded and disfigured by the money we seek and spend and we can lose our souls at the peak of our prosperity. I have had ample time to ponder on our origins as I have sat in the waiting rooms of the corporations and the foundations. 225

Later in his life, George Watkins looked back at his six years with Kimpton in the 1950s and took justifiable pride in having led a professional and successful effort. 226 But, in fact, by its conclusion in June 1958 the campaign had raised only $22 million out of the $32.8 million required for the original campaign objectives, and fully one-third of the total raised came as grants from the Ford Foundation, including very large grants for faculty salary support ($5 million) and for the Graduate School of Business ($1.375 million). 227 While the alumni and trustees’ segments fared quite well, the major-gifts initiative among non-alumni donors was disappointing. Our continued dependence on large foundation support, as opposed to major gifts from individuals, was striking.

The campaign was encouraging to the trustees and the faculty, not in the least because it was a vast improvement over the 1940–41 drive. But it could not satisfy the University’s need for additional resources. In fact, as early as 1956, the board realized that the needs of the University far surpassed the initial campaign goals of 1954–55. Neighborhood investments to stabilize the area adjacent to the University would be extremely costly, and much of the discussion at a second summit meeting of officers and trustees in February 1956 was about the possible need to take money from the endowment to invest in the neighborhood. Trustee Gardner Stern asked “if the neighborhood program is essential, would we object

225. Ibid. Kimpton drafted a protest statement, which was probably as much therapeutic as anything else, and sent it to four fellow university presidents in January 1957. Kimpton to C. W. de Kiewiet, Virgil Hancher, David Dodds Henry, and Grayson Kirk, January 8, 1957, ibid.: “It is the serious contention of this document that current foundation policy, if continued over a period of time, will tend to weaken the fundamental strength and health of the universities. Most of the difficulties that we in the universities have experienced with the foundations relate to the policy of project giving.” According to Kimpton, the idea of project-oriented grants implied that “the foundation knows better than the university what the university should be doing and who should be supported in such activity. This, of course, may be true, but, if true, the foundation officer should be operating the universities rather than the administrative heads of those institutions.” Kimpton was in fact anticipating the processes of professionalization and project-oriented grant making within the foundation world that accelerated in the 1970s. See Peter Frumkin, “Conflict and the Construction of an Organizational Field: The Transformation of American Philanthropic Foundations,” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1997), 227–30, 386. I owe this reference to Professor Andrew Abbott.

226. The progress of the campaign can be charted in the records of the trustees’ campaign Steering Committee, from May 13, 1954, to August 2, 1957. These minutes provide a candid, behind-the-scenes view of how a major campaign is organized and executed. Watkins and Duncan served as the conveners.

to taking profits from endowment for our goals?” Kimpton reminded the group that “if we lose the area we lose the character of the University and it might become an institution like C.C.N.Y. or N.Y.U.” Harold Moore thought that saving the “character of the institution” was more important than “maintaining the exact endowment with appropriate increases,” but Laird Bell responded that “we have dug our own grave in effect if we dip into endowments.”

Edward Ryerson later commented candidly that “we had lulled ourselves into thinking that $32,000,000 would be sufficient and that we must now recognize the cold fact that we must project plans which call for additional sums.”

Moreover, the campaign’s partial successes proved frustrating for some cherished projects. At another meeting of officers and trustees in March 1957, a vigorous debate broke out over whether to start the Law School’s new building on the south side of the Midway, based on incomplete fund-raising (only $2.5 million had been raised or pledged, out of a needed $3.6 million), or whether to delay it in favor of completing already launched central projects and providing for additional budget underwriting. Dean Edward Levi wrote to Kimpton strongly urging that he be given a green light, even though the University would have to underwrite nearly $1 million not in hand. Regretting that he sounded “hortatory,” Levi insisted that not building the new school would significantly damage the Law School. Trustees sympathetic to the Law School, especially Glen Lloyd and Henry Tenney, got involved. Tenney lobbied Kimpton hard, insisting that Levi had taken a second-rate Law School and helped it to blossom, and that it was a “miracle” that the Law School alumni had contributed over $300,000 toward a new building. Insisting that the needs of the neighborhood programs, student housing, the Laboratory Schools, and the regular budget ranked ahead of the Law School project, Kimpton opposed starting construction until the missing million dollars was raised, whereas Glen Lloyd argued fiercely for it. Finding no agreement, the trustees and officers adjourned to separate caucuses, but when they reassembled the next day consensus was still lacking. At a subsequent meeting of the Committee on the Budget on April 1, 1957, Kimpton was overruled, with the board supporting Lloyd, based on the latter’s scheme of a fund-raising “revolving fund” that, Lloyd promised, would raise money as we were spending it. Kimpton observed archly that


229. Ibid., 30.


231. Tenney to Kimpton, copying him on a longer letter he had sent to Glen Lloyd, March 20, 1957, ibid.

232. Robert Strozier, who took the minutes, described the collision as politely as he could: “There was uncertainty among the entire group as to the consensus of the final session of Lakeside IV. While there was not real disagreement, there was not concurrence about the prime needs particularly as they applied to [the] Law School. Mr. Lloyd’s position which represented one of great enthusiasm for the Law School, for the ability to raise additional funds, and for the financing through the proposed revolving fund changed the categories and priorities which had been presented by the members of the administration. Mr. Kimpton, while recognizing the value of the Law School project and also expressing his appreciation of the enthusiasm expressed by both Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Ryerson, expressed great doubts about moving ahead without further assurance of funds for the projects which he put in the first category.” Lakeside IV, box 167, folder 1, PP, 1952–1960. John Kirkpatrick drafted an internal staff memo dated April 1, 1957, that articulated the worries of the administration about an early construction of the Law School. See his “Early Construction of the Law School,” ibid. Kirkpatrick worried that allowing the project to go forward would reduce the pressure on the school’s fund-raisers and donors to generate the remainder of the costs.
“such a policy is a good one if we can raise new money, but a dangerous one if we cannot.”

Lawrence Kimpton provided a heroic service to the University. He helped to stabilize and to improve the neighborhood of Hyde Park; he enhanced faculty salaries (the median for full professors rose from $10,416 in 1951–52 to $13,257 in 1959–60) and he curbed the exodus of faculty that began in the early 1950s; he negotiated a successful, if controversial truce between the College and the divisions over the undergraduate curriculum; he presided over a generally successful fund-raising campaign; and he began the long road back to a reasonably sized undergraduate College. In his eulogy to Lawrence Kimpton in Rockefeller Chapel in January 1977, George Watkins insisted that his friend had “saved” the University, and there is much truth to that statement.

Yet the old-timer Harold Swift, who had great personal affection for Kimpton, was not persuaded that all was well. In the fall of 1959, Swift wrote to Kimpton arguing:

I understood you to say [in a conversation they had on September 19 about University finances] that you considered the University financial picture relatively good. I might agree to this if I were assured of prosperous conditions in the nation for the next ten or fifteen years. However, if we should have a national condition similar to the early 1930s—which we barely got through by the skin of our teeth because we had a great many reserves which could be called upon—I believe we would be in worse shape than we were in 1930, because we do not have reserves equivalent to those we had then and our budget responsibilities are greater in geometric proportion than at that time. Therefore, I cannot think of the University’s financial picture as being in relatively good shape until our reserves and budget are in like proportion to the 1930 reserves-budget situation.

THE 1960s AND 1970s

Exhausted from a decade of intense struggle, Lawrence Kimpton resigned in late March 1960. The board appointed a distinguished geneticist and recent Nobel Prize winner as president, George Beadle. Beadle came in with the intention to plan “a quiet but intensive campaign to raise substantial funds to meet current and future needs of the University.”

Just before he left the University’s service in 1957, George Watkins presented a series of recommendations to sustain the work of the development office past the campaign. He noted that the University had a long-standing problem with its alumni—having faced an “enormous backlog of inertia and ill will”—and that it was terribly important to

233. Committee on Budget, April 1, 1957, 10, ibid.; Minutes of the Board of Trustees, April 11, 1957, filed in box 79, folder 26, Harold Swift Papers. Concerning the Law School project, George Watkins later remembered that Lawrence Kimpton was “mighty upset about the proposal—and I was outraged—for I could see this seriously diverting support from the all-University goals…. Needless to say [the] other deans were furious—for they too had pet projects which they had set aside as campaign objectives to support the all-University campaign concept.” “Interview of Christopher Kimball with George H. Watkins,” August 25, 1987, 70, University of Chicago Oral History Program.


235. Swift to Kimpton, September 29, 1959, box 169, folder 4, ibid.

continue to sustain momentum. Watkins urged a permanent increase of
the budget of the alumni and development office by almost $400,000.237

Yet in the fall of 1961, two staffers in public relations, Carl W. Larsen
and Sheldon Garber, wrote a long memorandum criticizing current devel-
opment efforts and urged that the development office be abolished. Fund-
raising was to become part of the Office of the President, but the main
work was to be done in the individual units.238 Larsen and Garber totally
ignored Watkins’s work, as if the campaign of 1955–57 was centuries away.

Beadle approved this recommendation, and abolished the Office of
the Vice-President for Development in 1961, creating a more decentral-
ized system, “utilizing the efforts of the deans, department chairmen and
faculty members” under the direction of L. T. Coggeshall and an outside
consulting firm run by Charles R. Feldstein.239

Temporary confusion resulted, which ended when the University
decided to launch yet another major campaign in the mid-1960s. During
the transition from the Kimpton to the Beadle administrations, the Board
of Trustees under Glen Lloyd’s leadership determined that the University
needed $100 million in new resources for a new central library, additional
student housing, new science facilities, continued support for faculty
salaries, and scholarship and fellowship aid.240 Soon after Beadle took
office, Lloyd and he opened discussions with the officers of the Ford

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237. Watkins to the Officers attending Lakeside IV Conference, March 15,

238. Larsen and Garber, memorandum, October 27, 1961, box 25, folder 1, PP,

239. Coggeshall to the Deans, December 15, 1961, ibid.; Minutes of the Board
of Trustees, September 13, 1962, 190–91.

240. Minutes of the Board of Trustees, January 12, 1961, 5–6, 14–21.

Foundation for a large challenge grant that would serve as the centerpoint
of a new campaign.241 As was the case with the Rockefeller Boards in the
1920s and 1930s, Chicago had strong connections to the leadership of
Ford, since Clarence Faust and F. Champion Ward, both former deans
of the (Hutchins-era) College, held high administrative positions at the
foundation.

The lack of a challenge grant to launch the campaign slowed planning
in the early 1960s, and for a time the trustees considered the possibility
of a series of smaller, unit-based campaigns.242 Beadle continued to culti-
vate the Ford Foundation, visiting again in 1963. In the autumn of 1963,
the trustees decided to move forward with planning for a major cam-
paign, hiring Kersting, Brown & Company again as consultants and
launching a search for a new vice president for development, thus return-
ing the University to the professional format that George Watkins had
imagined some years earlier.243 The impetus for this decision was again
budgetary constraint, for Glen Lloyd informed the board in June 1963
that the University was “dangerously close to exhausting the funds”
needed to continue to improve the University, unless the Trustees were
willing to return to the practice of expending endowment funds (which
Lloyd now opposed), and that the only way forward was “to organize and
undertake a dramatic and huge development program in the amount of
$100 million to celebrate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the University
of Chicago.”244


244. Ibid., June 13, 1963, 108.
In February 1964, Richard F. O’Brien was appointed vice president for planning and development. In the fall of 1964, the Ford Foundation agreed to allow the University to submit a new application for a major challenge grant. The famous two-volume “Profile” was submitted in April 1965. In October 1965, the Ford Foundation approved a challenge grant of $25 million on the basis of a three-to-one match. This remarkable grant, which in 2004 dollars would be worth almost $150 million, became the core of the new campaign for Chicago, and was soon supplemented by a second Ford grant in April 1966 for an additional $8.5 million for international studies. Working with Levi, Beadle, and the trustees, O’Brien then orchestrated the first part of what became a two-part campaign over a ten-year period spanning the 1960s and 1970s.

The first part of the Campaign for Chicago, with a goal now set at $160 million, ran from 1966 to 1969. This drive was extremely successful in that it was the first campaign in the history of the University to meet its official target. The “golden” 1960s were buoyant, optimistic times, not unlike the 1920s, but the success of the campaign rested substantially on the good fortune of the University in obtaining two huge grants from the Ford Foundation (totaling $33.5 million), together with significant gifts from the Regenstein and Pritzker families. The most important single factor was the $25-million challenge grant offered by the Ford Foundation, which galvanized the campaign and gave impetus to the fund-raising staff to achieve their targets. Never before, not even in the 1920s, did the University of Chicago have such a powerful motive to encourage general philanthropy.

From the beginning of the campaign, the organizers manifested none of the defensiveness about relations to the city or to the alumni that was so apparent in the 1940–41 and 1954–57 campaigns. In this sense, Lawrence Kimpton and George Watkins had done their work extremely well, and the University was clearly moving in positive directions. Nor did the campaign feel compelled to hide Kimpton, for the official case statement in August 1965 acknowledged Kimpton along with Hutchins and declared that the decision to spend $29 million in the neighborhood revitalization program in the 1950s had been “an inspired, courageous act.” The statement outlined a vision for a still better and stronger University, with additional residential and athletics facilities for a larger College (the enrollment goal was now set at a more realistic four thousand undergraduate), more support for graduate students, and still more research luster for the institution.

The campaign of 1966–69 was also crucial in encouraging faculty morale, not only by building upon the achievements of the 1950s but going beyond them. When Provost Edward Levi asked the deans to comment on the initial impact of campaign in late 1966, most were able to come up with significant accomplishments that the campaign had made possible. Leon Jacobson of the Division of the Biological Sciences argued:

The decision to have a campaign for $160 million, the fact that Ford provided a matching grant of $25 million, and the initial success of the campaign—such as getting a donor for the library...
($10,000,000), one for the surgery building ($2,000,000) and other successes—all have provided the faculty with an enormous interest in upgrading the University of Chicago and a confidence that the funds necessary will somehow be provided. Regardless of how realistic is this belief that the money will be found for everyone’s need, the fact remains that the whole faculty has a new spirit; they believe in an impending renaissance in all parts of the University, which will again make it a model of Harper’s dream. This reawakened spirit in the faculty—more important than the availability of unlimited resources generated by the drive. I personally believe that this new spirit if nurtured can bring about a new and greater University even if all the money were not raised by the campaign. One can even die happy if despair is replaced by signs that some form of salvation is possible.248

The new Regenstein Library became the physical showpiece of the Campaign for Chicago, an extraordinary symbol of the ambition of the University to remain one of the leading universities of the world. Dean D. Gale Johnson observed:

The progress that has been made toward making a new graduate library for the social sciences and the humanities a reality has been a subtle but important factor in the enhanced morale of the faculty of the Division of the Social Sciences. This massive and imaginative solution to a major problem has done as much as any action could have done to convince the faculty that this University has both the will and the imagination to be one of the world’s outstanding universities.249

Alumni participation was robust. The final report on the campaign proudly argued that “the most spectacular gains, by far, were achieved by the alumni. The level of giving—including sizeable one-time gifts and campaign pledges as well as annual support for the Alumni Fund and the President’s Fund—nearly doubled year-to-year during the campaign. In 1968–69 the alumni gift total was nearly seven times what it had been in 1963–64.”250 But aside from the successful appeals to the Ford Foundation, foundation grants were disappointing, since the Ford Foundation contributed nearly 70 percent of all such gifts. More importantly, the University’s reliance on Ford to play a role similar to that of the Rockefeller Boards before 1940 could prove precarious if Ford support were to disappear (which it did in the 1970s). Special gifts were also a cause of concern at the beginning of the campaign, but improved substantially as time went on. O’Brien noted in 1965 that “more than 80 per cent of the $10.6 billion given to philanthropy last year came from individuals rather than from corporations or foundations. The University of Chicago does not have a good record of gifts from individuals when compared either with national results of all philanthropy in 1964 or with average results from other leading institutions during the past five years.”251 Yet, by 1969


the campaign had booked twenty-two gifts of $1 million or more and 119 gifts in the $100,000 to $900,000 range.

Phase II of the Campaign for Chicago was presented to Board of Trustees on April 27–28, 1973, with a goal of $280 million, and was launched on July 1, 1973, to run for three years. Unfortunately, it was pursued within a deeply troubled economy in recession, and came in the aftermath of the enormous disruptions and animosity caused by the sit-in of 1969. The latter events led to renewed concerns and in some cases bitterness on the part of younger alumni, creating a third nexus of disaffection among the alumni in the twentieth century. The campaign lacked an attractive, coherent focus, and it had pathetically few goals involving student life. Lacking strong administrative leadership, a huge challenge grant like that from Ford in the 1960s, and a compelling message, the campaign faltered. By 1977, Chauncy D. Harris, a senior faculty member who was forced to take temporary charge of development operations because of staff turnover, reported to the board that the “achievements, though great, are less than hoped for.” Among the problems encountered was that “the aspirations for some very large gifts have not been realized.” Also, there were “more changes in personnel than generally desirable.” By the end (June 1977, a year later than planned),

252. The University thus unwittingly exasperated elements of its alumni population almost on a cyclical basis: pre-1930 alumni during the Hutchins era; late 1940s and early 1950s alumni during the Kimpton era; and alumni of the late 1960s and early 1970s during the Beadle-Levi era.

253. The College was assigned goals of $3.5 million out of a total of $260 million, and student life only budgeted for $13.2 million. “Campaign for Chicago II. Presentation to the Board of Trustees,” April 27–28, 1973, box 4, PP, Addenda, 85–14.


the campaign raised $150 million, far short of its original goal. Only $27 million was raised for endowment, barely one-fifth of the original endowment target of $121 million, and most of that went to the Graduate School of Business and the Medical School.

Significant changes began under the leadership of President Hanna Holborn Gray. Among the many lessons to be learned from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s was the importance of a strong and stable professional development staff, enjoying the full personal support of decision-making authorities at the highest levels of the University. Such a staff would come together in the 1980s with the Gray administration. Vice President Jonathan Fanton led a systematic effort to formulate long-term strategies, including national benchmarking and campus-wide planning. More support staff were hired, and the development office’s structure rationalized and made part of the regular operations of the University.

Given the desultory results of the last general campaign from the 1970s, the trustees decided to launch several targeted campaigns focusing on the arts and sciences, law, and business, rather than a general campaign. The largest of these was the Campaign for the Arts and Sciences, which raised $150 million by 1988, with Law and Business each raising approximately $25 million. Fanton argued to the trustees on November 11, 1980:

“In considering how best to organize for the task ahead and after considerable discussion among officers and trustees, we have concluded that a single large campaign was not the right approach to take. A large goal runs the risk of being dismissed as unrealistic….

Unlike Phase I, no large gift could be secured from Ford, Lilly, or any other foundation.
Instead, several smaller, special purpose campaigns, no more than six at any one time, seems less formidable and more promising. In addition, the special purpose approach will appeal more directly to individual donors, some of whom are more likely to identify with a specific academic unit than with the University as a whole.”

At the end of the Gray administration significant progress had been made, resolving many of the internal structural challenges that George Watkins placed before the University in 1957. Still, when the University considered the prospects of the centennial campaign in 1991 on the basis of an outside report that examined Chicago’s fund-raising history and assets, the consultants found that alumni potential was limited and that the average gift given to Chicago lagged significantly behind those of our top peers. The trustees’ Campaign Steering Committee confirmed this finding. It reported that although the alumni held the University in the highest regard and a relatively high percentage of them contributed to it each year, the amounts they gave on average were low compared with some other leading private universities. In the face of this sober information the board was all the more cautious about setting ambitious targets. Hanna Gray was asked about these issues in the Council of the Senate in January 1987 and observed that “it is always more difficult for an institution which has only one-half as many undergraduates as graduates among its alumni and is also heavily oriented toward people who enter the academic and similar professions to develop the kind of alumni giving that characterizes [such] schools as Yale, Princeton, and Dartmouth. While our percentage of alumni donors is really quite good, it is a some what smaller percentage than is the case at those other institutions, and the average gift also tends to be smaller. It is not so much a matter of commitment to the school but rather the fact that the giving capacity of our alumni to a campaign for the arts and sciences is not as high by comparison with others.”

The positive improvements in development operations made by Gray served the University well, and made possible continued growth in philanthropy during the Sonnenschein administration throughout the 1990s. One crucial structural decision taken by President Hugo F. Sonnenschein and Provost Geoffrey R. Stone in 1995 was to empower the individual degree units and their deans to become much more active in fund-raising, urging them to set bold targets and to increase the work of alumni relations and development correspondingly on local levels. This decentralization of development and fund-raising was a powerful tool to advance the interests of the broader University, even as it has increased competition among units for donors and inevitably encouraged rival strategic approaches.

Since 2000 the national ambient culture for philanthropy has continued to grow in dramatic ways, and all major universities have become even more dependent on active fund-raising operations. Over the past eighteen years the University has launched two major capital campaigns, both of which were designed to begin to redress the deficiencies of the past but also to


256. Minutes of the Council of the University Senate, January 12, 1987, 299.
provide massive resources for new initiatives undertaken by the divisions, the schools, and the College. The first campaign, entitled the Chicago Initiative, was started in April 2002 and generated a total of $2.38 billion by its conclusion in June 2008. This campaign was framed as a pan-university effort, yet the controversy from the late 1990s surrounding the expansion of the College initially made the central development office uncertain how to position the role of the College in the context of the campaign. To put the matter bluntly, would the alumni support the “new” initiatives necessary to enrich the College’s programs in the face of the negative publicity that had been generated during the so-called “Core Wars” between 1998 to 2000? Indeed, the original version of this report was written in 2004 to clarify to alumni both the changes that had been made and the problems that had resulted from the University not establishing clear and attractive goals for undergraduate philanthropy and alumni relations. At that time, I also sought to highlight the fact that our past goals were insufficiently focused on objectives that the alumni could support passionately, whereas new programs focused on improving student financial support and student-life opportunities would, I believed, be extremely popular with the alumni.

The final results of the Chicago Initiative were impressive, compared to past campaigns: major facilities such as the Charles Harper Center, the Comer Children’s Hospital, the Joe and Rika Mansueto Library, the Reva and David Logan Center for the Arts, and the Gordon Center for Integrative Science were set in motion, as well as endowments for thirty-five new professorships and many substantial gifts for individual faculty research projects in all of the divisions and the schools. Finally, in 2007, a $100-million gift, then the largest gift to the University, established the Odyssey Scholarship Program in the College.

The 2002–08 campaign was followed by the still larger and extremely ambitious campaign that the University launched quietly in 2011 and publicly in 2014. The Inquiry and Impact campaign was organized on a wholly different scale, with major initiatives in the Booth School of Business, the College, and Medicine and the Biological Sciences. Among the many buildings that emerged have been the new Campus North Residential Commons and the Woodlawn Residential Commons, the new Francis and Rose Yuen Center in Hong Kong, the Rubenstein Forum, the Center for Care and Discovery, the Keller Center for the Harris School of Public Policy, the Saieh Hall for Economics, and new facilities for the Laboratory Schools. Other major gifts have included $125 million from Kenneth Griffin to endow the Department of Economics and many scholarship programs in the College and the Division of Social Sciences, and a $100 million gift to Medicine and Biological Sciences to create the Duchossois Family Institute. The campaign’s original target of $4.5 billion was raised to $5 billion in 2017. To date the campaign has raised $4.6 billion and engaged 124,460 alumni.

During the course of both campaigns the College has sought to support the many and varied activities of our faculty and students, but in both campaigns it placed special emphasis on strengthening student life and student resources. Three areas—scholarships, residential life, and career support—have been of particular note, and it is illuminating to consider them in some detail as practical case studies. As we will see, they involved broad policy decisions about the future priorities of the College, while also appealing directly to alumni to invest in students and student life as a way of strengthening the College and the University more generally.
SCHOLARSHIPS

he idea of scholarship support dates to the founding of the University of Chicago. William Rainey Harper was proud that he could provide a merit tuition scholarship to several high schools in the city and the region with whom the University had cooperative relationships for the highest-ranking graduating senior. Initially, funds for such grants came from unrestricted University income, but over time the University sought to raise endowed funds, one of the earliest of which was an endowment established by Harold Swift as a young alumni leader in 1916. Swift contributed a scholarship for an undergraduate student studying either history or English, and hoped that his gift would be used as an example to encourage other alumni donations. Over time he provided other scholarships, such as one in 1924 to enable women to attend medical school. But it was also telling of the fledgling and disorganized status of such philanthropy that one of Swift’s associates would contact a prospective donor in 1924 and suggest that, instead of scholarships, he might be interested in other gift opportunities, and that this too was fine with Swift and the board.257

The University thus offered scholarship assistance to undergraduates from the very beginning of its history, but in very modest amounts and almost always on a competitive merit basis. Scholarships were offered on the basis of evaluations of achievement within specific fields (prize or competition scholarships) and on the basis of a student’s academic record in high school or at the College (honor scholarships). In addition, about ninety partial tuition grants were available to students from the La Verne Noyes Foundation for veterans of the armed forces during World War I or for their descendants.

In 1930, the University awarded scholarship aid to 167 freshmen (19 percent of all new matriculants) and to 517 upper-class undergraduates (14 percent of all full-time upperclassmen).258 Many of the freshmen awards covered full tuition, but a large majority of the upper-class scholarships covered only partial tuition. Even students with aid encountered increasing financial pressures after their first year. Many students therefore had to earn part or all of their tuition and living expenses by working. Based on a survey of 2,065 College students in 1920, Harold Lasswell and Theodore Soares estimated that 42.5 percent of male undergraduate students and 31 percent of female undergraduates worked part- or full-time jobs.259 A team led by H. A. Millis surveyed 1,786 undergraduates in early 1924 and came to roughly similar conclusions: 36.6 percent of the students carrying a full load of four courses per quarter had gainful employment, while 46.7 percent of those taking two courses per quarter had outside jobs.260 In addition, almost one-third of those polled reported that they were living under stress because of the pressures of combining their studies with work. Reeves and Russell also found in 1930 that a

257. Harding to Kindred, January 24, 1924, box 140, folder 16, Harold Swift Papers.


260. H. A. Millis et al., Report of the Faculty-Student Committee on the Distribution of Students’ Time, January 1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1925), 84. Millis also found that the fact of being a commuter was directly related to the course load that a student could carry. Students carrying a two- or three-course load (per quarter) were much more likely to be commuters than students carrying a four-course load (p. 24).
very large number of students with full or partial scholarship assistance (who were a distinct minority of the total Chicago college population) had to work part time. Since many scholarship winners came from outside the Chicago area, they often experienced higher living costs than local students.\textsuperscript{261} The onset of the Depression further complicated the situation. In 1939, over 56 percent of undergraduate men and 30 percent of undergraduate women reported that they expected to be either fully or partially self-supporting during their tenure at Chicago. Equally important, 54 percent of the men and 18 percent of the women reported that they had contributed to their own support while in high school. It therefore appears that a large number of undergraduates in the early twentieth century navigated their studies with significant need that could not be met by any coordinated plan of scholarships at the College.

A key feature of our early scholarship program after 1918 was a limited number of Junior College Honor Scholarships worth $600 a year and offered to entrants to the College from high schools. Funding for the awards came from an anonymous donor, who specified that for the male students the emphasis was on selecting “young men who will become real leaders.” In 1931 the University awarded thirty-five such scholarships based solely on academic merit in high school and prospective campus leadership, without regard to need, selected from 250 applications that were read by a faculty-alumni committee.\textsuperscript{262} In addition to an application, candidates had to sit for a competitive prize exam, which was administered in the Midwest in Atlanta, Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Moline, Raleigh, South Bend, and Tulsa. They were good for two years, assuming adequate academic progress. By 1939 the emphasis on leadership was even more pronounced, and in addition to being in the top third of their high school class, recipients “must give evidence of having participated in several different major activities. Preferential consideration is given to those candidates who have held offices, have served as captains on athletic terms or have distinguished themselves by gaining public recognition through their activities.”\textsuperscript{263}

In addition, the University had a number of named awards, such as the Chicago Alumnae Club Scholarship, the Charles R. Henderson Scholarship, and the Louise Roth Scholarship. Most grants were only for one or at most two years, and in 1935 George Works complained that “relatively we offer more inducement at the beginning of the work than we are able to carry out in the later years.”\textsuperscript{264} Most of the scholarships were awarded by a small committee charged by the president, but others seem to have been allocated based on personal interest of a specific donor in the situation of a specific applicant. In some cases University officials responded to direct pleas from alumni, as was the case in a grant for a student named Joseph O’Mara in 1928, who enjoyed the patronage of

\textsuperscript{261} Reeves and Russell, \textit{Some University Student Problems}, 65–68. Using representative samples, John Kennan found in 1933 that 61 percent of entering freshmen on scholarship aid were commuters, whereas 75 percent of non-scholarship students were commuters, presumably living at home. John C. Kennan, “A Comparison of the Two-Year Honor Scholars Winners with a Non-Scholarship Group in Respect to Finances, Study, Recreation, and Sleep,” February 1933, College Archives.

\textsuperscript{262} “The Committee on Scholarships in the College, May 11, 1931,” box 84, folder 9, Hutchins Administration.

\textsuperscript{263} Brumbaugh to Filbey, March 3, 1939, box 141, folder 1, Harold Swift Papers.

\textsuperscript{264} George A. Works to James Stifler, May 8, 1935, box 190, folder 11, Hutchins Administration.
Illinois alumnus H. L. Mefford. Mefford secured a concession from David Stevens, the assistant to the president, that O’Mara would get some supplemental assistance ($50 a quarter) beyond a mere tuition grant. In the case just cited Stevens admitted, however, that “we have a great many undergraduates and graduates who must choose between extra outside employment and a reduction in their program.”

In 1934 Harold Swift and others presented Hutchins with the idea of an endowed scholarship campaign. Unfortunately, the idea was not successfully implemented and only about $23,000 was raised. Still, the Swift family continued to prove extraordinarily generous in creating a nucleus of funds to support the Swift Scholarship Program. By 1932–33 the University had assembled annual scholarship resources totaling $442,726. While this seems very modest today, it ranked quite well with the efforts of other top universities at the time: Harvard at $575,827, Yale at $571,911, Columbia at $427,172, Princeton at $235,022, and Cornell at $201,422. When one considers that our scholarship endowments today are significantly smaller than most of our peers—in contrast to many of our fellow research universities, who have resources to cover between 65 percent and 85 percent of all grant costs, we only cover about 35 percent of scholarship costs from existing endowments—we might well ask: what happened in the decades after 1940 such that Chicago’s resources did not keep pace? This question is, of course, part of the larger story of the comparative history of the size of the University’s general endowment that I mentioned earlier in this report.

After World War II, the University strove to offer grant support in a more centralized way, based on appeals at the time of application and not on regional testing practices. A document from the 1960s for parents and students states that “the financial assistance program of the College has one primary objective: no truly qualified student should fail to enter the College or be forced to leave it because of financial need. While the college cannot literally meet this goal at all times and in every instance, its financial assistance program does work from the general policy that all students worthy of admission to the college are worthy of financial assistance if they have need.”

The framework here was not fully funded support—rather a defined sum was available to distribute each year, and when it was exhausted, nothing more was possible. In part this was because the University designated scholarships as “grant” aid and was not completely transparent about the conditions under which a student might obtain such aid. The primary basis of aid was academic merit, and students deemed more meritorious would receive more grant aid. Financial need was also taken into account, but only after judgments about relative academic merit. Students were also expected to engage in summer and term-time work to generate about 15 percent of the total costs of attendance and were permitted to take out loans up to the cost of full tuition. The University continued to experiment with various small initiatives, such as the Trustee Scholar program, which allocated thirteen scholarships annually to “individual schools and school systems that have over the years had continuing good relations with the University.”

265. Stevens to Mefford, August 8, 1928, box 140, folder 16, Harold Swift Papers.
266. Swift to Herman A. Spoehr, December 23, 1933, box 140, folder 18, ibid.
267. “A Memorandum to Students and Parents from the Committee on College Aid, Chicago, 1966,” College Archive.
268. Margaret E. Perry to Wayne C. Booth, June 16, 1966, College Archive.
to help individual students but also to increase the notoriety and fame of the University among individual high schools—was that the program never really developed a national reputation and a national constituency, all the more because once the awardees arrived on campus, the University did not attempt to honor the recipients in any systematic way. Once the University embarked on its early entrants program in the 1950s, the idea of competitive in situ scholarships awarded to graduating high school seniors became less logical and compelling and was gradually discontinued.

The shortage of aid was also apparent on the graduate level, given that Chicago had to rely on graduate students paying significant levels of tuition throughout the second half of the twentieth century. In both cases the University strove to be as generous as its resources permitted, but it is fair to argue that the highest budgetary priority for the administrations after 1950 was to protect the competitive salary structures for the regular faculty and especially for the tenured associate and full professors.

Over the next forty years additional financial grant support was added to the budget, especially to cope with the impact of dramatic increases in tuition that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. Chicago had traditionally set its undergraduate tuition lower than its peers, but during the 1980s the University sought to close the gap with our peers, beginning with a tuition increase of almost 18 percent.²⁶⁹ Between 1975 and 1990 the University adopted the need-based aid system that other universities were also embracing, and scholarship support became a more central element in formal procedures for financial aid. Gradually, the University began to use need as the primary criterion for the award of scholarships, although it did retain a small category of full-tuition grants based only on competitive merit. This new system was especially important in the context of the tuition increases of the 1980s and the slowdown in the growth of annual family income since the late 1970s, which made both parents and students much more sensitive to tuition costs.

In recent times the Chicago Initiative of 2002 launched fund-raising initiatives to respond to the rising need for financial aid. Early results were modest, raising $4 million in 2002, but through concerted efforts the campaign increased annual scholarship fund-raising to $12 million by 2007, with a total of 3,069 gifts for financial aid. The conditions and opportunities that we faced in raising funds for scholarships changed fundamentally in 2007 with an impressive gift from an anonymous donor, nicknamed “Homer,” to create the Odyssey Scholarship Program. This gift of $100 million was designed to eliminate all loan and work expectations for high-need students, but over time it enabled the College to expand support dramatically for all of its scholarship goals. Homer also enabled us to create the Chicago Academic Achievement Program to support high-need students with special mentoring resources before they enroll in the College, and other substantial gifts have made this program stunningly successful.

Yet the most transformative feature of Odyssey was not its purpose but its vast public impact. Using a creative marketing program to interest alumni in the idea (Fig. 6), Odyssey generated support from our alumni that was unparalleled in size and scope. To date over 13,500 alumni and parents have contributed to the Odyssey Scholarship Program. Many donors have contributed multiple gifts, and especially noteworthy has been the fact that the campaign has raised more than 18,000 gifts of less than $1,000, combining to provide millions of dollars of new scholarship funds. College Reunion Classes have adopted the program and mounted mini-campaigns among their fellow class members, often competing to

attain the highest level of support. From an annual average of $9 million in scholarship contributions between 2002 and 2008, we have been averaging almost $50 million annually ten years later (Fig. 7 and 8). In addition, the program has been the recipient of several additional principal-level gifts, including a gift of $50 million from Michael Moritz and Harriet Heyman, AM’72, that made it possible to enrich the program still further by adding guaranteed internships in the first two summers of an Odyssey student’s tenure in the College.

RESIDENTIAL LIFE

A second major programmatic domain of the College’s philanthropic strategy has focused on resources for campus residential life, and here too a remarkable transformation has come about in the last two decades because of the engagement of College alumni and parents.

From the very beginning of its history the University struggled to come to terms with the need for a comprehensive strategy and for systematic renewal of resources for residential life. Harper and his colleagues constructed very few dorms. The early residence halls, and several smaller off-campus buildings, offered accommodation to about six hundred students, the majority of them graduate or professional school students. An increasingly large number of undergraduate men resided in fraternity houses, which began to be organized in the mid-1890s. Given the predominance of Chicago-based students at the College and the absence of

270. In 1928, approximately 39 percent of the available rooms were occupied by undergraduates and 61 percent were assigned to graduate and professional students. See “Student Housing—Autumn Quarter 1928,” box 8, folder 3, Mason Administration.
Figure 7. College Financial Aid Fund-raising: Campaign Comparison Summary

The inquiry and Impact campaign raised over $236 million for College financial aid, an increase of $14 million compared to the Chicago Initiative campaign. Homer’s $100 million gift in 2007 was a significant portion of the funds raised in the Chicago Initiative.

Since Homer’s matching gift in 2007, total undergraduate alumni and other donor gifts grew significantly from 3,000 to over 26,000. Over 86 percent of the donor gifts in the inquiry and Impact campaign were from undergraduate alumni, up from 56 percent in the Chicago Initiative.

Dollars are defined as Fund-raising Progress (FRP), the value of new financial commitments in the form of gifts made to the University within a specified period of time. Development typically counts FRP for fiscal years.

Figure 8. College Financial Aid Fundraising: Total Gifts by Donation Level

The inquiry and impact campaign raised over $236 million for College financial aid, an increase of $14 million compared to the $382 million raised in the Chicago Initiative campaign. The distribution of all individual donor’s gifts for each campaign is shown here.

While the number of total campaign donor gifts has significantly grown from 3,000 to over 26,000, the largest growth has been in gifts of less than $1,000. About 23,000 donor gifts, 87 percent, in the recent Inquiry and impact campaign were gifts of less than $1,000.

Dollars are defined as Fund-raising Progress (FRP), the value of new financial commitments in the form of gifts made to the University within a specified period of time. Development typically counts FRP for fiscal years.
attractive (and affordable) on-campus alternatives, for many decades a large number of undergraduate students lived at home or in rooming houses in the neighborhood. For example, over 50 percent of our undergraduates lived at home with their parents or other relatives in 1910.\textsuperscript{271} Thus, from the beginning of our history, most of our undergraduate students were not accommodated in campus housing. Too many other needs loomed on the horizon, and the University managed to build only a few residential halls, which had to be shared among the graduate, undergraduate, and professional school students. Demand for suitable campus housing outpaced resources, and almost no one was happy with this situation. In the face of burgeoning student enrollments after World War I, complaints about high rents and ill-kept housing conditions became increasingly common from students who did not live at home.

In the early 1920s President Ernest DeWitt Burton had articulated a major plan to improve this situation by developing the area south of the Midway into a separate campus for a college of three thousand students, consisting of both residential facilities and offices and classrooms to be laid out in a series of quadrangles. As Burton put it in May 1923: “I am thinking of a time when on our quadrangles there will be a group of colleges, perhaps eight or ten or twelve, each with its own buildings, each with its own distinctive character, but all with this common characteristic that each will afford opportunity for closer contact of student

with student, and of student with teacher than is possible in a college of three thousand students ungrouped except in classes that are organized for three months and then reorganized.” Burton then added that “it will not be a medieval Oxford; modern Oxford has moved far beyond that.”\textsuperscript{272} Such a new residential structure would enforce and solidify the educational mission of the College, which Burton took to be both broadly cultural as well as narrowly intellectual. He insisted that “life is more than lore, that character is more than facts; that college life is the period of the formation of habits, even more than of the acquisition of knowledge, and that the making of men and women with habits and character that will insure their being in after life men and women of power, achievement, and helpful influence in the world, is the great task of the college.” Burton further argued that the new residence buildings “should not be mere dormitories, but places of humane educational residence. They should provide opportunity on one hand for personal contacts, under the most favorable conditions, with older persons and fellow-students, and for the silent influences of good books and art…. All should be planned with a view to uniting, as far as possible, the two lines of influence which in our American colleges have been unfortunately separated in large measure as numbers have increased, namely, intellectual

\textsuperscript{271} A small number of Chicago-based students—varying between 10 and 25 percent—lived in the University dorms. Their habit of going home on weekends led to a request from the heads of the women’s houses in 1920 that priority be given to students who “signify their intention of not absenting themselves frequently.” Letter to Judson, January 3, 1920, box 41, folder 8, HJB Administrations.

\textsuperscript{272} “An Address Delivered by Acting President Ernest DeWitt Burton before the Chicago Alumni Club, May 31, 1923,” 13, box 5, folder 3, University Development Campaigns. In July 1923, Burton repeated the Oxford motif in a letter to Wilfred C. Kierstead: “The colleges so organized on the basis of the interests of the students would be made more after the fashion of the Oxford colleges…. What I feel to be in any case desirable is the creation of smaller groups, say three hundred at the outside, of students whose relation to one another are closer than is possible in a body of three thousand students.” Letter of July 3, 1923, box 34, folder 10, HJB Administrations.
activity on the one hand and friendly contact with persons on the other.273

This plan met with stiff resistance on the part of senior faculty in the later 1920s who opposed any investments in the College, and the Great Depression ended any chance for Burton’s plan becoming reality. After World War II the University embarked on a “neighborhood strategy,” acquiring older properties and converting them to dorms. Instead of relaunching a coordinated plan to build new campus housing, the University continued to acquire and convert older properties in the neighborhood for student housing—in part because financial circumstances made unfeasible a systematic investment in new residence halls of the scale that Burton imagined, in part because of the perceived need to stabilize our environs—which essentially meant that we were using undergraduates to help protect the neighborhood. In fact, this “neighborhood strategy” was less a consistent strategy than a series of ad hoc attempts to stay ahead of student demand by incrementally purchasing old buildings that had fallen upon hard times and converting them to student use.274 Often the pressure to buy and convert these old buildings came from the same colleagues who were also advocating new housing, as an expression of their supreme frustrations at the lack of plausible short-term alternatives.275

Voices were heard in opposition to these developments. In the 1960s then Dean of the College Alan Simpson was harshly critical of the laissez-faire attitudes of the past, especially of the “sprawling apartment culture, in which students swam in isolated little schools, or sank as the case might be. The result was a highly atomized social life, with characteristic virtues and vices; a forcing house for individualism and for enterprising coteries, but also a source of casualties, wasted opportunities, and squalor. Though small, the College was often thought to be impersonal, and the drop-out [rate] was heavy.”276 Simpson urged the University to “commit ourselves market to purchase several properties that were not receiving adequate care and management and were therefore beginning to create concern among neighbors in the community as they began to deteriorate. One of the properties purchased, the Shoreland Hotel, soon filled an urgent need for additional student housing.”

273. Ernest DeWitt Burton, The University of Chicago in 1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1925), 30. See also Burton’s notes for speeches in the Reynolds Club on April 5, 1923, and at the Chicago-Denison dinner on March 16, 1923, stressing the importance that colleges should play in the formation of character and personality in their students. Box 82, Ernest DeWitt Burton Papers.

274. The idea of using rooms in the former Shoreland Hotel seems to have first emerged in 1966, having been recommended by the University’s manager of commercial real estate, Winston Kennedy. See “Minutes of the Administrative Campus Facilities Planning Committee,” May 24, 1966, box 16, folder 5, Walter J. Blum Papers. The purchase of the Broadview Hotel was also discussed at this meeting. A subsequent survey of planning at the University explicitly connected the neighborhood stabilization strategy with the logic of College residential needs: “The University had stepped into the Hyde Park real estate

275. This was clearly the case presented by Dean of Students Warner Wick. In February 1966, he wrote to James Ritterskamp, the vice president for administration, to urge that the University buy the Eleanor Club “in time for Autumn 1966.” Wick confessed that “we will need to rely on makeshift housing for a good many years to come, with little chance of any new construction being ready before 1968. The Eleanor Club is an ideal ‘permanent makeshift’, especially for women, where our need for decent space is most acute.” In the same memo, Wick also told Ritterskamp that he would not allow first-year students “to be assigned to the former George Williams College building as Winston Kennedy has proposed,” since Wick insisted that the latter building, located as it was near 53rd Street, could not be regarded as an “on-campus” University dorm. Wick to Ritterskamp, February 8, 1966, box 16, folder 5, Walter J. Blum Papers.

276. Simpson to Vice President L. T. Coggeshall, January 8, 1962, College Archive.
to the principle of a residential college both for its own sake and for the
security it offers in our urban situation.” Unfortunately little was done
in any fundamental way to respond to Simpson’s concerns.

During the searching discussions in the 1980s about a possible growth
trajectory for the College, the lack of decent and suitable housing was
often discussed, and it was noted that any expansion beyond about 3,400
students would require major new investments in residential life. At the
same time a series of faculty committees stressed the importance of build-
ing high-quality, on-campus housing for our students.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, as the University planned a significant
increase in the demographic size of the College, the leaders of the College
took up and intensified the all-too justified refrains of the critics of the
past, namely, that the existing housing system was wholly inadequate,
indeed embarrassing and not worthy of a great university college. Ram-
shackle old buildings strung together with a few poorly designed and
badly constructed new buildings (Pierce Tower, 1960) did not create
the kind of vibrant, community-enriching system that President
Ernest Burton argued as early as 1925 the University of Chicago needed
to create. They believed that a more strongly residential campus would
be a significant asset for the University because it would encourage deeper
and more supportive cultural and intellectual communities among our
students; because it would reinforce the excellent educational work of the
faculty, but do so in more informal settings outside of the classroom; and
because, in the long run, it would encourage still greater satisfaction
among our alumni based on their positive experiences when they were at
the University. This meant that it would be a serious mistake to continue

the piecemeal decisions of the past. Instead, we needed a coherent vision
of high-quality collegiate housing located on our campus.

Such a policy had several consequences. First, we needed to sell or
otherwise dispose of most of the existing older structures (with the excep-
tion of Burton-Judson and Snell-Hitchcock) and to construct three or
four new residence complexes on our campus with a total capacity of
approximately three thousand new beds. These halls had to be of high-
quality construction, worthy of joining the other classic buildings that
enhance the beauty of our campus. Second, this strategy meant that it
was critical that we not return to our former practice of buying old build-
ings in the neighborhood. The system of disbursed housing using old
buildings was developed helter-skelter, showing no logic other than the
fact that it reflected the routes of through streets that accommodated the
large, ugly buses that plagued our neighborhood.

The breakthrough came in 1998 with a decision by the trustees to
build a major new residential complex around Regenstein Library that
opened in 2001. This new residential commons was followed in 2008 by
a second large complex on the south campus, adjoining the Law School
and Burton-Judson Courts, and by a third complex in 2016 replacing the
old Pierce Tower on the north campus. The latter cluster of buildings,
designed by Jeanne Gang, not only proved to be stunningly beautiful in
and of itself, but enabled the creation of a new quadrangle framed by the
Henry Crown Field House, the Smart Museum of Art, the Department
of Art History, and the Campus North Residential Commons, along with
new French-style birch-tree gardens and seating areas. Via the generosity
of the Crown family, new windows and façade lighting were installed in
the field house, restoring that venerable building to the quiet dignity that
it enjoyed when it first opened.

Additionally, International House, which was struggling to maintain

277. Alan Simpson, “Speech to the Visiting Committee of the College, September
graduate enrollments and was under severe financial constraints, was converted into a fourth major College residential facility with three houses, along with tens of millions of dollars of needed mechanical and structural upgrades. Most recently, the University has broken ground on a fifth new residential complex, Woodlawn Commons, on 61st and Woodlawn, which will house an additional 1,200 students beginning in June 2020.

Essentially, all of this activity over the last twenty years has allowed the University to recapitalize its undergraduate residential system, creating state-of-the-art facilities that have transformed student life and thus achieved the vision that Ernest Burton first articulated in 1925. The scale of these investments has been massive and unprecedented in the Ivy Plus universities, and they have been a key goal of our philanthropic efforts. As with Odyssey, the alumni have stepped up to the challenge: Max Palevsky (Class of 1948) provided $20 million to name the Regenstein complex, while a bequest of $44 million from Renee Granville-Grossman (Class of 1963) named the new south campus facility. In addition, alumni families have named and endowed almost all of the individual houses in these complexes. More than twenty gifts of $1 million or more have been generated for this purpose, while many dozens of gifts at smaller levels have arrived to designate and support individual rooms, suites, common areas, and study spaces. Substantial principal-level gifts from Arley D. Cathey (Class of 1950) and Frank Baker (Class of 1994) and his wife, Laura Day, named the dining facilities of Granville-Grossman and Campus North, respectively. Through gifts of this kind, our alumni have mobilized to literally rebuild the living and learning environment for current students, renewing our physical campus in ways that can be seen in the map of buildings that are either new or under construction (see Fig. 9).
Student career support was an afterthought at the College until the late 1990s. If one raises this issue with alumni from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, one hears humorous stories about a small office in the Reynolds Club, staffed by one person who had a Rolodex and a shoe box filled with file cards about possible internships and postgraduate employment opportunities. Surveys of the alumni from the 1990s highlighted the perceived indifference of the College toward their professional aspirations. In the late 1990s, owing to the intervention and advice of the College Visiting Committee, a senior advisory group of alumni to the dean, the College launched a series of initiatives to create a comprehensive professional advising and support program to assist students in career planning.

As in the domains of scholarships and residential life, the alumni and parents have proven themselves extraordinarily supportive of the new career advisory programs. The Jeff Metcalf Internship Program launched in 1998 with ten internships has grown to over 2,500 paid summer internships in 2018 and has generated a huge wave of philanthropic interest among thousands of our alumni and parents, not only in direct contributions, but in the provision of actual internships themselves. (Fig. 10) Contributions to the Jeff Metcalf Internship Program amounted to approximately $1 million in 2004, but the program by 2017 had generated over $26 million in endowed and cash gifts, based on a massive increase in gifts of all sizes, from both alumni and parents. In addition, several of the College’s new career support and advisory programs have merited major individual philanthropic gifts, notably Byron Trott (Class of 1981) for the business program, Barbara Fried (Class of 1957) for the
program in public and social service, Charles A. Lewis and Penny Sebring for the program in education professions, and Mike Klingensmith (Class of 1975) for the program in media, arts, and journalism. Gifts for the College’s career programs in general in the current campaign now total over $58 million.

CONCLUSION

In all of the three case studies, the substantial improvements in the resources available to help students have been made possibly by a wave of philanthropic support. New policies and opportunities have excited and inspired our alumni, and those alumni have in turn mobilized to help the University sustain these new programmatic investments. But the story would not be complete without a larger, framing argument, namely, that the visibility of these programs and initiatives has also inspired alumni, parents, and friends to give at much higher levels to the University across the board, thus improving gift levels for faculty research support, for new graduate initiatives, and for capital construction projects that were vital and necessary but that have nothing to do with undergraduate education and undergraduate life. The climate for University fund-raising has improved vastly not only because of the transformation of the College, but because of the excitement that this transformation has generated for the reputation of the University more generally.

Research universities like Chicago are national institutions with international reach and reputation. Recent rankings (2018) of five hundred universities in the world placed Chicago ninth in the world. The highest ranked continental European university was the Swiss Technical Institute in Zurich at ten, but the fabled German universities, whence we developed our original model, fared surprisingly poorly, with the highest ranking going to the University of Munich at thirty-four, the Technical University in Munich at forty-one, and Heidelberg at forty-five.278

Universities like Chicago are also local institutions. They owe much of their identity to the places in which they live. Our University is profoundly local in two ways. First, it owes much of its culture to the great metropolis of which it is a part. Chicago has often been called the most American of cities, which bespeaks the resilient diversity of its people, its respect for candor and ambition, its pragmatism in confronting hard choices, its sturdy optimism, and its disdain for mediocrity. The University shares these values, and in full measure. But we are also local in that we are a trans-generational community of past, present, and future members, each of whom lives and works with us in this magnificent city and each of whom, over the generations, nurtures memories of our community and helps to weave our collective identity into the University’s history.

Chicago faced special challenges not shared by many of our private peers. We began with a huge endowment from John D. Rockefeller and even larger support from his charitable boards, support that came without cultural, political, or ideological strings. Those gifts enabled the University to seize center stage in the early twentieth century as a uniquely independent, faculty-dominated university. The special faculty culture at Chicago—confidently autonomous, impatient with external regulation, committed to the highest scholarly and educational excellence, and ardently protective of the ideals of academic freedom—was deeply related to the style and the plenitude of aristocratic beneficence that the early

University enjoyed. But that munificent support also encouraged the institution to live in a highly independent way, without serious regard for the external constituencies on whom it would eventually have to depend, most notably our alumni and on local civic elites in the Chicago area. Moreover, before 1950 our very large endowment enabled us to pursue bold new ventures even in times of financial distress, at the risk of cutting into the fat and eventually the bone (i.e., spending funds designated as endowment), to use Harold Swift’s homespun term, rather than raising new money to cover new expenses.

We then endured two crucial blows. First, the unanticipated collapse of College enrollments in the early 1950s put us on a demographic trajectory that was extremely disadvantageous and even dangerous compared to our peer institutions, with the College falling to less than 1,400 students by the mid-1950s. Second, the simultaneous crisis of the South Side made it urgent that the University divert significant financial resources into stabilizing the neighborhood. Those resources, in another time and place, could also have gone into rebuilding our endowment.

The 1960s were times of optimism, and the campaign of 1966–69 was quite successful, owing to a one-time gift of $25 million from the Ford Foundation. But the golden 1960s were followed by the bleak 1970s, a time of further retrenchment, caution, and apprehension.

Since the 1980s, the University has significantly improved both its budgetary planning and its development operations. Perhaps the greatest structural change since 1980 has been the creation of an effective development office, now staffed by over four hundred dedicated professionals who, over the last forty years, have provided an enormous service to the University. In recent years, we have also set in place more dynamic programs of alumni relations, career counseling, and career placement. And our attitudes have changed in subtle, but significant, ways about how we work with our students. Not only have we added three thousand new students to the College since 1992—making our demographic portrait more closely aligned to those of our top private peers—but we understand that our undergraduates are full members of our community and that they deserve our support to develop all of their creative potential.

The cumulative result of these transformations has been to return Chicago to a trajectory of fiscal strength and fund-raising effectiveness. But we continue to face long-term structural challenges. As noted above, the endowments of our peers now substantially exceed our own, as a result (in part) of the structural and policy problems identified in this report: the small size of the undergraduate alumni body, reflecting the long-term impact of the enrollment crisis of the 1950s; the occupational distribution of our alumni (we still tend to have an over-proportional share of our total alumni population in the teaching professions); earlier incursions into the endowment to cover deficits, which reduced our growth base; and the heritage of episodic engagement, followed by disengagement, with the alumni and with the civic elites of the city of Chicago that marked the decades before 1980. In recent years, the University’s fund-raising income has grown at a positive and healthy rate in absolute terms, but it has grown on top of an endowment base considerably smaller than the average of our top peers. A chronic problem faced by the University leaders between the 1950s and 1980s was the need to withdraw cash from the endowment to cover budget deficits. Viewed over the longue durée of the University’s financial history, tight budgets have been characteristic of the University’s fiscal experience for much of the twentieth century after 1920. This was not because of waste or unworthy initiatives. Rather, our predecessors sought to constitute one of the three or four most distinguished research and teaching universities in the nation, if not the world. The endless pressure of high ambition constantly challenged the
resources of the institution. In effect, the University has always been underfunded, measured by its own ambitions. President Edward H. Levi observed in 1970 that “ours is a proud University, given to ambition beyond belief.” Yet ambition is not a free good, for it must be funded and thus sustained over time.

We are now engaged in the most ambitious fund-raising effort the University has ever attempted—to raise $5 billion by the end of 2019. Why should alumni and friends support this effort? I suggest three answers.

The first reason is that the future welfare of the University hinges upon it. The University of Chicago is a community devoted to learning and to scientific discovery as a way of life. It is a community that believes that knowledge is of fundamental value in guiding human action, and it sees the discovery of new knowledge as a compelling social necessity. To support the practical work of our community, we need an endowment that is appropriate to the mission and responsibilities of the University. For some of the reasons explained in this report, our endowment has failed to keep pace with those needs and responsibilities. Over $3 billion of the current $5 billion campaign will be dedicated toward increasing our endowment. The balance will underwrite essential building projects, instructional and faculty research programs, and current programs to support and enrich student life in the College, the divisions, and the schools.

The second reason is that we are Chicago’s university. Those civic leaders who care about the future of the city should care about the future of the University. As Robert Hughes so eloquently argued eighty years ago, the University is a part of the cultural fabric of the great midwestern metropolis. We bring prestige and honor to the city, and the city in turn provides us with a magnificent cultural and social milieu in which to educate our students and to undertake the discovery of new knowledge. We seek to encourage more opportunities for our students and our faculty to learn from the city and to help individuals and groups within the city. The campaign will support these partnerships, and we in turn hope that the city and its people will support their university.

A final reason is that the future welfare of the College is deeply implicated in the success of the University of Chicago. The College lies at the heart of the University. With 6,600 students the College is now the largest unit in the University and the one charged with the education of our youngest students. American research universities in the twenty-first century will be judged above all by how well they educate their undergraduate students. We have a long tradition of excellence and rigor in academic learning, but until recently we also had a checkered history in providing support mechanisms and learning opportunities beyond the classroom. In the past the College also had little capacity to support vital domains of student life. All of this has changed since 1990, and it has changed profoundly. Just as the College has initiated new programs to support and strengthen our faculty’s teaching in general education, it has also developed new international initiatives to enable our students to become leaders in a transnational world. The College has supported new programs in music, drama, creative writing, dance, and the visual arts to encourage the remarkable creativity of our students; we have launched a series of remarkable international programs in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, taught by our own faculty, to enable our students to study other cultures and civilizations; we have strongly advocated new residential-life projects to promote a more supportive and nurturing community for our students; and we have established a host of new mentoring and internship programs to help our students launch

their professional careers. The campaign has helped to buttress these new programs and to guarantee their future efficacy.

Many of the tensions that afflicted the Hutchins era involved fundamentally differing views about how to best educate young adults to serve as leaders in American society. In recent decades, we have tried to sustain the intellectual rigor and discipline that characterized Hutchins’s cultural revolution. But we have also sought to broaden our understanding of the work of the College to include new support for student-life programs; new encouragement of personal and community development; new programs of internships and community service that bring our students into direct contact with the people of Chicago and the nation at large; and new opportunities for international and second-language education, such as the Foreign Language Acquisition Grants, the Paris and Hong Kong Centers, and our many new civilizational studies programs around the world.

Today, the College is filled with extraordinary students who want to be at Chicago and who want to live in Chicago, who appreciate the value of a rigorous, interdisciplinary liberal education, who view themselves as full members of our community, and who deserve the best teaching that our gifted faculty colleagues can offer. The College’s welfare is essential to the long-term welfare of the University.

We can sustain our special intellectual values and scholarly greatness while also building a vibrant community with our students and maintaining wide and sturdy bridges to our alumni. We can celebrate the University as an essential asset for the great city to which it so naturally belongs. We seek support to do all of these things, and to do them well.

Without the consistent and passionate support of our own members—our alumni—the University will not be able to sustain its greatness. The age of huge, unrestricted foundation grants is over. The time of discreet trips to the Rockefellers at 61 Broadway is long gone. The alumni are now the principal stewards of our community, and they will determine, more than any other single agent, our future fate. The University is a unique community worthy of support, and more than ever in our past we need that support for the educational work that we must do with the most talented younger people of this nation.

As always, I thank you for your devotion to the work of the College, and I wish you a stimulating and productive academic year.
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